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**IRAQ STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION:
U.S. POLICY AND PLANS**

**HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION**

MAY 22, 2003

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THURSDAY, MAY 22, 2003

**U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
*Washington, DC.***

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m. in room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Brownback, Enzi, Coleman, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Feingold, Bill Nelson, and Corzine.

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order. It is a great personal privilege to welcome today Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace. We have been looking forward to your testimony and to our discussion of the status of policies and plans for Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction. This is the first of several hearings over the next few weeks that our committee will hold on Iraq stabilization and reconstruction issues. These hearings are intended to help the committee perform its oversight function and to inform the American people, whose support is necessary for United States efforts in Iraq.

The United States military and coalition forces and the President and his team, including our witnesses today, deserve high praise for execution of a brilliant war plan that brought the combat phase of conflict in Iraq to a decisive and speedy conclusion. We mourn those who lost their lives in this conflict. We recognize the extraordinary care taken to prevent such loss.

In fact, the comprehensive planning that went into the military campaign that ousted Saddam Hussein's regime was evident in every aspect of the resounding military victory declared by President Bush on May 1. This military success, however, was only the first step in winning the war in Iraq. Victory is at risk unless we ensure that effective post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq succeed over the long term.

The measure of success in Iraq that matters most is what kind of country and institutions we leave behind. Iraq has some important ingredients for success, an educated population, a tradition of trade and industry, large reserves of oil to benefit its people. The achievement of stability and democracy in Iraq present an opportunity to catalyze change in the region that can greatly improve United States national security. Stabilizing and reconstructing Iraq

are key to success in this larger context of the Middle East region and in the global war on terrorism.

Given these stakes, the United States must make a long-term commitment to achieving our objectives in Iraq. A sustained American commitment would heavily influence the political dynamics of the region and reinforce the credibility of United States diplomacy around the world. I am concerned that the administration's initial stabilization and reconstruction efforts have been inadequate. The planning for peace was much less developed than the planning for war. Moreover, the administration has not sufficiently involved Congress and the American people in its plans regarding the costs, the methods, and goals of reconstruction Iraq.

Congress has already voted \$2.5 billion toward the rebuilding effort in Iraq, but we have heard estimates before this committee that the final bill may be over \$100 billion. Now, I believe the process could take at least 5 years. There is little understanding of the administration's short-and mid-term plans and priorities to address increasingly urgent issues such as providing food, water, electricity, and fuel. The United States and coalition forces are struggling to create a secure environment to allow civil engineers and humanitarian assistance workers to do their jobs, but there seem to be insufficient military and police forces to establish this security. Given these circumstances, talk of a reduction in forces by year's end is premature. To restore law and order, we may need to put more soldiers and marines into Iraq, rather than draw them down.

There also is uncertainty about the long-term plans for the transition from military to civilian authority in Iraq, and increasing fear that vacuums of authority will lead to sustained internal conflict in Iraq and greater instability throughout the region. We should not underestimate the ethnic and religious rivalries of a long-repressed people.

Now, these challenges should be met by a unified command structure that clearly articulates objectives and shares transparent plans for political transition, and this committee is hopeful that the recent appointment of Ambassador Bremer as the Civil Administrator of the Department of Defense's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance is the first step in a carefully coordinated, integrated plan for dealing with Iraq.

In addition, our plans must be clear about the roles of all forces, agencies, and organizations involved in the stabilization and reconstruction process. The specific responsibilities of the Department of Defense, Department of State, and other agencies must be more clearly delineated. We also want to hear about the administration's plans for generating alliance contributions that will reduce long-term American burdens. Can NATO play a peacekeeping role in Iraq that would allow for the replacement of United States' units? The main criteria for involvement of allies in international organizations beyond the coalition must be their ability to make contributions that will advance our goals in Iraq.

Secretary Wolfowitz and General Pace, we look forward to your testimony today to give us confidence that comprehensive planning is occurring, that our strategy in Iraq is designed to be a springboard to a greater regional stability and wider peace in the region. Achieving such ambitious goals will not be easy, quick, or cheap,

and we are engaged in nation building in Iraq because it is in our national interest.

This is a complicated and uncertain business that requires both a sense of urgency now, and patience over the long run. Before I ask our distinguished witnesses to testify. I would like to add that Hon. Alan Larson and Hon. Wendy Chamberlin are at the table, and they may be of benefit and of counsel throughout the hearing today. It was at the specific request of Secretary Wolfowitz that we wanted to make certain that all those who might have information today that would be supplemental were on hand, and we appreciate your presence.

[The opening statement of Senator Lugar follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

I am very pleased to welcome Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace. We have been looking forward to your testimony and to our discussion of the status, policies, and plans for Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction.

This is the first of several hearings over the next few weeks that the Foreign Relations Committee will hold on Iraq stabilization and reconstruction issues. These hearings are intended to help the committee perform its oversight function and to inform the American people, whose support is necessary for U.S. efforts in Iraq.

The U.S. military and Coalition forces and the President and his team, including our witnesses today, deserve praise for the execution of a brilliant war plan that brought the combat phase of conflict in Iraq to a decisive and speedy conclusion. We mourn those who lost their lives in this conflict. We recognize the extraordinary care taken to prevent such loss. In fact, the comprehensive planning that went into the military campaign that ousted Saddam Hussein's regime was evident in every aspect of the resounding military victory declared by President Bush on May 1st.

This military success, however, was only the first step in winning the war in Iraq. Victory is at risk unless we ensure that effective post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq succeed over the long-term.

The measure of success in Iraq that matters most is what kind of country and institutions we leave behind. Iraq has some important ingredients for success—an educated population, a tradition of trade and industry, and large reserves of oil to benefit its people. The achievement of stability and democracy in Iraq present an opportunity to catalyze change in the region that can greatly improve U.S. national security. Stabilizing and reconstructing Iraq are a key to success in the larger context of the Middle East region and in the global war on terrorism.

Given these stakes, the United States must make a long-term commitment to achieving our objectives in Iraq. A sustained American commitment would heavily influence the political dynamics of the region and reinforce the credibility of U.S. diplomacy around the world.

I am concerned that the administration's initial stabilization and reconstruction efforts have been inadequate. The planning for peace was much less developed than the planning for war. Moreover, the administration has not sufficiently involved Congress and the American people in its plans regarding the costs, methods, and goals of reconstructing Iraq. Congress has already voted \$2.5 billion toward the rebuilding effort in Iraq. We've heard estimates that the final bill may be over \$100 billion. I believe the process could take at least five years.

There is little understanding of the administration's short and mid-term plans and priorities to address increasingly urgent issues such as providing food, water, electricity, and fuel. U.S. and Coalition forces are struggling to create a secure environment to allow civil engineers and humanitarian assistance workers to do their jobs, but there seems to be insufficient military and police forces to establish this security. Given these circumstances, talk of a reduction in forces by year's end is premature. To restore law and order we may need to put more soldiers and Marines into Iraq, rather than draw them down.

There also is uncertainty about the long-term plans for the transition from military to civilian authority in Iraq and increasing fear that vacuums of authority will lead to sustained internal conflict in Iraq and greater instability throughout the region. We should not underestimate the ethnic and religious rivalries of a long-repressed people.

These challenges should be met by a unified command structure that clearly articulates objectives and shares transparent plans for political transition. This committee is hopeful that the recent appointment of Ambassador Bremer as the Civil Administrator of the Department of Defense Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, is the first step in a carefully coordinated, integrated plan for dealing with Iraq.

In addition, our plans must be clear about the roles of all forces, agencies, and organizations involved in the stabilization and reconstruction process. The specific responsibilities of the Department of Defense, Department of State, and other agencies must be more clearly delineated. We also want to hear about the administration's plans for generating alliance contributions that will reduce long-term American burdens. Can NATO play a peacekeeping role in Iraq that would allow for the replacement of some U.S. units? The main criteria for the involvement of allies and international organizations beyond the Coalition must be their ability to make contributions that will advance our goals in Iraq.

Secretary Wolfowitz and General Pace, we look forward to your testimony today to give us confidence that comprehensive planning is occurring and that our strategy in Iraq is designed to be a springboard to greater regional stability and a wider peace in the region.

Achieving such ambitious goals will not be easy, quick, or cheap. We are engaged in nation-building in Iraq, because it is in our national interests. This is a complicated and uncertain business that requires both a sense of urgency now and patience over the long run.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to call now upon the distinguished ranking member of our committee, Senator Joe Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, General Pace, Secretary Larson. I welcome you all. Let me take this opportunity to publicly state in front of you, Secretary Wolfowitz and General Pace, and others what you already know and what the whole country has attested to, and that is how brilliantly our military forces performed. Their success is a tribute to their skill and courage and to the commitment of the administrations, the last two administrations, in ensuring that our fighting men and women are the best-trained and the best-equipped in the world.

Mr. Secretary, I think it is not an understatement to say that no other member of the administration has been more identified with the effort to change the regime in Iraq than you have. You have been a passionate and articulate spokesman for the view that ending Saddam's regime was a moral as well as a strategic imperative, and the mass graves discovered since Iraq's liberation are a terrible testament to the uniquely barbaric nature of the former regime, and to how right you were about the moral imperative. It is my hope that the Iraqi people will never again have to endure such brutality and they can soon, with God willing, enjoy the liberties that so many of us take for granted.

But it also is my hope that the administration recognizes that reaping the strategic dividends of Iraq's liberation—from sending a message to reluctant States such as Syria, which you have done well; to spreading democracy in the Middle East, which is a task undertaken; to shifting the balance in the region away from radicalism—all depend upon winning the peace. So does helping the Iraqi people build the kind of future they deserve. This commitment has focused on the need to win the peace, and we have as a committee focused on one point in this effort—and under both chairmanships sometimes we have been questioned why we focus so much on it—and that is how to win the peace.

For the last 10 months, since our hearing last summer that has been the subject of this committee. We have made the simple point

repeatedly about Afghanistan, but sometimes I fear that it has fallen on deaf ears. What we saw in Afghanistan and what, unfortunately, we may be seeing again in Iraq is that for all our success in projecting power, we are less adept at staying power. We know how to win wars, but, Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, so far we have not gotten off to as stellar a start, in my view, in winning the peace.

We cannot afford to defeat rogue States, and I am sure we all agree with this, to allow them to become failed States which become breeding grounds for terrorism and instability.

I would like to read from an article in Monday's Washington Post, which I am sure you all have seen and probably already been questioned on. Of course the press is always interested in the dogs that bark more than the dogs that do not, but this is not an isolated account. Virtually every major news outlet has published similar reports, and your opening statement, Mr. Secretary, which we have had a chance to read because you have been kind enough to submit to us, in part makes reference to this and takes it on. The Washington Post article I am about to read from reflects the views of many so-called experts who have made the same point, but let me quote from the Post:

"Military officers, other administration officials and defense experts said the Pentagon ignored lessons from a decade of peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Somalia, and the Balkans and Afghanistan. It also badly underestimated the potential for looting and lawlessness after the collapse of the Iraqi Government, lacking forces capable of securing the streets of Baghdad in the transition from combat to post-war reconstruction."

Continuing the quote: "Only in the past week did administration officials began to acknowledge publicly these miscalculations. They described continued lawlessness as a serious problem in Baghdad, and called for more U.S. forces on the ground to quell the wave of violence that has kept American officials from assuring the Iraqi people that order would soon be restored.

"How and why senior military and civilian leaders were caught unaware of the need to quickly make the transition from warfighting to stability operations with adequate forces mystifies military officers, administration officials and defense experts with peacekeeping experience from the 1990s."

Continuing the quote: "Defense experts inside and outside the Pentagon say military planners are clearly influenced by the Pentagon's belief, expressed by Deputy Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz and other senior leaders, that U.S. forces would be welcomed as liberators. They also point to the Bush administration's professed antipathy to military peacekeeping and nation-building as articulated by the President during the 2000 campaign when he charged the Clinton administration with overextending the armed forces with such missions.

"Defense experts and some military forces also cited the Pentagon's determination to fight the war and maintain the peace with as small a force as possible, noting that it reflected Rumsfeld's determination to use the war in Iraq to support his vision for 'transforming' the military by showing that smaller and lighter armed

units supported by special forces and air power could prevail on the 21st century battlefield.”

Later, the article says, “Officials inside and outside the administration say the shift in mission should not have been a surprise. In January, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank, published an ‘action strategy’ for Iraq that recommended that the Pentagon plan as diligently for the post-war period as for the war. ‘To avoid a dangerous security vacuum it is imperative to organize, train, and equip for post-conflict security missions in conjunction with planning for combat,’ the document states.

“In February, an official from the U.S. Institute of Peace briefed the Defense Policy Board, an influential advisory panel on a \$628 million proposal developed by the institute and based on the peace-keeping experiences in Kosovo. It called for bringing 6,000 civilian police officers, 200 lawyers, judges, court administrators, and corrections officers into Iraq as soon as the fighting stops. ‘Both proposals,’ according to senior administration officials, ‘were matched by debates inside the government.’ But the Pentagon had no plan for civilian policing assistance in place and almost no military police on hand when the fighting stopped in early April.”

Last paragraph: “Before the war began, General Eric K. Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff, told Congress that ‘several hundred thousand’ forces would be necessary to stabilize Iraq after the war. Several days later, Wolfowitz told another congressional committee that far fewer troops would be needed, calling Shinseki’s estimate ‘way off the mark.’”

Well, this is not the first time we are hearing this kind of thing. The points highlighted in this story were raised during the hearings that the chairman and I have held since last July, and it is no surprise. The Deputy Secretary, I am sure, will have an answer for this, but I am confident you have come prepared today to address and rebut several of these items mentioned in the story, and there is no doubt that we are seeing positive changes in Iraq, that we are making progress, especially outside of Baghdad, but the overall impression has begun to take hold, and justifiably, in my view, that there was either a lack of planning or overly optimistic assumptions, or both.

I mean, we were honestly surprised by the rise of the Shiites and the resurgence of fundamentalism. Did we plan for that? Were we honestly surprised by the lawlessness that plagues Baghdad? I have to say, Mr. Secretary, in my view there is a real danger that if we do not recover quickly, the damage may be irreparable.

The Taliban takeover in Afghanistan was a sobering lesson to the people willing to pay almost any price for a basic sense of security, and the longer it takes us to restore law and order, the more likely it is the Iraqis will turn to extremist solutions, in my view.

Just as many in Iraq and the region invented the conspiracy theory that the United States wanted Saddam to remain in power, they will now begin to believe that we want to see Iraqis remain in a state of anarchy so that we can control their riches. We have two competing pressures, I acknowledge. One is the understandable desire to leave as soon as possible and not become occupiers. The other is to stay as long as necessary to make sure that Iraq

can stay together and function on its own without descending into chaos. It is still my view, it has not changed, that only if we satisfy both of these demands are we going to be all right.

It would seem to me that the common sense solution remains, invite in NATO, involve our European allies, involve friendly nations in the Arab and Muslim world. The good start today with the Security Council resolution and its changed emphasis. Only then will we lighten our burden on our forces, spread the risk, and prevent us from being seen as occupiers, and vastly improve our chance of success, and yes, getting the endorsement of the much-maligned United Nations will make it easier, I believe, for those governments whose people opposed the war in the beginning and still oppose it to contribute to the building of the peace, and as I said, I am pleased that the President has made significant progress at the U.N. today, and that NATO has said yes to Poland's request for assistance in managing its sector.

Now, if we could show a little magnanimity in victory instead of talking about retaliation and limiting contracts with countries who were not with us in the war, maybe we can get even more friends in on the peace, for I do not believe Iraq is some kind of prize. Iraq, just as Afghanistan—and I cannot say I have seen it yet, but I think Iraq, just as Afghanistan, the single most important issue, as you all would agree, I suspect, is security, and if people are afraid for their lives, if they will not go to work or to school, if shooting and lawlessness rage, engineers, builders, and technicians will not be able to make the repairs needed to get the economy going, the oil flowing and civil servants will stay away from their offices and doctors from their hospitals, and the people who drive the buses, run the power plants, and pick up the garbage are not going to do their job.

And as good as our soldiers are, most of them are not trained to be police, to control crowds, to capture common criminals. Where are the military police, the gendarmes? Who is going to do this job? How could we have failed to learn from the Balkans about the need to bolster our soldier peacekeepers with properly trained peacekeepers?

So Mr. Secretary, I read your prepared remarks. I have a number of questions I want to ask you. I have already taken longer than I usually do in an opening statement, but I believe if we had more police, our soldiers would have more flexibility to perform other critical tasks that we have fallen short of the mark on, like securing nuclear facilities, where we have seen looting.

No one is talking about 100,000 police, as you claim in your statement. We are talking about 10,000. Actually, the report suggested to you was 6,000, and we should have planned for it, and if the security situation is still too dicey for even heavily armed gendarmes, then we need more troops, maybe even several hundred thousand, as General Shinseki had indicated early on.

Indeed, I find it a little ironic that you are quoted today as saying that one of the lessons of the Balkans in terms of post-conflict situations is to have forces, "so big and so strong that nobody would pick a fight with us." By your own testimony, you say that they are still picking fights with us in Iraq and our land commander, General McKiernan, complained a week ago that he can-

not stabilize a country the size of California with only 150,000 troops, so I am anxious to hear what we are going to do from this point on and ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, that the rest of my statement be placed in the record as if read.

The CHAIRMAN. Your statement will be placed in the record in full.

I thank the Senator. Likewise, for all Senators who have them, statements will be placed in the record in full immediately following the two statements that have just occurred.

[The statements of Senator Biden, Senator Hagel, Senator Brownback, and Senator Feingold follow:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Mr. Secretary, General Pace: I join the chairman in welcoming you to the committee.

Let me also take this opportunity to say our Armed Forces performed brilliantly. Their success is a tribute to their skill and courage—and to the commitment of the last two administrations in ensuring that our fighting forces are second to none in training and equipment.

Mr. Secretary, I think it is not an understatement to say that no other member of the administration has been more identified with the effort to change the regime in Iraq than you. You've been a passionate, and articulate spokesperson for the view that ending Saddam Hussein's regime was a moral as well as a strategic imperative.

The mass graves discovered since Iraq's liberation are a terrible testament to the uniquely barbaric nature of the former regime.

It is my hope that the Iraqi people will never again have to endure such brutality and they can soon enjoy the liberties that so many of us take for granted.

But, Mr. Secretary, It's also my hope that the administration recognizes that reaping the strategic dividends of Iraq's liberation—from sending a message to reluctant states such as Syria—to spreading democracy in the Middle East—to shifting the balance in the region away from radicalism—all depend upon winning the peace. So does helping the Iraqi people build the kind of future they deserve.

This committee has focused on the need to win the peace relentlessly for ten months, ever since our hearings last summer. We've made the same point, repeatedly, about Afghanistan. But sometimes I fear it has fallen on deaf ears.

What we saw in Afghanistan, and what, unfortunately, we may be seeing again in Iraq, is that for all our success at projecting power, we're less adept at staying power. We know how to win wars, but, Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, so far we're fumbling the peace.

We cannot afford to defeat rogue states only to allow them to become failed states, which are breeding grounds for terrorism and instability.

I'd like to read from an article in Monday's Washington Post, which I am sure you have seen. Of course, the press is always more interested in the dogs that bark than those that don't. But this is not an isolated account. Virtually every major news outlet has published similar reports. And the many experts this committee has spoken with have made the same points. But let me quote from the Post:

Military officers, other administration officials and defense experts said the Pentagon ignored lessons from a decade of peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans and Afghanistan.

It also badly underestimated the potential for looting and lawlessness after the collapse of the Iraqi government, lacking forces capable of securing the streets of Baghdad in the transition from combat to postwar reconstruction.

Only in the past week did administration officials begin to acknowledge publicly these miscalculations. They described continued lawlessness as a serious problem in Baghdad and called for more U.S. forces on the ground to quell a wave of violence that has kept American officials from assuring the Iraqi people that order would soon be restored.

It goes on to say:

How and why senior military and civilian leaders were caught unaware of the need to quickly make the transition from war-fighting to stability op-

erations with adequate forces mystifies military officers, administration officials and defense experts with peacekeeping experience in the 1990s.

Defense experts inside and outside the Pentagon say military planners were clearly influenced by the Pentagon's belief, expressed by Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz and other senior leaders, that U.S. forces would be welcomed as liberators. They also point to the Bush administration's professed antipathy to military peacekeeping and nation-building, as articulated by the president during the 2000 campaign when he charged the Clinton administration with overextending the armed forces with such missions.

Defense experts and some military officers also cite the Pentagon's determination to fight the war and maintain the peace with as small a force as possible, noting it reflected Rumsfeld's determination to use the war in Iraq to support his vision for "transforming" the military by showing that smaller and lighter armed units, supported by Special Forces and air power, could prevail on the 21st century battlefield.

Later, the article says:

Officials inside and outside the administration say the shift in mission should not have been a surprise.

In January, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank, published an 'action strategy' for Iraq that recommended the Pentagon plan as diligently for the postwar period as for the war. 'To avoid a dangerous security vacuum, it is imperative to organize, train, and equip for the post-conflict security mission in conjunction with planning for combat,' the document states.

In February, an official from the U.S. Institute of Peace briefed the Defense Policy Board, an influential advisory panel, on a \$628 million proposal, developed by the institute and based on peacekeeping experiences in Kosovo.

It called for bringing 6,000 civilian police officers and 200 lawyers, judges, court administrators and corrections officers into Iraq as soon as the fighting stopped.

Both proposals, according to a senior administration official, "were matched by debates inside the government." But the Pentagon had no plan for civilian policing assistance in place, and almost no military police on hand, when the fighting stopped in early April.

Before the war began, Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, the Army chief of staff, told Congress that "several hundred thousand" forces could be necessary to stabilize Iraq after a war. Several days later, Wolfowitz told another congressional committee that far fewer troops would be needed, calling Shinseki's estimate "way off the mark."

This isn't the first time we're hearing this. The points highlighted in this story were raised during hearings that the Chairman and I have held since last July. There's no surprise here.

Mr. Secretary, I'm confident that you have come prepared today to address and rebut several of the items mentioned in this story.

And there is no doubt that we are seeing positive changes in Iraq—that we're making progress, especially outside of Baghdad.

But the overall impression has begun to take hold—and justifiably—that there was either a lack of planning or overly-optimistic assumptions, or both. I mean, were we honestly surprised by the rise of the Shiites and the resurgence of fundamentalism. Did we plan for it? Were we honestly surprised by the lawlessness that plagues Baghdad?

I have to say, Mr. Secretary, in my view, there is a real danger that if we do not recover quickly, the damage may be irreparable.

The Taliban takeover in Afghanistan was a sobering lesson that people are willing to pay almost any price for a basic sense of security.

The longer it takes for us to restore law and order, the more likely it is that Iraqis will turn to extremist solutions.

Just as many in Iraq and the region invented the conspiracy theory that the United States wanted Saddam to remain in power, they will now begin to believe that we want to see Iraq remain in a state of anarchy so that we can control its riches.

We have two competing pressures in Iraq. One is the understandable desire to leave as soon as possible and not become occupiers. The other is to stay as long as

necessary to make sure that Iraq can stay together and function on its own without descending into chaos.

It is still my view—it has not changed—that the only way to satisfy these competing demands is to share the burden with others.

It would seem to me that the common sense solution remains. Involve NATO. Involve our European allies. Involve friendly nations in the Arab and Muslim world. It will lighten the burden on our forces, spread the risk, prevent us from being seen as occupiers, and vastly improve our chances of success.

And, yes, getting the endorsement of the much-maligned U.N. will make it easier for governments whose people opposed the war to contribute to building the peace. I'm pleased we've made good progress on a new U.N. resolution, and that NATO has said yes to Poland's request for assistance in managing its sector.

Now, if we would show a little magnanimity in victory instead of talking about retaliation and limiting contacts with countries that were not with us in the war, maybe we can get even more friends in on the peace. Iraq is not some kind of prize.

In Iraq, just as in Afghanistan, and, Mr. Secretary, I can't say I've seen it yet—security is the single most important issue. Security should be our number one priority. Everything follows from that.

If people are afraid for their lives, they won't go to work or to school. If shooting and lawlessness reign, engineers, builders and technicians won't be able to make the repairs needed to get the economy going and the oil flowing. Civil servants will stay away from their offices and doctors from their hospitals. The people who drive the buses, run the power plants and pick up the garbage won't do their jobs.

As good as our soldiers are, most of them are not trained to be police—to control crowds—to capture common criminals. Where are the Military Police—the gendarmes—who know how to do this? How could we have failed to learn from the Balkans and Haiti about the need to bolster our soldier peacemakers with properly trained peacekeepers?

Mr. Secretary, I read your prepared remarks. You argue that the situation in Iraq is profoundly different than the situation in the Balkans or Haiti because the enemy, while largely defeated, is still capable of killing Americans. As a result, you conclude, our emphasis has to be on soldiers, not police in Iraq. With all due respect, this is not a zero sum game. We need both.

If we had more police, we'd free up more soldiers to take on the remnants of the enemy.

If we had more police, our soldiers would have more flexibility to perform other critical tasks where we've fallen short of the mark, like securing nuclear facilities where we've seen looting. No one is talking about "100,000" police as you claim in your statement. We're talking about maybe 10,000 and we should have planned for it. And if the security situation is still too dicey for even heavily armed gendarmes, then we need more troops—maybe even the "several hundred thousand" that General Shinseki proposed. We're pretty close to that number now.

Indeed, I find it a little ironic that you are quoted today as saying that one of the lessons from the Balkans in terms of post-conflict situations is to have forces "so big and so strong that nobody would pick a fight with us." But in your testimony, you say they are still picking fights with us in Iraq. And our land commander, General McKiernan, complained a week ago that we can't stabilize a country the size of California with only 150,000 troops.

Finally, Mr. Secretary, I was glad to read in your statement that you believe we must be in Iraq for the long haul. You remind us that we're still in Bosnia 8 years after Dayton—and rightly so—and that the stakes in Iraq are even greater and the tasks more difficult. I agree. I only wish that the President had made this clear to the American people ahead of time—something I asked for repeatedly in the many months leading up to the war. I wish that the President would tell the American people now that we are going to be in Iraq for years and it is going to cost us tens of billions of dollars.

No foreign policy, no matter how well conceived, can be sustained without the informed consent of the American people. And they have not been informed.

There are many other critical issues, including where we are in the search for weapons of mass destruction and what we're doing to support the creation of an interim Iraqi government that is seen as legitimate by the people of Iraq, not a U.S. puppet. But let me leave it at that for now and thank you both, again, for being with us today.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHUCK HAGEL

Thank you, Chairman Lugar for calling this and subsequent hearings on Iraq Reconstruction. Let me begin by fully associating myself with your op-ed on this subject in today's Washington Post.

I would like to take the opportunity offered by the appearance today of Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and General Pace to express my respect and appreciation for the spectacular performance of our Armed Forces in Iraq. War is never an easy option, and American men and women have taken great risks and made great sacrifices in meeting our initial objectives in Iraq. Our men and women in uniform have the respect and admiration of all Americans.

We are now in the business of "nation building" in Iraq. The complexities of Iraq—its size, its culture, its geography, its demography—make nation-building there one of the greatest challenges this country has ever faced. We are only at the beginning of a process that Chairman Lugar estimates could take at least five years. I agree.

That the American military would defeat Saddam Hussein's regime was never in doubt. What was in doubt was what comes next in Iraq and how we manage a transition to stability and democracy in such a complicated region of the world.

The sudden change in the structure, mission, and personnel at the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) in Iraq indicates that we may have underestimated or mischaracterized the challenges of establishing security and rebuilding Iraq. This is an area of great unknowns and uncertainty. No one can accurately predict the future.

I encourage the Bush Administration to continue to reach out to the United Nations and our NATO and Arab allies to work with us as partners in this immense task of rebuilding Iraq. President Bush and Secretary Powell have achieved a major diplomatic success with today's vote at the United Nations. Our interests are well-served by UN engagement and legitimacy. NATO also has taken steps to get more involved in security in Iraq. We need to encourage them to do more. America cannot, and should not, bear this burden alone.

Iraq cannot be considered in a vacuum. Without progress on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process; new confidence-building measures in the Persian Gulf, and real steps toward political reform and economic development in the Arab world, our efforts in Iraq and throughout the Middle East will be frustrated and fail.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman for calling this hearing today. I look forward to the testimony of our distinguished witnesses.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing on the status of activities in this post-conflict stage of Operation Iraqi Freedom. I must first begin by congratulating the President on today's resounding victory in the United Nations Security Council on lifting sanctions. I hope members from this committee soon will be able to visit Iraq to survey the country and to provide support to the Bremer administration for the enormous task that is now just beginning to unfold. I especially hope we are able to visit the southern Shi'a areas of Iraq where I understand we are having notable successes.

I hear many reports from the field and while it is not a perfect picture, I believe much is being achieved by our many able-bodied soldiers, diplomats and others on the ground. There has been much criticism from my colleagues about the purported events transpiring in this newly liberated country.

First, I would like to begin by talking about the threat Iran poses to America's security and our efforts to bring security and stability to Iraq and Afghanistan.

I want to call the committee's attention to some important revelations that have come out in this week's news regarding Iran. From the May 21st, New York Times—the headline: "U.S. Suggests Al Qaeda Cell in Iran Directed Saudi Bombings" and the L.A. Times, the headline: "U.S. Ends Talks with Iran Over Al Qaeda Links."

Mr. Chairman, these headlines say it all. To say that we can not trust the Iranians is perhaps the understatement of the year. I know many on this committee have hoped that we could reach some type of deal with the so-called reformers in this country—but it is obvious that this is not only impossible, but that trusting in such an approach is extremely dangerous for U.S. security.

The NY Times quotes a senior Bush administration official as saying that "*The United States has 'rock-hard intelligence' that at least a dozen Qaeda members, including Mr. Adel [the organization's security chief] had been directing some oper-*

ations from Iran'." Furthermore, the article goes on to cite a senior Saudi official confirming the view that it is Adel—who is in Iran, who directed the Riyadh attack.

The Iranian regime is a terrorist regime. A longstanding truism of American foreign policy has been that you can not and should not negotiate with terrorists. I hope that the current revelations will put an end to the dangerous desires by some to make a deal with these tyrants.

- What examples have you seen of Iran's meddling in the reconstruction of Iraq?
- In clear violation of Iran's promises, we have heard reports that the Iran is sending numerous agents into Iraq to stir up the Shiite community. What is being done to combat this?
- If we do not confront Iran—it seems that by removing Saddam Hussein and the Taliban, we have merely paved the way for export of the Islamic Revolution? Could you address the importance of confronting Iran on the nuclear, terrorist and human rights abuses—as it relates to our ability to ever achieve long-term stability in Iraq?

I would like to extend to my colleagues the question of what their expectations are for moving forward in Iraq, whether on reconstruction, political transition or security? Sadly, I think many of us have wrongly pointed to already existing difficulties and blamed a lack of immediate solution on the President. I would point out to you that it took us quite a while to establish a constitution to govern our own country after we liberated ourselves. We should not be so arrogant as to expect instant gratification on these matters.

In the southern Shi'a cities, the children are in school, people are being fed and are making much headway with very little. The expediency with which we have deployed a civilian administrator is validation of the success of the post-conflict operation.

Many have beat-up on General Garner and claimed that he was being sent back home with his tail between his legs. That is not the case and to my knowledge, the pre-supposed expectation by many that he would stay indefinitely in Iraq was not part of the plan—in fact, he was told that he had no obligation to deploy and his leadership of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) would be for a specific task for a short period.

The Bremer team is just now on the ground. I hope Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz will highlight the successes, but I certainly hope he will give us an unvarnished view of the things transpiring on the ground. I hope he emphasizes the twenty-five year theft by Saddam Hussein of the resources, the energy and the vitality of the Iraqi people—that is clearly our biggest challenge. In his wake are destroyed lives, decaying and unattended infrastructure, a regime indoctrinated in fear, and the imagination, traditions and talent of a strong people suppressed.

In addition, I would hope we are able to look into past human rights abuse and war crimes, and be able to intercept new violations of human rights and religious freedom. First, reports have been coming out of the country of mass graves and rumors have circulated that we are on the verge of uncovering a massive tragedy—graves that could total in excess of a million people. I think the scale of the crimes against humanity are still widely unknown here on Capitol Hill.

Emotions are running high in the country and I understand our military, at the request of local clerics, has tried to remain out of sight so as to be sensitive to the families who want to bury their relatives according to Islamic customs. I am afraid it will soon be apparent to all of us here that these crimes will be on the scale of Hitler and Stalin in their brutality and in the number of lives taken.

Currently, I understand Chaldean Catholics, Assyrian and other religious minorities in Iraq are reporting that they are being targeted with violence for religious reasons throughout Iraq—in Baghdad, Basrah, and Kirkuk. Some have been hunted down and murdered, others are reporting that their homes, factories, and businesses have been burned or otherwise destroyed. According to a recent LA Times report, Christian women are reporting threats and intimidation for not wearing "Islamic" dress. These Christian communities are 2000 years old and constitute one of the largest Christian communities in the Middle East. There are now fears that they could be forced out under such treatment over the next few months. Their co-religionists are expressing fear and frustration about an apparent lack of concern by U.S. authorities for the protection of religious minorities.

- Beyond efforts to restore law and order, is the ORHA taking steps to protect vulnerable religious minorities? What are they?
- Is there anyone in the Bremer administration charged with monitoring and relating to religious minority groups? Who?

- Has the Bremer administration or anyone else in ORHA made statements specifically aimed at warning dominant Shiite groups and militants warning them not to attack or harass non-Muslim minorities?

Noah Feldman, a 32-year-old NYU law professor, has been appointed by the U.S. Government to head up the drafting of Iraq's new constitution. Professor Feldman has written a recent book, "After Jihad," and has made other comments that raise concerns about whether basic human rights and freedom will be guaranteed in the new constitution. In his book, it is clear he does not equate democracy with liberal democracy and seems unconcerned with some basic human rights and freedoms. He praises Iraq as an "Islamic democracy" that has brought women into the work place and achieved more equitable income distribution. He was quoted by the BBC as saying, "that the separation of church and state, although a central part of the U.S. constitution might not be appropriate for a country which was overwhelmingly Muslim." He is not one who advocates for religious freedom or other human rights in his insistence that jihadists be brought into the electoral process.

- Will basic human rights including religious freedom be guaranteed without qualification for all groups and individuals, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, in the new Iraq constitution?
 - Will the U.S. advocate protection for these basic human rights in the new constitution and laws of Iraq?
 - Will Islamic law be a basis for Iraq's new legal system and judiciary or will it be referenced in the new constitution?
 - What can be pointed to as a model for "Islamic democracy" that Prof. Feldman enthusiastically supports in his book?
 - Is it out of the question for Iraq to be a secular state or is it a foregone conclusion that Iraq will be an Islamic state as Prof. Feldman implied in his BBC interview just before going to Baghdad?
 - If it is to be an Islamic state what would the protections be for Iraq's many religious minorities?
 - Will the constitution drafting team include any Christian human rights experts (such as Habib Malik)?
 - Is there anyone in the drafting team who are expert in forging human rights guarantees within an Islamic context (like Khalid El Fadi)?
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Mr. Chairman, I thank you and Senator Biden for holding this important hearing, and I thank both of our witnesses for being here today.

Since last summer, many members of this committee, myself included, have been asking questions about the nature of the U.S. commitment to post-conflict Iraq, trying to identify clearly the tremendous needs that must be met if Iraq is to enjoy stability and cease to threaten the region in the future. This has gone from a speculative exercise to a very current one, but what troubles me is that we still have so few answers. Answers from the administration about the scope of the job, and the likely requirements in terms of U.S. manpower, resources, and time, remain vague at best.

Recent press reports give our efforts to date mixed reviews at best. I am deeply concerned about our failure to account for weapons of mass destruction and the means to make them. I am also concerned about the disorder that persists in parts of the country, and about the shifting American plans and teams involved in what appears to be an adhoc effort, despite all of the advance warnings about the critically important reconstruction period.

Unfolding events in Afghanistan have proven the importance of a robust commitment to security and reconstruction. We do not need more examples or more reports to convince us that this is a serious business and that we need to get stabilization and reconstruction right. What we do need is candor about the commitment that will be required, and clarity about our priorities in the short, medium, and long terms. And critically, we need help from the rest of the world.

The men and women of the United States Armed Forces performed brilliantly in Iraq. We cannot let them down by squandering their efforts now with a half-baked plan for reconstruction.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me indicate that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz will present his statement. My understanding is that, General Pace, your statement will be included in the record in full, and then we will commence questioning by the Senators at that point.

Let me just say, as a point of personal privilege, that Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz is a friend. He has been not only an able American public servant, but one who certainly guided my understanding of the Philippines during 1985 and 1986. In his own service in Indonesia it was my privilege to visit with him and to understand that country through his eyes and through his witness. I appreciate very much his service to the country now, and it is a real privilege to have him before our committee today, and I call upon you, Mr. Secretary, for your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY: GENERAL PETER PACE, VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, HON. ALAN P. LARSON, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, FOR ECONOMIC, BUSINESS AND AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS AND HON. WENDY J. CHAMBERLIN, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR ASIA AND THE NEAR EAST, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thinking back on your visit to Indonesia, it seems like eons ago. It was a very different time in the Muslim world, in that biggest Muslim country in the Muslim world. A lot has changed, not all of it by any means for the better, that is for sure.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, your example has consistently demonstrated that America's security concerns transcend party or politics. On behalf of the men and women who serve our country so faithfully and so well, we are grateful for the support of you and your colleagues in both Houses of the Congress. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today the critical task of stabilization and reconstruction in Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, we are committed to helping Iraqis build what could be and should be a model for the Middle East, a government that protects the rights of its citizens, that represents all ethnic and religious groups, and that will help bring Iraq into the international community of peace-seeking nations. Now that this goal is within sight, Iraq represents one of the first and best opportunities to build what President Bush has referred to in his State of the Union Message last year as, "a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror."

I would note too, Mr. Chairman, I have heard the President refer privately to the fact that the challenge of winning the peace in Iraq is even greater than the challenge of winning the war, and I think he would share the sentiments that you have expressed in that regard and your distinguished ranking member has expressed in that regard.

Mr. Chairman, Saddam Hussein was a danger to his people and a support to terrorists and an encouragement to terrorist regimes. His removal from power opens opportunities to strengthen governments and institutions in the Muslim world that respect funda-

mental human dignity and protect freedom, that abhor the killing of innocents as an instrument of national policy. Success in Iraq will continue to demoralize those who preach doctrines of hatred and oppression and subjugation. It will encourage those who dream the ancient dream of freedom.

In the last half-century, those ideals of freedom and self-government have been the most powerful engines of change in the world. They give us hope for further development in the Muslim world, a development that will benefit every nation throughout the world and bring us important allies in the war against terror. We cannot afford to fail. We cannot afford to allow Iraq to revert to the remnants of the Baathist regime that now reigns throughout their country in a desperate bid for influence and power, or to see that country become vulnerable to other extremist elements.

As the distinguished chairman of this committee said as recently as Sunday at Notre Dame, "Iraq must not become a failed State and a potential incubator for terrorist cells." We cannot and we will not allow such a threat to rise again, nor can we dash the hopes of the Iraqi people. Make no mistake, recent efforts to destabilize Iraq in large measure represent the death rattle of a dying regime. We can defeat them, and we will.

As Presidential envoy Paul Bremer told me recently in a telephone conversation, "If the Baathists have any staying power, let there be no doubt—we have more." We will not stop our efforts until that regime is dead. Rebuilding Iraq will require similar time and commitment.

Mr. Chairman, I have just returned from a visit to Bosnia and Kosovo and Macedonia. My main purpose in those first two countries was to thank American troops for their dedication and commitment, and to assure the authorities in the region that the United States will see our tasks through to completion.

To those who question American resolve and determination, I would remind them that we are still playing our crucial role in Bosnia 8 years after the Dayton Accord, many years after some predicted we would be gone, and we continue to be the key to stability in Macedonia and in Kosovo. The stakes in Iraq are even greater than in the Balkans, far greater, but if the stakes are huge in Iraq, there is no question that our commitment to secure a peaceful Iraq is at least equal to those stakes.

Mr. Chairman, I have noted with strong agreement your statements about the need for America to stay the course in Iraq. I applaud your determination and appreciate your support and the support of this committee in helping the American people to understand the stakes that we have in success and what we must do to achieve it.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that today is only 67 days since our Marines and Army forces first crossed the Kuwaiti border into Iraq. It is only 3 weeks since President Bush announced the end of major combat operations. I underscore that word major, because I will explain at greater length later smaller combat operations in Iraq still continue on a daily basis.

Even though the war has not completely ended, we are already started on the process of rebuilding that country. Several months before the war even began, we established the Office of Reconstruc-

tion and Humanitarian Assistance in order to be able to address the post-war tasks. As the title of that office implies, much of its early planning and focus was aimed at two disasters that fortunately did not happen, one was to relieve what was anticipated to be a massive humanitarian crisis, and the second to halt the environmental damage that was anticipated from large-scale destruction of the Iraqi oil fields.

Thanks, I think in large measure to the speedy success of the military operation, the task we face has turned out to be very different. There is no humanitarian crisis in Iraq. However, a great deal of other work remains to be done, most of it anticipated in ORHA's planning and staffing, work such as restoring rapidly the functioning of the electric power in that country and restoring essential medical services. Most of these problems are not primarily a result of the war, but rather the result of decades of tyrannical neglect and misrule, where the wealth and treasure of the country was poured into creating palaces, building tanks, and procuring weapons of mass destruction instead of caring for the Iraqi people.

That damage has been compounded by widespread looting in the aftermath of the Saddam regime, some of it clearly conducted by surviving elements of the regime for political purposes. The task before us is more about construction than reconstruction, the building of a society that was allowed to rot for more than three decades by one of the world's worst tyrants.

There is some good news in all of that. The good news is that the Iraqi people will be able to notice improvements in their normal lives long before we have reached the full potential of that country, one of the most important in the Arab world.

Just a few examples, Mr. Chairman. Before the war, large numbers, estimates range from 20 to 50 percent of Iraq's children under the age of five suffered from malnutrition. Only 60 percent of the Iraqi people had access to safe drinking water. Ten of Basrah's 21 potable water treatment facilities were not functional. Seventy percent of Iraq's sewage treatment plant needed repair, and according to UNICEF, some half-a-million metric tons of raw or partially treated sewage was dumped in the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, Iraq's main source of water.

Eighty percent of Iraq's 25,000 schools were in poor condition, with an average of one book per six students, while I would note at the same time in every one of the first 100 or so schools we inspected in Southern Iraq, every one of them had been used as a military command post and an arms storage site.

Iraq's electrical power system operated at half its capacity before the war. Iraq's agriculture production had dropped significantly, and Iraq's oil infrastructure was badly neglected. It will take time to reverse the effects of persistent, systematic neglect and misallocation of resources, but if the task is enormous, even at this very early stage there are grounds for optimism.

I talked this morning on a secure telephone with Lieutenant General John Abizaid, the Deputy Commander of Central Command, one of our most distinguished army leaders. He also commanded U.S. peacekeeping troops in Bosnia and in Kosovo, and he reported after his very recent visit to Baghdad that in Iraq we are

already way ahead of where we were in either Bosnia or Kosovo at a comparable stage in those deployments.

Despite claims that there were no plans for peace operations in the wake of military operations, Presidential envoy Bremer and Jay Garner are implementing plans drawn up long before the war to strengthen and rebuild the country. Assertions that we were already failing, detailed at some length in the Washington Post article that the ranking member read from, assertions that remind me of similar assertions that the military campaign had taken us into a quagmire just one week into the war, reflect in my view an incomplete understanding of the situation in Iraq as it existed before the war, and an unreasonable expectation of where we should be now.

Security is our No. 1 priority, and our most urgent task in the post-Saddam Hussein era is to establish secure and stable conditions throughout the country. Secretary Rumsfeld reiterated recently, and I quote, "security remains the No. 1 priority in Iraq precisely because security and stability are the fundamental prerequisites for everything else we need to accomplish, essential for providing the basic normal life and services, and beyond that to create a climate"—and this is important—"where people for the first time in their history can express political views in an atmosphere free of rear and intimidation."

Much of what I read on this subject suggests what I believe is a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of the security problem in Iraq, and consequently a failure to appreciate that a regime which had tens of thousands of thugs and war criminals on its payroll does not vanish overnight. The people who created the mass graves that are now being uncovered in Iraq still represent a threat to stability that was not eliminated automatically when the statues came tumbling down in Baghdad.

I read recently in that same article that unnamed officials and experts say that the Pentagon ignored lessons from a decade of peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans, and Afghanistan. It seems to me that those anonymous sources ignore the difference between normal peacekeeping operations and the kind of situation we are in now, which is a combination of peacekeeping and low-level combat. In just the last 24 hours alone—I emphasize this is just the report that came in this morning—in Baghdad, the 3rd Infantry Division raided a Baath Party meeting and detained nine Baathists in Fallujah, which continues to be a hotbed of Baathist activity, some of it with connections to foreign extremists, possibly al-Qaeda. An Iraqi vehicle attacked a checkpoint in the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, two enemy were killed and one detained. In the same area, in the same 24-hour period, three Iraqi snipers engaged U.S. troops, and in a third incident in the Fallujah, area a Bradley was disabled by a rocket-propelled grenade fired from a mosque.

In Baqubah, another town in north central Iraq, again in just the last 24 hours, the 4th Infantry Division conducted a raid and captured seven Iraqis and seized 15 million dinars. In al Kut, a patrol of the 1st Marine Division engaged 20 enemy, killed two, wounded one, and captured 11. Fortunately, in this 24-hour period there were no U.S. casualties, but that level of activity illustrates contin-

ued hostile activity that we encounter, much of it apparently associated with elements of the old regime.

To give you some statistics, in the last 2 weeks there have been 50 hostile incidents, 37 of them initiated against our troops. We have had 17 wounded in action and one killed. That is since the end of major combat activity.

In short, while major combat operations have ended, American soldiers continue to be shot at almost daily. While we have made substantial progress in catching the people on the blacklist, there is still additional work that needs to be done. We face in Iraq a situation where a substantially defeated enemy is still working hard to kill Americans and to kill Iraqis who are trying to build a new and free Iraq because they want to prevent Iraqi society from stabilizing and recovering. Bizarre as it may sound, it would appear that their goal is to create nostalgia for Saddam Hussein. We cannot allow them to succeed.

We need to recognize that this situation is completely different from Haiti or Bosnia or Kosovo, where opposition ceased very soon after our peacekeeping troops arrived. We do not have the choice in Iraq of avoiding confrontation with these repressive elements of the old regime. We have to eliminate them, and we will do so, but it will take time.

This task requires more than just military policemen. There is a very difficult balance to be struck, particularly in Baghdad, between providing ordinary civil order forces on the streets, which we are doing, and being prepared to deal with snipers and armed bands. CENTCOM is making that transition. There are now 45,000 coalition military personnel in the Baghdad area, approximately 21,000 of whom are actively involved in security operations. In just the last 24 hours alone, the 3rd Infantry Division has conducted nearly 600 patrols, secured 200 fixed sites, and manned 85 checkpoints. Again, General Abizaid reports from his recent visit that we are already seeing much more commerce, many more people on the street, and much shorter gas lines.

I think of importance in Sadr City, the notorious Shia slum in Baghdad of more than a million people that used to be known as Saddam City, that people are already reporting that their conditions are better than they were before the war. Of course, that is not hard to do in that part of town. We are making progress.

In my most recent conversation with Presidential Envoy Bremer, he reports that while the security situation is serious, and unfortunately still imposes very severe restrictions on the ability of U.S. personnel to move freely, and that is a constraint on our reconstruction effort, Baghdad more generally is not a city in anarchy. Shops are open and the city is bustling with traffic. We have gotten some 7,000 Iraqi police on duty in Baghdad, and reports of looting and curfew violations and gunfire are decreasing, but one of our principle challenges is that we have been able to make much less use of the old Iraqi police force than we had planned. It turns out that their leadership was hopelessly corrupted by the old regime, and the policemen themselves seem to have been better trained to raid people's homes at night than to patrol the streets.

It is important to distinguish the security situation also in different parts of the country. Most of the attention, appropriately

enough, is on Baghdad, and there is no question that the capital is one of the keys to the future of the country, but we would make a mistake if we saw it as the only one.

Conditions in other parts of the country are generally better. For example, in the south, the second largest city in the country, Basrah, with a population of almost 1.3 million people, most of them Shia, are overwhelmingly grateful to be free of Saddam's tyranny, and the city is largely stable. In Nasiriah, local police are now armed, and the force has grown to over 600. In Diwaniya, nearly 300 Iraqi police officers have been hired and the coalition is installing two 911 emergency phone lines.

In Northern Iraq, the two large cities, Mosul and Kirkuk, with a combined population of more than 2½ million people, are largely stable thanks to the successful efforts of Major General Dave Petraeus and the 101st Air Assault Division. There remain some problems in those two cities, most significantly problems arising out of the property disputes created by Saddam's policy of Arabization, a kind of slow-motion ethnic cleansing, but we are taking political and legal measures to try to address those problems.

We sent a study team led by former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq William Eagleton, that included distinguished experts from Poland, the Czech Republic, and Bosnia, countries that have had experience with these kinds of property restitution problems in the past, and they will come up with some recommendations of how we can address those problems by legal means and discourage the use of force.

Finally, if you would indulge me, Mr. Chairman, I would like to give a little detail about what I think is potentially a very important success story in the somewhat smaller city, although it is still a city of half a million, called Karbala. Karbala's significance far exceeds its size, because as one of the two holy cities of Shia Islam, it has enormous potential to point the direction for Iraqi society, or at least for the Shia segment of Iraqi society.

There, the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Marines has worked effectively with local officials to create what are reportedly excellent conditions of law and order in that town. A political officer from our embassy in Kuwait visited Karbala recently and he reported that, and I quote, "with support from U.S. military forces, moderate reformers are engaged in an audacious experiment aimed at building democratic rule in one of Shiism's two holiest cities."

In cooperation with civil affairs teams from 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, they have achieved notable successes, and that report goes on to note that the infrastructure in Karbala is largely functioning. Electricity service has returned to pre-war levels and almost all homes have running water. The three local hospitals are open, although they admittedly lack basic medicines. U.S. Marine engineers are repairing local schools, hospitals, and the water plant.

Most significantly, in addition to fostering the reestablishment of basic public service, and this, I think, is particularly important, the Marines have supported the emergence of a functional, competent provisional government in Karbala Province that advocates—remember, this is in the heart of Shia Iraq—that advocates a secular democratic future for that country.

Significantly, the leadership of this new secular and democratic local government is a religious figure, Sheikh Ali Abdel Hassan Kamuna. He is not only a Said, which means a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed, and a member of a prominent local tribal clan, but, apparently no contradiction, he is also a member of the secular intelligentsia.

The council elites contain other senior tribal figures, including five other Saids, but also representatives of the secular intelligentsia and business world, including a university professor, a civil engineer, a merchant, a retired army colonel, several lawyers, sociologists, and ophthalmologists. I am going to ask if there are any women among them, because that would be a good sign of progress, but I think that is pretty impressive by itself. The religious intelligentsia is represented by a sheikh who endured 12 years in Saddam's prisons for his part in the 1991 uprisings.

The fact that a new day has dawned in Iraq was nowhere so evident as in the recent Arbayeen pilgrimage in the cities of Karbala and Najaf. For the first time in 26 years, more than a million Shia pilgrims walked to their holy cities without fear and without violence.

In judging the success or failure of the military plan for dealing with the aftermath of the collapse of the regime, one cannot judge it against the standard of unachievable perfection. There is no plan that could have achieved all of the extraordinary speed of this one, and at the same time been able to flood the country with military policemen. Choices had to be made. I think we made the choices, the right choices, choices that saved both American and Iraqi lives and prevented damage to the environment and to the resources of the Iraqi people.

Let me just say a little bit about those plans. Starting in January of this year we recruited Jay Garner to stand up the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. To my knowledge, this is the first time we have created an office for post-war administration before a conflict had even started. It was obviously a sensitive matter because we did not want to do anything that would undercut the efforts to reach a diplomatic resolution of the crisis presented by Iraq's defiance of U.N. Resolution 1441. For that reason also, we did not brief key Members of Congress perhaps in as much detail as we would have liked.

We should certainly have ensured that Jay Garner briefed you before he left for the theater. We will work hard to do our best to remedy those errors, including arranging secure video teleconferences with Envoy Bremer and Mr. Garner as appropriate. Having said that, let me also say we picked Jay Garner because he had demonstrated at other times in his career, most significantly when he was a commander in the extraordinarily successful operation in Northern Iraq in 1991, a capacity for putting organizations together quickly and energizing them and focusing them on getting practical tasks accomplished.

Fortunately, as I noted earlier, a great deal of our pre-war planning turned out not to be needed, because there were no massive food shortages, there was no massive destruction of oil wells or gas platforms, and I believe in large measure that is attributable to the

success of the military plan. I would like to briefly mention some of the features of that plan that I think contributed to that success.

At the heart of the military plan was the imperative to defeat Iraq's major combat forces. The emphasis was on speed. We consciously chose to keep our force size relatively small, limiting the amount of people and materiel deployed on the initial thrust into Iraq. This plan gave great flexibility. Those forces quickly plunged deep into Iraq, bypassing a good portion of the country in their push to Baghdad. We recognized that was a choice, and that we would be leaving problems in our rear.

Despite the fact that Saddam's regime had strategic warning of an impending attack, because of our speed, coalition forces were able to achieve substantial tactical surprise. In short, we began the war with a timetable the regime did not expect, and we combined it with a speed that made it difficult for the regime to react and regroup. The enemy was never able to mount a coherent defense, nor was it able to blow up dams, bridges, and critical infrastructure or use weapons of mass terror, perhaps because it was caught so completely off-guard.

As a result, in less than 3 weeks we were in Baghdad, and with the toppling of Saddam's statue, history's annals tallied another victory for freedom akin to the fall of the Berlin Wall or the liberation of Paris.

Our plan worked even better than we could have hoped. For example, in Baghdad we tried a few armored raids to probe and shock the Iraqi Army. We had not expected to see resistance collapse completely as a result, but when those armored raids actually caused the collapse of Iraqi resistance, we capitalized on our success and moved into the heart of Baghdad, a decision that testifies to the flexibility of the war plan as well as its speed.

Mr. Chairman, not only did this plan achieve its military objectives, this plan saved lives, American lives and Iraqi lives. The unprecedented use of precision not only destroyed the intended military targets, but protected innocent lives and key infrastructure, and the Iraqi people stayed home. They understood our military actions were directed against Saddam and his regime, not against them.

As a result, there is a list of crises we have averted, successes that are measured as much by what did not happen as what did. There is no food crisis in Iraq. There have been no major epidemics. There was not the refugee crisis that many predicted would destabilize the region. There was no wholesale destruction of oil wells or other critical infrastructure after the war began, and the regime did not use weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Chairman, let me say a few words about costs, or more importantly about how we are going to pay for them. The costs of reconstruction are difficult to estimate, since many of the problems we face resulted from decades of neglect and corruption, but there are a number of funding sources that can help Iraq. First, there is \$1.7 billion in formerly frozen Iraqi Government assets in the United States that the U.S. Government vested by Presidential order. Second, there is about \$700 million, and the number grows almost daily, in State- or regime-owned cash that has so far been seized and brought under our control and is available to be used

for the benefit of the Iraqi people. Third, once Iraqi oil exports resume, and with the passage of the U.N. Security Council resolution today, they can resume immediately, the proceeds from those sales will be devoted entirely to the benefit of the Iraqi people, except for a 5 percent fund that the U.N. is setting aside for reparations from past conflicts.

Under the terms of the recently passed U.N. Security Council resolution, assets from two additional sources would be placed in the Iraqi Assistance Fund, and there have been public pledges from the international community of more than \$600 million under the U.N. appeal and nearly \$1.3 billion in other offers of assistance for the food, health, agriculture, and security sectors. Indeed, I believe the passage of the resolution today is an important watershed in making it possible to get contributions on both military assistance for stability operations and on the nonmilitary side for reconstruction from many countries around the world.

Mr. Chairman, just a few words about the political side, which in the long run will turn out to be the most important, although it is not at the moment our most urgent task, but we continue to work toward the establishment of an Iraqi interim administration [IIA] which will assume increasingly greater responsibility for the administration of Iraq.

The IIA will draw from all of Iraq's religious and ethnic groups and provide a way for Iraqis to begin to direct the economic and political reconstruction of their country, but the interim administration's most important responsibility will be to set in motion a process leading to the creation of a new Iraqi Government, for example by setting up local elections, drafting a new constitution and new laws. This is a process that foreigners cannot direct. It must be a process owned by Iraqis.

In the final phase of our plan, an Iraqi Government would assume full sovereignty on the basis of elections in accordance with a new constitution. Our intention is to leave Iraq in the hands of Iraqis themselves, and to do so as soon as we can. As President Bush has said, the United States intends to stay in Iraq as long as necessary, but not a day longer. To those who fear that Baathists and Iranians may intervene when we have left, our message is simple. While we intend to withdraw as rapidly as possible from Iraqi political life and day-to-day decisions, we will remain there as an essential security force for as long as we are needed.

I would also caution that this process will take time, and it is necessary to get it right. Mr. Chairman, currently 24 coalition countries are providing military support, some of that publicly, some of it is still private. Thirty-eight nations have offered financial assistance, totaling now \$1.8 billion, and very importantly, a number of countries have made commitments to providing brigade-size and larger forces for the stability operation once the U.N. Security Council resolution has passed, as has just happened.

I would just like, before I conclude, to note that there have been some very significant successes already as a result of the efforts of ORHA and our pre-war planning. Some Iraqis today have more electric service than the past 12 years. For the first time since 1991, the people in Basrah have electricity 24 hours a day. When the national grid backbone is operational later this month, Bagh-

dad will be able to receive excess power from the north and the south, and with the removal of U.N. sanctions and the ability to start exporting, we will now be able to use Iraqi natural gas to produce another 700 megawatts of power.

Primary schools throughout Iraq opened on May 4. Jay Garner is hopeful that secondary schools and universities will open soon. We have started emergency payments to civil servants, to more than a million of them. Privately hired stevedores have begun off-loading operations and put rice directly on trucks. Currently over 1,500 tons per day are offloaded, and I could go on with more and more. A great deal is happening. More is happening every day.

Let me just conclude by mentioning the important subject of the energy infrastructure. Obviously, one of the keys to getting Iraq up and running as a country is to restore its primary source of revenue, its oil infrastructure. As with many other facets of life in Iraq, this infrastructure had been allowed to decay to a surprising degree. Fortunately, we averted the destruction of almost all of the Iraqi oil wells, and a great deal of repair work is underway to ensure that operations can safely resume.

While the coalition will be involved at the outset, the goal is to have production and marketing responsibility in the hands of a stable Iraqi authority as soon as possible. The lifting of the U.N. sanctions, which is something we have been working hard to achieve, the lifting of those sanctions today not only represents an opportunity for Iraq to start earning the oil revenues that can help rebuild that country, it also allows us to relieve shortages of gasoline and cooking fuel, since the absence of any available storage capacity had meant the refineries could no longer operate.

Mr. Chairman, let me close by thanking you for holding this hearing and thanking all the Members of Congress for the outstanding bipartisan support that we have had since the beginning of this war, indeed since the beginning of the war on terror. As I noted in my statement, we are still fighting at the same time that we are trying to win the peace, and as you noted in your article today, transforming Iraq will not be quick or easy. Our victory will be based, as you put it so well, on the kind of country we leave behind.

The stakes for our country and the world are enormous, and the continued commitment of Congress and the American people is essential. I appeal to you and your colleagues for your continued support and your leadership in this historic effort.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statements of Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and General Pace follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: Your example consistently demonstrates that America's security concerns transcend party or politics. On behalf of the men and women who serve our country so faithfully and so well, we are indeed grateful for your support. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today the Defense Department's perspective on stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

OUR IMPERATIVE—WINNING THE PEACE IN IRAQ: THE STAKES ARE ENORMOUS

Just as the Department was committed to getting right the plan for military operations in Iraq, we are equally committed to getting right the process of helping Iraqis establish an Iraq that is whole, free, and at peace with itself and its neigh-

bors. We are committed to helping Iraqis build what could be a model for the Middle East—a government that protects the rights of its citizens, that represents all ethnic and religious groups, and that will help bring Iraq into the international community of peace-seeking nations. Now that this goal is within sight, Iraq represents one of the first and best opportunities to build what President Bush has referred to as a “just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror.”

Saddam Hussein was a danger to his people and a support to terrorists and an encouragement to terrorist regimes. His removal from power opens opportunities to strengthen governments and institutions in the Muslim world that respect fundamental human dignity and protect freedom, and that abhor the killing of innocents as an instrument of national policy. Success in Iraq will continue to demoralize those who preach doctrines of hatred and oppression and subjugation. It will encourage those who dream the ancient dream of freedom. In the last half century, those ideals of freedom and self-government have been the most powerful engines of change in the world. They give us hope for further development in the Muslim world, a development that will benefit every nation throughout the world and bring us important allies in the war against terrorism.

We cannot afford to fail. We cannot afford to allow Iraq to revert to the remnants of the Baathist regime that now range throughout Iraq in their desperate bid for influence and power—or, to see it vulnerable to other extremist elements. As the distinguished Chairman said as recently as Sunday at Notre Dame, “Iraq must not become a failed state and a potential incubator for terrorist cells.” We cannot and we will not allow such a threat to rise again—nor can we dash the hopes of the Iraqi people. Make no mistake: recent efforts to destabilize Iraq represent the death rattle of a dying regime. We can defeat them. And we will. As Presidential Envoy Paul Bremer has told me, “If the Baathists have any staying power, let there be no doubt—we have more.” We will not stop our efforts until that regime is dead.

Rebuilding Iraq will require similar time and commitment. Mr. Chairman, I’ve just returned from a visit to Bosnia and Kosovo, where my main purpose was to thank our American troops for their dedication and commitment and to assure the authorities in the region that the United States will see our tasks through to completion. To those who question American resolve and determination, I would remind them that we are still playing our crucial role in Bosnia eight years after the Dayton Accord, long after some predicted we would be gone, and we continue to be the key to stability in Kosovo and even in Macedonia.

The stakes in Iraq are even greater than in the Balkans. But if the stakes are huge in Iraq, there is no question that our commitment to secure a peaceful Iraq is at least equal to the stakes. Mr. Chairman, I have noted with strong agreement your statements about the need for America to stay the course in Iraq. I applaud your determination and appreciate your support and the support of this Committee in helping the American people understand the stakes that we have in success.

Mr. Chairman, today marks only day 67 since the start of major combat operations in Iraq. It is only three weeks since President Bush announced the end of major combat operations, and, as I will explain at greater length later, smaller combat operations in Iraq still continue. Even though the war has not completely ended, we are already started on the process of rebuilding Iraq. Several months before the war even began, we established the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance in order to be able to address that task.

As the title of the office implies, much of its early focus was on planning for two disasters that fortunately did not happen: First, to provide humanitarian assistance to a war-ravaged population, including the possible victims of large-scale urban fighting, and secondly, to halt the environmental damage that was anticipated from large-scale torching of the Iraqi oil fields and to begin the reconstruction of that vital national asset. Thanks to the speedy success of the military operation, the task we face has turned out to be very different. There is no humanitarian crisis in Iraq.

The humanitarian problems of war have been largely avoided, in no small measure because of the speed with which the campaign was carried out. However, a great deal of other work remains to be done, most of it anticipated in ORHA’s planning and staffing, work such as restoring rapidly the functioning of the electric power in Iraq and restoring essential medical services. Most of these problems are not primarily a result of the war, but rather the result of decades of tyrannical neglect, where the wealth and treasure of the country was poured into creating palaces, building tanks and procuring weapons of mass destruction, instead of caring for the Iraqi people. That damage has been compounded by widespread looting in the aftermath of the Saddam regime, some of it clearly conducted by surviving elements of the regime themselves. The task before us is more about construction than reconstruction—the building of a society that was allowed to rot from within for more than three decades by one of the world’s worst tyrants. The good news in all

of this is that the Iraqi people will be able to notice improvements in their normal lives long before we have reached the full potential of this country—one of the most important in the Arab world.

The level of pre-war neglect and repression was as widespread and as systematic as Saddam's methods of terror. As the uncovering of mass graves is revealing to a world that should have known before, tens of thousands of Iraqis have been brutally executed by Saddam's regime. Families, businesses and even cultures were destroyed, as we saw in Saddam's brutal attempt to wipe out the Marsh Arabs, an ancient people with a remarkable culture in southern Iraq. The latter also represents a horrific act of ecological terrorism, which others are left to fix. The following list suggests the widespread neglect of what we consider basic services, but for Saddam many were used as instruments of control.

Before the war:

- Large numbers of Iraq's children under five years old suffered from malnutrition;
- Only 60% of the Iraqi people had access to safe drinking water;
- 10 of Basrah's 21 potable water treatment facilities were not functional;
- 70% of Iraq's sewage treatment plants needed repair. According to UNICEF reports, some 500,000 metric tons of raw or partially treated sewage was dumped into the Tigris or Euphrates rivers, which are Iraq's main source of water;
- 80% of Iraq's 25,000 schools were in poor condition; in some cases, as many as 180 students occupied one classroom—with an average of one book per six students—while at the same time every one of the first 100 or so schools we inspected in Southern Iraq had been used as military command posts and arms storage sites;
- Iraq's electrical power system operated at half its capacity;
- Iraq's agriculture production had dropped significantly;
- Iraq's oil infrastructure was neglected.

Obviously, it will take time to reverse the effects of persistent, systematic neglect. But, if the task is enormous, even at this very early stage, there are many reasons for optimism. Deputy Commander of Central Command, LTG John Abizaid, who also commanded U.S. peacekeeping troops in Bosnia and in Kosovo, reported after a recent visit to Baghdad that we are already much further along in Iraq than we were in either of those two places at a comparable stage. Despite claims that there were no plans for peace operations in the wake of military operations, Presidential Envoy Bremer and Jay Garner are implementing plans drawn up long before the war to strengthen and rebuild Iraq. Assertions that we are already failing—reminiscent of similar assertions that the military plan had taken us into a quagmire just one week into the campaign—reflect both an incomplete understanding of the situation as it existed in Iraq before the war and an unreasonable expectation of where we should be now.

The situation in Iraq right now is difficult—it's very difficult. But, it was even more difficult a couple weeks ago, and worse yet a couple months before that. We continue to make progress in what was expected to be an extremely difficult situation. As press accounts continue to report what is wrong, I would say, we don't want less of these reports, we want more—because we are eager to see revelations in the press about what needs our attention. And we're interested in the opinions of a people who are newly free. If the situation in Iraq is somewhat messy now, it's likely to seem even messier as Iraqis sort out their political process. But, that is part of self-determination. We expected this period of uncertainty and our plans anticipated it.

However, there is also a great deal of good news, and it is important to report that also. I will be discussing some of it later in my statement, but first let me address what is unquestionably our most immediate challenge, and that is establishing secure and stable conditions throughout the country.

SECURITY IS PRIORITY NUMBER ONE

Our most urgent task in the post-Saddam Hussein era is to establish secure and stable conditions throughout the country. Secretary Rumsfeld reiterated recently, "security remains the number one priority in Iraq" precisely because security and stability are a fundamental prerequisite for everything else we need to accomplish in Iraq—to provide the basics of normal life and services, and beyond that, to create a climate where people can express political views in an atmosphere free of fear and intimidation, something that Iraqis have been unable to do for decades.

Much of what I read on this subject suggests a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of the security problem in Iraq, and in particular, a failure to appreciate that a regime which had tens of thousands of thugs and war criminals on its payroll does not disappear overnight. The people who have created the mass graves that are now being uncovered in Iraq represent a threat to stability that was not eliminated merely when the statues came tumbling down in Baghdad. I have read recently that unnamed officials and experts say that the Pentagon ignored lessons from a decade of peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans and Afghanistan. It seems to me that those speaking anonymously ignore the difference between normal peacekeeping operations and the kind of situation that we are now in.

In just the last 24 hours alone, in Baghdad the 3rd Infantry Division raided a Baath Party meeting and detained 9 Baathists. In Fallujah, which continues to be a hotbed of Baathist activity, some of it with connections to foreign extremists, an Iraqi vehicle attacked a checkpoint of the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment and two enemy were killed and one detained. In the same area, three Iraqi snipers engaged U.S. troops and, in a third incident, a Bradley was disabled by an rocket propelled grenade fired from a mosque. In Baqubah, again in just the last 24 hours, the 4th Infantry Division conducted a raid and captured seven Iraqis and seized 15 million dinars. In Al Kut, a patrol of the 1st Marine Division engaged 20 enemy, killed two, wounded one, and captured 11. There were no U.S. casualties in any of these incidents, but they illustrate the level of continued hostile activity, much of it apparently associated with elements of the old regime.

In short, while major combat operations have ended, American soldiers continue to be shot at almost daily. While we made substantial progress in catching the people on the black list, there is still additional work that needs to be done. We face in Iraq a situation where a substantially defeated enemy is still working hard to kill Americans and Iraqis who are trying to build a new and free Iraq in order to prevent Iraqi society from stabilizing and recovering. Bizarre as it may sound, their goal is to create nostalgia for Saddam Hussein. We cannot allow them to succeed. We need to recognize that this is completely different from Haiti, Bosnia or Kosovo, where opposition ceased very soon after peacekeeping troops arrived in force.

In those situations, we could successfully adopt a strategy that emphasized the intimidating effect of presence, rather than active combat operations. Indeed, the strategy in both those places was to minimize the extent to which we got involved in direct confrontation with any of the local forces. We do not have the choice in Iraq of avoiding confrontation with the repressive elements of the old regime. We have to eliminate them, root and branch. We will do so, but it will take time.

It's perhaps worth noting that the striking exception in that list of peacekeeping operations is the case of Somalia, where we, in fact, encountered the enormous difficulties of taking on armed elements without adequate force and preparation. This task requires more than just military policemen. There is a very difficult balance to be struck, particularly in Baghdad, between providing ordinary civil order forces on the streets—which we are doing—and being prepared to deal with snipers and armed bands. CENTCOM is making that transition. There are now 45,000 Coalition military personnel in the Baghdad area, approximately 21,000 of whom are actively involved in security operations. In just the last 24 hours alone, the 3rd Infantry Division has conducted nearly 600 patrols, secured 202 fixed sites, and manned 85 checkpoints. The total number of patrolling battalions in Baghdad has increased in just the last 24 hours from 22 to 29. Again, General Abizaid reports from his recent visit that we are already seeing much more commerce, many more people on the street, and much shorter gas lines. In Sadr City—the notorious Shi'a slum in Baghdad that used to be known as Saddam City—the people are already reporting that their conditions are better than before the war. General Pace will be able to comment on that in more detail.

We are making progress. In my most recent conversation with Presidential Envoy Bremer, he reports that, while the security situation is serious—and still imposes severe restrictions on our ability to move freely—Baghdad is not a city in anarchy—shops are open and the city is bustling with traffic. Let me offer some details about our progress in achieving law and order: In Baghdad, some 7,000 Iraqi police are on duty, and reports of looting, curfew violations and gunfire are decreasing. However, one of our principal challenges is that the old Iraqi police are much less unable than we had planned. Their leadership was corrupted by the old regime and they were trained to raid people's homes at night rather than conduct street patrols.

It is also important to distinguish the security situation in different parts of the country. Most of the attention, appropriately, is on Baghdad, and there is no question that Baghdad is one of the keys to the future of the country. We would make a mistake if we saw it as the only one and overemphasized the importance of the

capital. For example, the second largest city in the south, Basrah, with a population of almost 1.3 million people, most of them Shi'a and overwhelmingly grateful to be free of Saddam's tyranny, is now stable.

In Nasiriyah, local police are now armed and the force has grown from 350 to over 600. In Diwaniya, 277 Iraqi police officers have been hired, and the coalition is installing two "911" emergency phone lines. A USAID DART team (Disaster Assistance Response Team) recently visited Karbala and according to their recent cable, the "city is in the safe hands of the U.S. Marines . . . who have succeeded in establishing a largely stable and secure environment." This is obviously a good news story, and we're working to replicate it throughout the country.

Perhaps the single most important factor in achieving a more secure environment is the active engagement and support of the people of Iraq. Members of local populations continue to come forward and provide information about subversive activities and weapons caches.

It is also important to recognize that the situation we face is in no small measure a result of the success of our military plan, which I will discuss in more detail, and the speed with which we were able to collapse the main structures of the regime.

In Northern Iraq, including the two large cities of Mosul and Kirkuk, with a combined population of more than 2.5 million, Major General Dave Petraeus and the 101st Air Assault Division have been largely successful in creating a stable situation. There remain some problems, most significantly those arising out of the property disputes created by Saddam's policy of Arabization—a kind of slow-motion ethnic cleansing—but we are taking measures to address that. We have already sent a study team led by former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq William Eagleton and including some distinguished experts from Poland, the Czech Republic, and Bosnia, which have had experience with these kinds of problems in the past—to come up with some recommendations about how these problems can be solved by peaceful legal means and discourage the use of force. It also remains the case that there still appear to be some active organized cells of old regime elements in those cities that are still working to attack us and defeat the coalition effort.

Finally, I would note a possibly very significant success story in the relatively smaller city of Karbala (population 500,000), whose significance far exceeds its size. As one of the two holy cities of Shi'a Islam, it has enormous potential for pointing the direction for Iraqi society. There, as already noted, the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Marines has worked effectively with local officials to create what are reportedly excellent conditions of law and order in this key town. A political officer from our Embassy in Kuwait visited Karbala recently and reported that, "With support from U.S. military forces, moderate reformers are engaged in audacious experiment aimed at building democratic rule in one of Shi'ism's two holiest cities. In cooperation with Civil Affairs Teams from 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, they have achieved notable successes." Karbala's infrastructure is largely functioning, although problems remain. Electricity service has returned to pre-war levels, and almost all homes have running water. The three local hospitals are open, though they lack many basic medicines and supplies. Marine engineers are busy repairing local schools, hospitals, and the water plant. The local television station is privately owned and relatively unbiased.

Most significantly, in addition to fostering the reestablishment of basic public services, the Marines have supported the emergence of a functional, competent provisional government in Karbala Province that advocates a secular democratic future for Iraq. Significantly, the leadership of this new secular and democratic local government is a religious figure, Shaykh Ali Abdal Hassan Kamuna. He is not only a Said or descendant of the Prophet Mohammed and the member of a prominent local tribal clan, but he is also a member of the local secular intelligentsia. The council elites contains other senior tribal figures, but also five other Saids and representatives of the secular intelligentsia and business world, including a university professor, civil engineer, a merchant, a retired army colonel, several lawyers, sociologists and an ophthalmologist. Religious intelligentsia is represented by a shaykh who endured 12 years in Saddam's prisons for his part in the 1991 Shi'a uprising.

The fact that a new day has dawned in Iraq was nowhere so evident as the recent Shia pilgrimage in the city of Karbala. For the first time since Saddam's regime, more than a million Shia pilgrims walked to that holy city without fear and without violence, something that had been illegal for twenty-six years.

It is worth noting the surviving elements of the Baathist regime target not only our troops but also aim at destabilizing Iraqi society. There are indications that some of the most serious looting that is continuing should more accurately be described as acts of sabotage. They seem specifically targeted at making it more difficult to repair those facilities such as power plants that are critical to restoring some of the basic functioning of society.

In judging the success or failure of the military plan for dealing with the aftermath of the collapse of the regime, one cannot judge it against a standard of unachievable perfection. There is no plan that could have achieved all the extraordinary speed of the plan and, at the same time, have been able to flood the country with 100,000 military policemen. Choices had to be made. I think that we made choices that saved both American and Iraqi lives, and prevented damage to the environment and to the resources of the Iraqi people.

It's also worth pausing for a moment to think about the alternative if we had simply waited for another decade or two until this regime collapsed. Setting aside the horrors the Iraqi people would have suffered in that time and the threat that it would have presented to us and our friends in the region, the eventual collapse of the Saddam regime would almost certainly have created a situation of some anarchy. The difference in what has happened is not only that we ended that threat and that horror sooner rather than later, but we are now in a position, working with our coalition partners and with the Iraqi people, to restore security and stability much faster and more thoroughly than would have happened in our absence.

PLANNING TO GET IT RIGHT

Starting in January of this year, we recruited Jay Garner to stand up the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, the first time, to my knowledge, that we have created an office for post-war administration before a conflict even started. It was obviously a sensitive matter, because we did not want to do anything that would undercut the efforts to achieve a diplomatic resolution of the crisis presented by Iraq's defiance of UN Security Council Resolution 1441. For that reason also, we did not brief key Members of Congress in as much detail as we would have liked. We should have ensured that Jay Garner had the opportunity to brief you before he left for the theater. We will work hard to do our best to remedy that situation, including arranging secure video-teleconferences with Presidential Envoy Bremer and Mr. Garner, as appropriate.

Having said that, let me also say that we picked Jay Garner because he had demonstrated at other times in his career, and most significantly when he was a commander in the extraordinarily successful Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq in 1991, a capacity for putting organizations together quickly and energizing them and focusing on getting practical tasks accomplished. The magnitude of his efforts goes under appreciated, in part because so much of his energy was appropriately focused on preparations to handle large numbers of refugees and to put out extensive oil well fires—neither of which, fortunately, happened, in no small measure because of the speedy success of the military plan to which I have now referred several times. It is ironic, in fact, that we seem to be criticized not only for lack of planning but also for too much planning when people complain that we contracted with some corporations—to be able to take on these tasks quickly.

Let me give you further insight into the extent of our planning. An interagency Political Military Cell was formed in July of 2002; an Executive Steering Group was formed just a month later. We began planning efforts for Humanitarian and Reconstruction issues in the fall of 2002.

This planning provided the basis for the creation of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, which formally came into existence this past January.

Fortunately, a great deal of that planning turned out not to be needed. And that is, in some measure, because of the military plan. Allow me to briefly discuss the basis for CENTCOM's plan, and then I will address some of the crises that were averted precisely because of that plan.

Military plan: At the heart of the military plan was the imperative to defeat Iraq's major combat forces. The emphasis was on speed. We consciously chose to keep our force size relatively small, but packing a powerful punch, limiting the amount of people and materiel deployed on the initial thrust into Iraq. This plan gave great flexibility. These forces quickly plunged deep into Iraq, bypassing a good portion of the country in their push to Baghdad. Despite the fact that Saddam's regime had strategic warning of an impending attack, because of this swift attack, coalition forces were able to achieve tactical surprise. Beginning the ground war before the major air campaign was another surprise for the Iraqis, since it broke with the expected model of Operation Desert Storm.

In short, we began the war with a timetable the regime did not expect and we combined it with a speed that made it difficult for the regime to react and regroup. The enemy was never able to mount a coherent defense; nor was it able to blow up dams, bridges and critical infrastructure—or use weapons of mass terror—perhaps because it was caught so completely off guard.

In less than three weeks, we were in Baghdad, and, with the toppling of Saddam's statue, history's annals tallied another victory for freedom akin to the fall of the Wall in Berlin or the liberation of Paris. Our plan worked even better than we could have hoped. For example, in Baghdad we tried a few armored raids to probe and to shock the Iraqi Army. We hadn't expected to see resistance collapse in Baghdad completely as a result. When these armored raids actually caused the collapse of Iraqi resistance—before the larger force that was planned for could arrive—we capitalized on our success, and moved into the heart of Baghdad—a decision that testifies to the flexibility of the war plan as well as to its speed.

Not only did this plan achieve its military objectives, this plan saved lives—American lives and Iraqi lives. The unprecedented use of precision not only destroyed the intended military targets, but protected innocent lives and key infrastructure. And as a result, the Iraqi people stayed home; they understood military actions were directed against Saddam and his regime—not against them.

Crises averted: We can also judge the success of the military operation in Iraq as much by what didn't happen as by what did:

- There is no food crisis in Iraq. Fortunately, we did not need all the humanitarian assistance stocks we had planned for. . . . The coalition is working closely with the World Food Program to reestablish food distribution throughout Iraq.
- There have been no major epidemics. The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance is working to reestablish a Ministry of Health, and we have seen active cooperation among ORHA, the World Health Organization and the emerging Iraqi Ministry of Health.
- There was no refugee crisis that many predicted would destabilize the region. Due to the accuracy of the military campaign, residents felt safe enough to stay in their homes, contrary to many pre-war forecasts. Those who fled from Saddam Hussein moved in with friends and relatives in secure areas.
- There was no wholesale destruction of oil wells or other critical infrastructure after the war began. Efforts are underway to restore oil production as quickly as possible to provide the Iraqi people with their primary source of revenue.
- The regime did not use weapons of mass destruction.

As we continue to study Operation Iraqi Freedom, we will note other important lessons. Above all, we can be confident that a remarkable plan combined with the bravery and skill of American Armed Forces contributed in very great measure to its overall success.

The costs of reconstruction in Iraq are difficult to estimate since many of the problems we face resulted from decades of the regime corruption, mismanagement and tyranny. Damage due to the war was relatively small-scale. There are a number of funding sources that can help Iraq.

First, there is \$1.7 billion in formerly frozen Iraqi government assets in the U.S. that the U.S. Government vested by Presidential order. Second, about \$700 million in state or regime owned cash has so far been seized and brought under U.S. control in accordance with the laws of war, available to be used for the benefit of the Iraqi people.

Third, once Iraqi oil exports resume, those proceeds will be available for the benefit of the Iraqi people.

Under the terms of the proposed UN Security Council resolution, assets from two additional sources would be placed in the Iraqi Assistance Fund. Other countries are called to place in the Fund any Iraqi government assets, or assets that have been removed from Iraq by Saddam Hussein or other senior officials of the former regime, held in their countries. And the remaining balance in the UN's "Oil For Food" escrow account is to be turned over to the Fund.

There have been public pledges from the international community of more than \$600 million under the UN appeal and nearly \$1.3 billion in other offers of assistance for the food, health, agriculture, and security sectors. We anticipate other contributions as well, including troop contributions to create Multi-National Divisions of peacekeeping troops.

Finally, Congress has appropriated approximately \$2.5 billion for reconstruction efforts. There are also additional authorities that we can draw from if needed, such as the Natural Resources Risk Remediation Fund, which can be used for repairing damage to the oil facilities in Iraq.

POLITICAL SITUATION

As I mentioned earlier, in the city of Karbala, because the presence of U.S. Marines has supported the emergence of a functional, competent provisional govern-

ment in Karbala province that advocates a secular, democratic future for Iraq. That's good news—an indication, we hope, of more to come.

If such a sign at the local level is positive, there is cause for optimism on a national level as well. There has already been an acceptance of the idea of a unified Iraq among all Iraqis' Kurds, Arabs, Sunni and Shi'a and members of smaller minorities.

With Presidential Envoy Bremer's order last Friday that banned senior members of the Baath Party from positions of authority in Iraq, the people of Iraq can be assured that their way forward will not be blocked by remnants of the regime that terrorized them for decades. Baathist remnants and Iranian-oriented theocratic groups constitute, at present, our main concerns with respect to the political reconstruction of Iraq. To deal with these concerns, we must encourage the rest of the Iraqi population to become more politically active and organized. We are confident that neither group constitutes a large segment of Iraqi society—they may have a temporary advantage due to their greater degree of organization, but they can be marginalized as wider and wider swathes of Iraqi society become involved in the country's political life.

Iraqi Interim Administration: We continue work towards the establishment of an Iraqi Interim Administration, which will assume increasingly greater responsibility for the administration of Iraq. The IIA will draw from all of Iraq's religious and ethnic groups and will provide a way for Iraqis to begin immediately to direct the economic and political reconstruction of their country.

Over time, the IIA will take control of an increasing number of administrative functions. But the Interim Administration's most important responsibility will be to set in motion the process leading to the creation of a new Iraqi government, for example, by setting up local elections, drafting a new constitution and new laws. This is a process that foreigners cannot direct; it must be a process owned by Iraqis. Our task is to create the conditions in which they can formulate a process and then pick their leaders freely. An Interim Administration would be a bridge from the initial administration of basic services to an eventual government that represents the Iraqi people.

Iraqi government: In the final phase of our plan, an Iraqi government would assume sovereignty on the basis of elections in accordance with a new constitution. Our intention is to leave Iraq in the hands of Iraqis themselves as soon as we can. As President Bush has said, the United States intends to stay in Iraq as long as necessary, but not a day longer. To those who fear that Baathists and Iranians may intervene when we have left, our message is simple: while it is our intention to withdraw relatively rapidly from Iraqi political life and day-to-day decisions, we will remain in Iraq as an essential security force for as long as it takes. But I would also caution that this process will take time and is also worth getting right.

EXTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, COALITION AND UN

That so many nations came together speaks to the enormity of the threat posed by a vicious dictator in possession of weapons of mass destruction. The coalition acted to ensure that a regime that places little value on the lives of its own people—or those of others—will no longer be able to possess and pursue—or export—the means of mass terror. A significant consequence of Saddam's removal is that an industrious, educated people have reason to believe that representative government is within their grasp. The men and women of our American and coalition forces performed their missions with incredible courage and skill, and we are enormously proud of them.

To help Iraq take its place among peace-seeking nations, the international community has a responsibility to ensure this vision becomes a reality. And the coalition is committed to working with international institutions. To date, coalition partners have contributed in great measure to the progress described. Currently, 24 coalition countries are providing military support—some of which is public, some of which is private. Thirty-eight nations have offered financial assistance that totals more than \$1.8 billion. Here are a few examples of coalition support:

- Greece has given some 20 tons of clothing and food;
- The Czech Republic has deployed a field hospital to Basra and has sent aid convoys with medicine, drinking water, tents and blankets;
- Spain has a 150-person health team in Iraq, and is helping repair water and electrical systems;
- Lithuania has sent orthopedic surgery specialists to Um-Qasr.
- Jordan has sent two field hospitals and Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. have each sent one.

There are many other contributions, and they will be described in the future. Our continued progress will depend on international assistance, including that of the United Nations. To facilitate our goals, we advocate a Security Council resolution that will lift the sanctions from the Iraqi people, define the UN's role in Iraq, and encourage the greater international community to participate in building a free and peaceful Iraq. This support must be geared for the long haul for, as one Iraqi councilman in Um-Qasr has said, "it will take time. People need to understand that we cannot undo years of Saddam overnight."

CHALLENGES AND SUCCESSES

We knew that certain systems and services we take for granted here would not exist in a formerly totalitarian regime. And we also knew that we could not fully understand the scope of Iraq's needs until we were in the country and on the ground. One area that did surprise us, as I mentioned, was the extent of decay in Iraq's overall infrastructure. The coalition campaign went to great lengths to preserve Iraq's schools, mosques, hospitals, bridges, dams and roads. But, it has become clear that the Baath regime did not.

As with any plan, we were ready to readjust and recalibrate when we could carefully assess conditions. We are doing that, and have begun addressing Saddam's legacy of destruction and decay. We began by calling in civilian companies familiar with tackling vast rebuilding challenges. USAID is developing a contractual mechanism to permit immediate action by Bechtel for emergency repair of power facilities. Among other successes we can point to are the following:

- The World Food Program has large stocks of food in Iraq and has plans to bring in each month some 487,000 metric tons; June's rations are on their way. Although it will be a challenge to distribute the food, we're working with the WFP manager at CENTCOM to get it done;
- Some Iraqis have more electric service than in the past 12 years. For example, people in Basrah have electricity 24 hours a day. Only Baghdad suffers from electrical shortages above pre-war levels. When the National Grid Backbone is operational later this month, Baghdad will receive excess power from the north and south;
- Primary schools throughout Iraq opened on May 4. Jay Gamar is hopeful that secondary schools and universities will open soon;
- Emergency civil servant payments have been made to more than a million civil servants;
- Baghdad's water system is at 60% of pre-war levels; in some places where there is reliable electric power, there are claims of higher levels of drinkable water than before the war;
- Privately hired stevedores began ship off-loading operations and put rice directly on trucks. Currently, over 1,500 tons per day are off-loaded.
- In a first, the UN will use oil-for-food funds to buy Iraq's cereal crop.
- In Karbala, the DART team reports that 130 school buildings have been cleared of unexploded ordinance; battalion teams have begun the renovation of five schoolbuildings.

Energy infrastructure: One of the keys to getting Iraq up and running as a country is to restore its primary source of revenue: its oil infrastructure. As with many other facets of life in Iraq, this infrastructure had been allowed to decay to a surprising degree. Fortunately, the coalition plan averted the destruction of many of the oil wells. And a great deal of repair work is underway to ensure operations can safely resume at oil facilities. While the coalition will be involved at the outset, the goal is to have production and marketing responsibility in the hands of a stable Iraqi authority as soon as possible. Iraqi oil operations are now being run by an Interim Management Team, led by Thamir Ghadban, who was a senior Oil Ministry official under the former regime. Ghadban is advised by an American former oil executive and the former head of Iraq's State Oil Marketing Organization. The Iraqis have demonstrated in the past their skills in operating their energy infrastructure in the face of adversity. We are confident they will do even better now.

The resolution before the UN Security Council will also relieve shortages of gasoline and cooking fuel. The resolution envisions the resumption of oil exports, and provides that revenues be deposited in the Development Fund for Iraq, with transparency provided by independent auditors and an international advisory board.

Decisions regarding the long-term development of Iraq's oil resources and its economy will be the responsibility of a stable Iraqi government. The United States is

dedicated to ensuring that Iraq's oil resources remain under Iraqi control. Iraq's resources—including all of its oil—belong to all of Iraq's people.

Mr. Chairman, let me close by thanking you for holding this hearing and thanking all the Members of the Congress for the outstanding bipartisan support that we've had since the beginning of this war. As I noted in my statement, we are still fighting a war at the same time that we are struggling to win the peace. And as you noted in your article today, transforming Iraq will not be quick or easy. And our victory will be based, as you put it so well, on the "kind of country we leave behind." The stakes for our country and for the world are enormous, and the continued commitment of the Congress and the American people is essential. I appeal to you and your colleagues for your continued support and leadership in this historic effort.

**PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENERAL PETER PACE, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF**

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today to discuss U.S. policy and plans for Iraq stabilization and reconstruction. I'd like to first thank you for your continued support to the men and women of our armed forces. That support is as critical to our success now in the post-conflict phase as it was during the conflict, and we greatly appreciate it.

Major combat operations in Iraq have ceased, yet much work lies ahead as we stabilize the country and help the Iraqis reconstruct their government and economy.

MILITARY ORGANIZATION

When General Tommy Franks declared the liberation of Iraq, he also announced the creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The CPA temporarily administers the government, pending the people of Iraq's adoption of a new constitution, and the formation of a new government under that constitution. As the military commander, General Franks was the initial head of the CPA, and all coalition forces and other activities in Iraq, such as the Office of Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction (ORHA), reported to him. Ambassador Bremer is now the head of the CPA, and General Franks has returned to his headquarters in Tampa.

Central Command's military organization in Iraq is now Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7), commanded by Lieutenant General David McKiernan. All coalition military forces in Iraq are under CJTF-7, which reports back to General Franks in his continuing role as Commander, U.S. Central Command.

Secretary Rumsfeld has directed General Franks, as the Commander of U.S. Central Command, to secure and stabilize the country in direct support of Ambassador Bremer. Those military tasks include deterring hostilities; maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity and security; searching for, securing, and destroying weapons of mass destruction; and assisting in carrying out U.S. policy.

SECURITY

Today, security is the military coalition's highest priority. The situation is relatively calm throughout Iraq, with isolated incidents of anti-coalition activity. We continue to see low-level violence from Ba'athist remnants and criminals, particularly in Baghdad. The population continues to provide information on subversive groups and weapons caches to assist coalition forces in eliminating threats to a safe and secure environment. We have identified the high threat areas and are focusing the patrolling efforts there. We are conducting both fixed site security, as well as roving patrols, day and night.

TROOP STRENGTH

We continue to adjust the mix and number of our military forces to meet the needs of the current situation. Today, the 3d Infantry Division, a brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, and elements of the 2nd Light Cavalry Regiment are focused on providing security and stability in Baghdad. In addition, the 1st Armored Division continues its deployment to Iraq, with all division personnel now in theater and their onward staging, movement and integration due to complete on 26 May. We will continue to assess the situation and adjust the future force structure mix as required.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

I also want to clarify our rules of engagement for these forces. Some press reports have stated that looters will be shot on sight, and that is simply not accurate. Coalition soldiers retain their inherent right to self-defense, and they use that avenue when necessary, and only when necessary. Simple looting does not warrant shooting Iraqi civilians. Coalition soldiers will, however, arrest and hold those caught in criminal acts.

IRAQI SUPPORT

Coalition military forces are vigorously recruiting and training Iraqi police elements. This is an ongoing process, and our greatest challenge is the vetting and training of suitable candidates. The status varies by city, but Baghdad now has over 7,000 police officers that have been rehired. However, that number is less than half of what we assess is required for Baghdad alone, and we will continue to work to recruit and train police officers throughout Iraq.

COALITION SUPPORT

Negotiations and discussions for recruiting and integrating coalition military forces from other nations continue. While some countries' domestic sensitivities limit the details that can be discussed openly, I'm happy to report that Poland, Spain, Italy, Denmark, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Ukraine, and Romania have already agreed to provide forces. As we firm up commitments from these nations, U.S. Central Command will work with the appropriate country's planners to coordinate force flow into the theater.

The composition of our military forces in Iraq will change over time, as heavy combat units are eventually withdrawn and replaced with less heavily armored forces, more military police, engineers, and the like. The exact timelines for withdrawal and/or replacement of U.S. forces has yet to be determined. The presence of U.S. forces, however, remains event-driven, and not timeline-driven.

The coalition military forces have demonstrated speed, flexibility and precision throughout this war. They are now working to provide a secure and stable environment for post-conflict activities, allowing the people of Iraq the opportunity to make their own decisions regarding their future. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz. The committee will have a 7-minute-per-member question period at this point. I will ask the timekeeper to start the 7-minutes on my questions, but I want to start with some comments.

I appreciate very much the testimony you have just given. As you would confirm, we visited 2 weeks or so ago, and my plea to you was to come before the committee, as you have today, with a comprehensive statement. To my knowledge this is the first time that I have been privy to an all-points view of what is going on in the country. The American people I think will benefit from the fact you have given us some good news. There have been remarkable achievements that by and large are unrecognized.

Likewise, I appreciate very much the thought that, perhaps through secure television, there could be regular reports to this committee, and perhaps to other Senators as well. We had the benefit of progress reports on the war from the Department of Defense daily up in S. 407, and we appreciate that. Most of us were there at 8 o'clock in the morning, as you were. The military came over, which was tremendously important in terms of instilling confidence in all of us in what was occurring, and the support mechanisms, I would simply say that was tremendously important during all of this period.

You could just say, well, this is going to go on for a long time, these daily briefings, and we understand that. There has to be a reasonable situation to warrant these briefings, but there also have to be some ways in which the good news is conveyed, in addition

to the other things you have to say to some of us, even with our own interpretations.

Tom Friedman of the New York Times has written about the fact, as you have suggested today, that we have discovered that the Iraqi people were really beaten down. This is a situation which was not hopeful and prosperous for anybody except for the regime. Here you have people who, as you pointed out, have not had electric power, in some cases, ever, and in other cases not for quite a long while. This is a really beaten-down situation.

Not only that, but in terms of morale of the people, these are folks who are not just leaping to take advantage of political action and volunteering to run in the next election or take part in the council. A good number of them, obviously and unfortunately most of the middle class, as I have observed, are hanging back wondering if Saddam is going to return. If not Saddam, the Baathist Party types who you have had to battle sort of day by day are not going to do them in.

This is still a repressive situation in the perception of many people. The Iraqi people have not only the inconveniences of lack of power or lack of security, but they are really still not sure who is in charge. They are not sure about our staying power and resolve to make sure that the bad people do not finally return. That can be changed by the President saying, as he said to many Members of Congress today, stay the course, we are going to be there as long as we need to be. When that assurance comes, and you have given it to us again with a lot of supporting detail, that is tremendously important.

Now, likewise, I appreciate the perception by Mr. Bremer that the Baathist people are not the ones who are going to restore democracy or even bring about any vestige of it, and that they are the enemy. There are people I know within our own government who have been sort of battling back and forth in terms of freedom of speech and freedom of all of this, and I understand that. It is an honest philosophical disagreement, but here we have got people who are cowed in the country by recognition that the same types are still around. How do you develop others? Very tough on the political side, quite apart from the security arrangements.

Now, once again, we have the right kind of personnel to be there to do these things—so you have recognized these things, and I will not reiterate them because I appreciate the comprehensive statement that you have made, which I hope all of us will study.

Let me just say a few words regarding the oil situation, which began to find some clarification in the Security Council. Secretary Powell is certainly to be complimented in the remarkable work he has done. He has been supported by you and the Department of Defense, and obviously the White House. Collectively that was a very important victory in a short period of time for all who were the naysayers to come around and say sanctions will be lifted. The United States, Britain, and those who fought the war are in charge, we will review it in due course, exports can happen. Those are very big things. For those who are always diminishing American diplomacy, you know, I hope they take notice of this remarkable change.

However, having said that, if you were chief executive of Iraq oil today, the problem is still there—and you may clarify this a little bit more for us. Somebody has to deposit the money, somebody has to disburse the money, and make decisions as to who it goes to. You have set aside 5 percent for reparations and past wars, and 95 percent is out there. The transparency of all of that is obviously important, and overhanging this is the debt situation.

As you take a look, if you are chief executive of this, how much do you put into repair of that which is there, and has been in disrepair even before the damage and looting. How much do you put in new investment? How much do you allocate to debt?

Now, I had a meeting yesterday with a gentleman who has been an advisor to Russian rulers as they come and go, and his suggestion was, as perhaps Secretary Powell found, that the Russians were deeply interested in contracts. When it comes to debt, that is maybe something else. He had a lot of experience with both. They would like a lot of their debt forgiven. So would a lot of other nations who are involved in this. With that overhanging problem there, somebody has to be in charge of the fiscal situation of the country and the allocation of resources, the business management of it. There cannot be temporizing, in my judgment, about that. This is a very serious matter right now in terms of the confidence level that this money come out.

Now, in doing that, the papers today point out that the Kurds in the north, are very worried about allocation of these oil resources for, say, relief of all of the country. They would say this is ours. Well, once again, we are back into what does it mean to be an Iraqi? Is there a sense that Iraqis want to be Iraqis?

Most would say, sure, and the testimony we have had is that there is a very cultivated sense of that over decades. Still, we must promote the ability of the Iraqi people to come together and make compromises, to begin to think as we would like for Iraqis to think of themselves, as a cohesive society and country that are prepared to have great diversity in one government as opposed to a theological tyranny. All of these things you have thought of, and you must do so every day.

Specifically, on the question of the oil money and the management of resources, those are not the only revenues. You have pointed out some others, but I am not sure how many taxes are being collected of any sort, on the fiscal side, on the income side. What can we expect and how can people manage that? In the absence of a legislature, a congress, or a President, will we make those decisions? Are they being made, or is there planning in a fiscal sense for the country presently?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. If I could say first of all, just very briefly, your suggestion of having, if not daily, at least regular briefings up here I think is an excellent one. I am impressed—Bill Luti who is sitting behind me I think was the OSD representative of the daily ones we had during the war, and it did seem to really establish a good pattern of communication, and maybe daily is too often, but let us work together and figure out what is the right schedule, because it helps us, and it is not just to transmit good news. There is plenty of bad news, too, and we could use help.

The CHAIRMAN. Because we need to share, as opposed to being ultra critical. We must be prepared to be supportive.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. And I think it is very important. I notice this on a transatlantic meeting in Europe over the weekend that a lot of our allies are reassured when they hear that, in fact, we intend to stay the course. I do not know why, after what we have done in Bosnia, they doubt it, but at any rate we need to say it.

This is an opportunity to do it, and I appreciate that, and I think you were correct in singling out Envoy Bremer's decree on de-Baathification. We are hearing already that just the mere declaration has had a big political impact.

On the key question you brought up about these decisions about—and there are many decisions, one, there are decisions about how you get the oil sector up and running and how you invest to repair it, and I was pleasantly surprised to discover that we have found an Iraqi, his name I mentioned in my testimony—Tamir Gadban—and I am told that he had a senior position in the Oil Ministry despite his refusal to join the Baath Party. It is pretty remarkable. It also says he must be extremely competent, because they did not tolerate that in other people, but he will be running it.

We have an advisory board and an American advisor who will help him make decisions and give us some guidance as to whether we think those are the right decisions. Ultimately, for the time being he is under the authority of the coalition provisional administrator, who is Ambassador Bremer.

The issues about how the revenues get spent and invested are again under the authority of the coalition provisional administration. The key individual under Ambassador Bremer is a very distinguished American official, a former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, Peter McPherson, who was the president, still is, I guess, he is on leave, from Michigan State University.

We have had some extraordinary Americans volunteer to help us out there—a former commissioner of the New York police is going to help us with the police job.

Peter McPherson I guess for the time being is a de facto finance economics minister for the provisional authority, but I would also emphasize we are looking for help everywhere we can get it, and in ORHA right now the current staffing is 617 U.S. and 471 coalition, about 1,000 people, and about 40 percent non-Americans, and I am pleased at that 40 percent number. I have been pushing particularly hard to tap into the expertise, which I think is substantial, of our friends in Poland and other Central European countries who have had to undertake this kind of tricky economic transition themselves and have a better sense of the tradeoffs than we have, with our experience of running a functioning economy, but it is a big effort. There are a lot of decisions to be made.

What I tried to describe, maybe too briefly, in my statement is, there are two things that have to happen, and they need to happen in parallel. On the one hand we need to make sure that the country runs, and it is not that we want this responsibility, but we know that if we do not take it on, and with some unity of command and some ability to make decisions, things will limp.

On the other hand, there needs to be a political process that eventually produces a legitimate government, and in that process I think our main function is just to make sure that it can take place under secure conditions, which is a long way from where we are now.

Your point about people being afraid is, I think—I mean if members of ORHA have to worry about traveling in the streets and the ministries, imagine what somebody has to think about, not if they are going to the shops in Baghdad. People are doing that on a daily basis, but if they want to speak up in support of the coalition, they may get killed. It is still a problem.

So creating secure conditions, and I think also setting the boundary lines, I think we can say that people who show that they are not willing to play by democratic rules are not included in this process, but inside the process I think we need to let Iraqis make decisions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me begin by saying in a sense you are the wrong guy for me to be questioning, and what I mean by that is, I have known you for 30 years. One of the things that I am absolutely convinced about is your absolute conviction that we have to build a stable country there as long as it takes. I remember sitting in a couple of conferences on whether NATO, and what about Bosnia, and I remember you being critical of the candidate for President then, saying we had to get out of Bosnia and we had to get out of the Balkans, and during the last campaign—

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Excuse me. The candidate was not saying that. I am sorry, let us not go into that.

Senator BIDEN. Well, it is important to go into it for this reason. One of the things I would like to know is when the President is going to tell the American people that we are likely to be in the country of Iraq for 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10 years, with thousands of forces and spending billions of dollars, because it has not been told to them yet. They have not been told. They were not told before we went in, and you knew we were going to have to stay there, and he knew.

It has not been told to them since then, and we are facing a \$400 billion deficit, and we are going to be left holding the bag here a year from now when the military and the administration need considerable input in dollars in Iraq, and the American people are not going to understand why we are not spending it on education. Instead we are voting to spend it, as I will vote to spend it on Iraq, and that is the reason why I raise the question.

You seem to want it both ways. You ask why anyone would doubt our resolve. We have been in Bosnia for 8 years, and the problem is a lot less significant and less difficult in Bosnia than it is in Iraq. That would seem to compute that we are likely to be in Iraq for a long time, a long time. If the problems are so much more complicated, which they are—as you point out—in Iraq than in Bosnia, then we are going to be around for a long time. I do not know about you, but my home constituency does not understand that. They think Johnny and Jane are going to come marching home pretty soon.

Nobody in this country thinks we are going to be there for the next 4, 5, 6, 10 or 8 years, like in Bosnia, and so I would hope the President at some point will make our job of continuing to support him easier, which I have done every single step of the way in his effort here, and tell the American people. When are you going to say that?

Are we not likely to be—and I am asking you. Are we likely to be in Iraq for at least the next 4 years, in significant numbers with a significant monetary commitment? Is that likely?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, the problem is, it is very difficult to predict. It is possible, and it is possible that things will go faster.

Senator BIDEN. Is it possible at all, Mr. Secretary, at all to be out of there in the next 2 years?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Not necessarily out of there, but I do not know how many forces we are going to need in the next 2 years. Things are going to be very different 2 years from now than they are now. As a matter of fact, things are very, very different in Bosnia now from they were 8 years ago, and let me be clear, I did not say this is more complicated than Bosnia. I said the stakes are higher than Bosnia. In some respects, it is less complicated. It was a functioning country in important respects. It has enormous resources, which Bosnia did not have.

Senator BIDEN. It is not functioning now. You point out it is much more devastated than we thought it was going to be. There is little infrastructure left—

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. There are huge problems, but there are huge resources.

Senator BIDEN. What are the resources? I just attended the meeting with oil experts—with Mr. Larson present and with Ms. Chamberlin present—where the following numbers were, for us just to get to the point where we are talking about 1 million barrels per day export, there is going to be a need for a \$5 billion investment in the oil fields. To get to the point where you will buildup production to 5.5 million barrels per day, it is estimated, by the folks testifying today—and I would ask either of your colleagues if they disagree with this—7 to 10 years and an investment of \$30 to \$40 billion in the fields.

Now, nobody I know in the oil business is suggesting that there are going to be revenues that remotely cover the cost of rebuilding Iraq coming from those oil fields in the next 3 years. I have not heard anybody. For the record, I would love you to submit—take as much time as you want—any evidence to suggest that a significant part of the reconstruction of Iraq required in the next 3 years will come out of revenues from Iraqi oil. Would you be willing to do that for the record?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I will be happy to do it for the record.¹

Senator BIDEN. OK. Because I have not heard a single person suggest that yet, not one. And I just wonder when we are going to start leveling. Look, you want us to continue to support you. You wonder why our European friends say—how they could doubt our staying power.

¹ See page 67.

You make this case that somehow this is so fundamentally different from Bosnia. Well, how about Afghanistan? American soldiers are still being shot at. Al-Qaeda is still alive and well. The Taliban did not go anywhere. Those 60,000 forces we are talking about, they are now living in mud huts all throughout there. They are not all in Pakistan or into Iran. They are still there. It is a shambles.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I would not agree it is a shambles. The problem, if you want to shift to Afghanistan from here—

Senator BIDEN. No, no, I want to shift to the comparison. You are suggesting that the reason why you cannot bring in large numbers of police and why you did not plan on doing that is because it is implicitly incompatible with the environment that they are in—what we really need are soldiers there, not police there—and I am suggesting to you the same situation exists—

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I am saying to you 3 months from now it may be very different.

Senator BIDEN. Well, tell me the plans you have—so if it is different in 3 months you are able to drop in 6,000 police officers. Do you have a plan?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I will give you the example of Karbala. There are about 1,000 marines in that city of half-a-million, and there is effective law and order in Karbala. So that is one example of how it might work.

Senator BIDEN. What is being—

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I might ask General Pace to address the issue of where we might be 3 months from now in terms of change in composition of the force.

Senator BIDEN. Well, with all due respect, I respect the general, but his judgment about where we are 3 months from now is going to be better than most, but still it is going to be a guess where we are going to be 3 months from now. I want to know where we are today. That is what I am worried about. I am not worried about anybody being able to predict 3 months from now. What I am concerned about is that, look, I met with the British Defense Minister. What is different in the city that you acknowledge is the most stable? What are they doing differently there than we are doing in Baghdad?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Well, they have been there a lot longer. They are dealing with a population—

Senator BIDEN. A lot longer. How much longer have they been there, a week, two, three?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Oh, I think it is closer to a month, but they are dealing with a city which is very different in its composition, which is much less friendly to the kind of Baathist elements we are having trouble with. It is actually—Basrah is probably comparable to Sadr City, the large neighborhood in Baghdad, roughly in population, roughly in ethnic composition, and General Abizaid reports that Sadr City is largely stable.

We are dealing, particularly in central and north central Iraq, with armed opposition of some 30,000—I do not know the exact number, but it is several tens of thousands of people who were in the four major security organizations that kept an eye on one another and kept an eye on the Iraqi people. They are murderers,

they are torturers, their goal is to destabilize the country. Those people are largely eliminated in Basrah. At some point I think they will be eliminated even in Baghdad, and then the numbers required to do this kind of work will be a lot smaller, but it is not a simple police function, it is something closer to light infantry. General Pace, do you—

Senator BIDEN. I do not know why we cannot walk and chew gum at the same time, have police in the city and forces—

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Well, we are. I can go back and read you the statistics I read about how many people are in Baghdad today, how many of our forces are there. I think it is 21,000 that are doing patrolling duties and the number of patrols—

Senator BIDEN. They are not trained to be police.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. They are trained to do this—this is not police work. This is something closer to urban combat, and they are trained for that. General Pace.

Senator BIDEN. Looting is not urban combat, but I will come back to that later.

General PACE. Sir, I would say it is certainly not time-driven, it is event-driven. We have been in Basrah longer than Baghdad. We have been in Mosel shorter than Baghdad. Both Basrah and Mosel are in better condition securitywise than is Baghdad. Baghdad has, in addition to all its major-city problems, about 20,000 prisoners, criminal prisoners who were in jail who were released during the course of the war who have concentrated a lot of their activities. Just last night, just the patrols last night—

Senator BIDEN. But they are thugs, they are not Baathists.

General PACE. They are thugs and they need to be policed, and about 104 were policed up last night, so it is a combination of military and police. The police forces are being recruited. They are being trained, and it was a judgment going into Baghdad as to whether or not you waited outside the city to have enough forces that when you went in you could have complete control of the city and then potentially have the Fortress Baghdad fight that none of us wanted, or to take advantage of the opportunity of the speed and precision that we had, get in there quickly, take it down quickly, not destroy a city with 5 million people in it, and accept the problem of having a less secure environment than we would like to have.

So on balance, I would much rather be where I am today, at the 2-month mark worrying about police action, than at the 2-month mark still pounding away at a city because we waited too long.

Senator BIDEN. In the second round I will point out why I do not believe that they are incompatible.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. To our distinguished witnesses, thank you for coming today, and congratulations on the good work that you and your colleagues have accomplished so far. Mr. Deputy Secretary and general, give our best wishes and congratulations and thanks to our Armed Forces, our men and women who have achieved a spectacular victory. To our State Department representatives, you had a big day today at the United Nations, and give Secretary Powell our best and our congratulations.

As Chairman Lugar pointed out, this was important for America today, and important for Iraq, and quite frankly important for the United Nations as we rebuild alliances that were fractured as a result of Iraq, and strengthen these institutions that I believe will be critically important to the outcome in Iraq, as Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz has talked about today.

Mr. Secretary, you went into some detail in the last part of your testimony about the political situation and the future of Iraq, and I paraphrase your comment. I believe you said something to the effect that that may be overall the most important dynamic as you stabilize Iraq and do the things you are doing to secure Iraq, because it will be the political process, as you note, that determines what kind of Iraq we have, and that will ripple across the region.

Today's front page of the Washington Post, which you have seen—and let me quote just quickly a paragraph to set the question. "Paul Bremer, chief U.S. civilian in Iraq, said today that the selection of an interim Iraqi Government is at least 7 weeks away, prompting aspiring leaders from Kurdish and returned exile groups to warn that Iraqis are tiring of the 6-week-old U.S. occupation, and they want swift movement toward self-rule."

Yesterday's headlines in the New York Times: "Iraqi political leaders warn of rising hostility if allies do not support an interim Government." Would you share with the committee what we are doing to get to that end? I recognize, we all do, it is imperfect. It is difficult for all the reasons you mentioned and others, but I think this is a pretty serious statement coming from serious allies of ours, the two main Kurdish leaders who Senator Biden and I met with in December when we are in Iraq, they are critical to the future of Iraq, you all know that.

Some of the exiled leaders who you have strongly supported, Mr. Chalabi and others, obviously are a bit nervous about this. Can you tell us how we are going to get there?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. First of all, let me point out that, as important as that part is, the most urgent requirement remains the creation of stable and secure conditions and, in fact, while it may be the case that some Iraqis and certainly the gentlemen you quoted are impatient, or at least they want to say they are impatient, I think on the whole we hear more from Iraqis who are impatient to make sure that we are doing something about providing security and providing basic services, and there is a tension between those Iraqis who want us to be in charge and who frankly are used to the government taking care of things for them and those Iraqis who are impatient to be able to run their own affairs.

I do not think it is an accident that the ones who are most impatient on the latter point are the ones who have had the experience of 12 years of pretty free conditions in Northern Iraq. I know Ambassador Bremer went out there—at the time he went out we had, as I think also noted in that article, an expectation that we might be able to stand up an interim administration as early as the beginning of next month.

He went out there with explicit authority to make his own judgments about how right the situation was and how prepared conditions were, and I think his overall judgment, partly based on the need to focus on this restoration of security and services, but I be-

lieve also his sense that we still did not have a good enough feel for who were the appropriate people who could be brought into a group that would adequately represent the Iraqi people, I think is his reason for taking a little more time. That is not a lot of time.

And you ask about the process. The process is, in fact, in some considerable measure focused on intensive consultations which he has been conducting now with the senior leadership council that was formed in Northern Iraq just before the war, including the two principal Kurdish leaders, Talibani and Barzani, including Mr. Chalabi and Mr. Alawi and two Sunni leaders who were—I am sorry, Mr. Alawi is one of the Sunnis. Bakar al Hakim from Syria, who initially opted not to participate and has since decided he will participate, and we are looking closely to make sure that his participation remains within the bounds of legitimate political activity and does not include the importation of his Badr Corps armed people from Iran, and finally Mr. Pachachi. That was the core six, and Ambassador Bremer is consulting with those people about how to expand their numbers, and we do not have a particular figure in mind, but to a larger council that would be more adequately representative of the larger population, and then the question will be how to get from there to an interim administration.

But let me emphasize that word interim. It is really important. There is no way in present conditions to have an Iraqi administration that derives its legitimacy from Iraqi political processes. There are none. Its legitimacy really comes from its interim character and the fact that it is really a bridge paving the way to something that will provide legitimacy, so the more challenging task will be writing a constitution, which you can take your guess as good as mine. It sounds like that is a 6- to 12-month process, and getting elections organized, and there is going to be some discussion, I am sure, about whether you would start them at a national level or, I will give my bias, start working from the local level up.

I mean, if you have a situation like the one I described in Karbala, then that is a wonderful opportunity to experiment with how Iraqis can handle the political process. Obviously, most areas of Baghdad are not ready for that sort of thing yet, so I think some local experimentation I believe will be a part of getting there. It will take some time, but I think the ingredients for success are—though they have never done it before, so this is a guess, but I think the ingredients for success are very good, an educated population—we can argue about how soon those resources will be available, but one of the richest natural resource producers in the world.

And finally, and I think this is important in things that did not happen, unlike Bosnia, while there has been horrible killing, it has been the regime killing everybody. It is not one ethnic group killing another ethnic group. A lot of people expected Sunni-on-Shia violence. I think they were wrong to expect that. A lot of us were afraid that there would be Kurdish-on-Turkish, or Kurdish-on-Arab violence in the north, and while there have been isolated and tragic incidents of that sort of thing, it has not happened on a large scale, so Iraq starts, I believe, with more good will among the elements of the population toward one another than we ever had in the Balkans. That is a plus.

Senator HAGEL. I will followup on some of those on the second round. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Hagel.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to commend Chairman Lugar for scheduling this hearing. In view of the confusions, the ambiguities and contradictions that exist with respect to our policy in Iraq, I think this hearing was certainly needed. I hope it will be the first in a series of hearings. I think that may be the intention. When it comes to this Nation's foreign policy, the executive and legislative branches play complementary roles, and neither can properly fulfill its responsibilities when acting entirely on its own.

Mr. Chairman, I commend you for your tenacity in insisting on the importance of what you have called interbranch partnership on the question of Iraq. As you have written in the op ed piece which appeared in today's Washington Post, "transforming Iraq will not be easy, quick, or cheap. Clearly, the administration's planning for the post-conflict phase in Iraq was inadequate."

I am concerned that the Bush administration and Congress have not yet faced up to the true size of the task that lies ahead or prepared the American people for it, which was, of course, also a point that Senator Biden made just earlier in this hearing. And you went on to say, "the public and Congress need to know what we are getting into," and I fully agree with that.

Now, Secretary Wolfowitz, before I turn to Iraq, I want to divert for just a moment. The Economist on May 10—and the Economist by and large has been very supportive of the administration's foreign policy—has an article on Guantanamo in the course of which they say America's handling of the prisoners at Guantanamo is wrong in principle and a tactical error in its broader fight against terrorism, and they go on to question the continued holding of these people. After 16 months, none of those detained at the camp has been charged.

"The claim that America is free to do whatever it wishes with the Guantanamo prisoners is unworthy of a nation which has cherished the rule of law from its very birth, and represents a more extreme approach than the United States has taken even during periods of all-out war. It has alienated many other governments at a time when the efforts to defeat terrorism require more international cooperation and law enforcement than ever before."

I gather Guantanamo is under the supervision and jurisdiction of the Defense Department.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. That is right.

Senator SARBANES. What are your plans with respect to that situation?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Well, we continue—we pay a lot of attention to it. We are looking into—frankly, we would like to reduce the population there as much as possible, and we have made some releases. It is not an easy process.

I recall a few weeks ago, when we were on the verge of sending some detainees back to their home countries and the FBI came up with some information that suggested these people would be dangerous to release, and we had to hold it up. We are working with

a number of countries to get agreements so that if there are dangerous characters that need to be detained they can at least be detained in their home countries, and I think it is essential to point out that many of these people have very important information that can help us to prevent other terrorist attacks, and we are trying to manage the whole process in such a way that they cooperate with us and tell us what they know about the planning that they were involved in, and other terrorists who are still at large.

These people are enemy prisoners of war, and prisoners of war in a war that was conducted by the most vicious means, and in violation of all the rules of war. It is a war that is not over. If anyone has any doubt about that, we got a reminder a few days ago, and we need to treat them in that way. We treat them fairly. We treat them humanely. If it turns out that they, in fact, are harmless, they are released rather quickly. If it turns out that they are of no intelligence value, but they remain somewhat dangerous, we try to find circumstances to detain them longer, and I will take a look at that Economist article.

I agree with you that it is a matter of concern if our European allies feel that we are violating basic standards of fairness, but—and we need to perhaps do a better job of explaining what we are about, but I think the American people would have a hard time understanding why we would release people who have been involved in terrorist plotting against the United States.

Senator SARBANES. Well, if, in fact, that is the case, I do not know that I quarrel with that statement, but is that the case?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. It is the case, otherwise—we are not holding them because we enjoy it, Senator. We have really tried to prune that population down, and we continue to work at it, and where there are people who, in fact, are appropriate to be brought to some kind of trial, we are looking at military commissions for that purpose.

Senator SARBANES. Yes, well, this article says after 16 months, none of those detained at the camp has been charged. They also make the point that we have been receiving a lot of complaints from many of the 42 nations, including some of America's closest allies, whose citizens are being held at Guantanamo. I gather they are, in effect, held incommunicado. They cannot communicate either with consular officials from their countries or with lawyers, is that correct?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. They do not have access to lawyers. They do have access to officials from their own countries I think in every case, not consular officials. They do not have consular privileges, but in every case where a country has citizens there and they want access to them we provided them access.

Senator SARBANES. Well, I would send this article to you, and I would be interested if you would want to send us up a written response, and I note again in citing it that the Economist generally has been very supportive of your position, so it is not as though this is coming from a source which has been critical of the administration.

How many U.S. troops are in Iraq now, General Pace?

General PACE. There are 145,000, sir.

Senator SARBANES. And are we expecting to increase that number?

General PACE. The number is being increased as we speak, sir, by about 18,000 with the arrival of the 1st Armored Division, and then beyond that there are no current projected deployments.

Senator SARBANES. So we are going to go up to over 160,000?

General PACE. Potentially, sir, although some of the troops that are there now, the ones who did all the fighting early, as General Franks sees the opportunity, when the security environment allows he will bring home who got there first.

Senator SARBANES. Well, General Franks is stepping down, is that right?

General PACE. Sir, General Franks' time as commander there would normally end around 1 July. I believe the Secretary of Defense and the President are still discussing how long his tour will be and who would replace him.

Senator SARBANES. I gather he is retiring. There is a story on CNN to that effect. Is that correct?

General PACE. Sir, that is likely, but again it is not confirmed. The President and the Secretary to my knowledge have not made a decision, nor have they discussed the final outcome with Tom, that I know of. That is a likely outcome, sir, but it is not a decision.

Senator SARBANES. All right, just to be clear, I am looking at an Associated Press dispatch here, "U.S. Army General Tommy Franks, who planned and commanded the American-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, has decided to retire, Defense officials said Thursday."

General PACE. Sir, I am not trying to be cute at all, sir. The fact of the matter is that before he—

Senator SARBANES. I was not suggesting that you were trying to be cute.

General PACE. Before he can retire he has to ask for it, and the Senate of the United States has to say yes, he may, neither of which has happened, and then the President and the Secretary of Defense need to decide who is going to replace him, and to my knowledge, they have not decided that, so I am just trying to be accurate, sir.

Senator SARBANES. My time is up, but I just want to pursue this point quickly. Being over 160,000 troops, Secretary Wolfowitz, I would ask you whether you think it was fair to label General Shinseki's remarks back in February that we would need roughly several hundred thousand troops in post-war Iraq as an estimate "wildly off the mark."

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I would say several hundred thousand is 300,000 or more, and I do not think we are close to that.

Senator SARBANES. You would say what?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Several hundred thousand to me means 300,000 or more, and I do not think we are close to that.

Senator SARBANES. If it means 200,000, which is how I would read it, would you say we are close to that?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Well, I would—several, to me—we are close to 200,000, but the other point, there are a couple of other points, Senator, which are important to make. We are looking, particularly now that the U.N. resolution has passed, at having some substan-

tial contributions from other NATO allies and, indeed, from other countries.

Senator SARBANES. How many?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. We do not—we are just starting. There are countries that have said come talk to us after a U.N. resolution and we are going to be doing that, and the issue, too, is one number today, another number a year from now, another number 2 years from now. I think if you look at the experience in the Balkans, where we drew down from 60,000 NATO forces in Bosnia 8 years ago to 12,000 today, you can see a pretty sharp downward trend.

What concerned me most about that very large number being out there, and I think most people take several to be three or more, is the implication that we were going to treat Iraq like Japan or Germany and occupy it indefinitely, and that, frankly, is what a lot of our enemies in the Arab world were trying to say about us, and I thought it was very harmful, otherwise I would have preferred not to have commented on the whole subject.

Senator SARBANES. How many British troops are there?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. About 20,000.

Senator SARBANES. About 20,000.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.

Let me just announce that there is a supposition that there will be roll call votes starting at about 4:15. They may run back-to-back. What I would propose is that we proceed with the questioning, because our witnesses' time is very valuable, as is the time of Senators. I will recognize Senator Chafee. I will proceed to vote on anticipation that vote can be cast swiftly and return. In the event I have not, Senator Chafee, you are in charge until I return, and then you may proceed to vote and we will try to expedite that.

Senator BIDEN. That is OK by us, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand.

Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE [presiding]. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to the distinguished panel. It seems to me that we have thrown a rock into the pool that is the Middle East, and just for the sake of my question, if all goes well with restoring order in Iraq, what is the strategic vision of the ripples that are now going out from this rock? What is the strategic vision in the Middle East now?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I would say several things. I think some of them hopefully will happen even perhaps before some of the other results are achieved inside Iraq. I think one of the ripples is a positive impact on the Arab-Israeli peace process, and clearly we need it. We need to move that process forward. I think we have credibility, enormous credibility, not that we did not have it before. We have it more than we did before.

I think the removal of Saddam Hussein as somebody who was providing \$25,000 to every terrorist family is already a sign that that is having a positive impact. I think a less direct, but maybe even more important impact is that I think the defeat of Saddam Hussein has improved the strategic position of Saudi Arabia, and the events of the terrorist attack of 10 days ago demonstrate that they need an improved strategic position.

What do I mean by an improved strategic position? I mean, one, that the Saudis do not have to worry about a hostile regime to their north that was actively interested in undermining them, but second, and maybe even more important, because of the successful operation in Iraq, Secretary Rumsfeld and his Saudi counterpart 2 or 3 weeks ago now were able to agree that most U.S. forces could come out of Saudi Arabia.

That gives the Government of Saudi Arabia some freedom it has not had for 12 years to not be constantly subject to the charge leveled by Osama bin Laden that they are basing so-called crusader forces on Arab territory, and hopefully that also rebounds back into the peace process, because I think one of the things that was missing in the Camp David and Taba negotiations in 2000 and early 2001 was that the Saudis and the Egyptians did not step up to the plate, so those are big effects.

But finally, I think if we could get to the point where Iraq can be a model of free representative democratic government by an Arab standard, not—I mean, Japan's democracy is different from ours, is different from England's. Iraq's democracy will be different from Poland's and different from Romania's, but if Iraq can present an example to the Arab world that is a positive example, I think, just as we have seen the power of example operate in East Asia or in Europe, I think it can operate in the Middle East in the Muslim world.

It is hard to say exactly how. It is not a domino effect. It is not that Iraq affects the country next door, which affects—it is not a physical thing. It is a psychological and political and sort of moral impact, which can be large.

I just met with the Foreign Minister of Morocco, who was very emphatic about what a positive effect the demise of the Saddam Hussein regime had on the Arab world, and Morocco is one of those countries that is making some of the most courageous steps to try to expand the realm of political freedom and democracy in that country.

Senator CHAFEE. Could you elaborate, please, on how you see this affecting progress between the Palestinians and the Israelis?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Well, as I said, it removes a factor that was deeply opposed to progress. In fact, it is not at all insignificant that when the Arab League organized against Anwar Sadat's peace efforts 20 years ago, it was led by Saddam Hussein and it was known as the Baghdad Summit. He has clearly been openly and probably less openly on a larger scale financing and supporting terrorism among the Palestinians, and I suspect also aligning with those people—and this is important—who, one of the biggest obstacles to peace is not just the terrorism against Israelis, but the threats that arise against those Palestinians who want to make progress, so I think that is a help.

I think, as I said, the ability now of the moderate Arab countries to step up to the plate more easily is a help, but without any question, the commitment of the United States, the commitment of this President, the understanding that we have a major role to play, and I think that we have credibility in playing it that we did not have before.

The problem is incredibly difficult, let us not underestimate it, but I think the stakes are also huge. If 2 years from now, 3 years from now we could have the dual victories of a successful, prospering, free and democratic Iraq on the one hand, and a peace between Israelis and Palestinians on the other, those will be massive victories in the war against terrorism.

Senator CHAFEE. Yes, I could not agree more, and seeing as how my light is still green, could you just reaffirm the President's commitment to the "road map" in these very, very difficult times as more than ever, with increased terrorist acts, the pressure to cease the settlements and to get the parties back talking about adhering to a "road map"?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator Chafee, you have heard him say it in public, I have heard him say it in private, and in circumstances where there was no need to reaffirm his commitment. He, I believe, has understood from the beginning that it has got to be a major initiative coming off of a successful war in Iraq.

Senator CHAFEE. And my last question would be, there are those that question that commitment, and I suppose they want to see something accomplished on the settlement issue. What could you propose on that?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think I will turn to my colleagues in the State Department. This is a very tough problem, but I heard Henry Kissinger put it in a way that I thought captured the issue rather well. The Palestinians fear that Sharon is only prepared to grant them a shrunken kind of Bantustan sort of entity that would not be a State. The Israelis fear the Palestinians want a State only as a cease-fire and a stepping stone to the destruction of Israel, and I think both sides need some reassurance.

The Palestinians need some reassurance, which I think needs to come from us, that, in fact, the outcome is going to be a viable Palestinian State, and that obviously means the elimination of large areas of Israeli settlement activity, or at least a complete change in their status. At the same time, I think Israel needs the assurance that this really will be peace and not just a step on the way to something worse, and as I said, in this meeting with Europeans on the weekend, I think Europe needs to step up to the plate in terms of reassuring Israel. Both sides need reassurance, and outside parties I think have a big role to play now.

And finally, and I come back to my point about the Saudis, the Saudis in particular, but moderate Arab States in general, Egypt is important, could play a big role in part of that reassurance effort and also in, I think, encouraging the Palestinians to be reasonable on some of the more difficult issues.

Senator CHAFEE. Yes. I will make the one comment that from visits that I get from Arab emissaries, they represent that it is just going to be physically impossible in not too long a time to have the President's vision of a Palestinian State on the West Bank as the settlements continue, that it is going to be physically impossible to have that happen.

I will now, since the chairman has given me the authority, turn to Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. How do you like the sound of that word, Mr. Chairman?

Senator CHAFEE. Love it.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much. Let me thank our witnesses, and I apologize for arriving a little bit late.

I am sorry I was not at Bilderberg this weekend. I gather from my colleague from New Jersey it was a rather lively discussion with the Secretary. I will leave it at that. I do not know if time will permit me to follow two lines of questioning, but let me proceed if I can. I would like to ask you to comment on the role of international inspectors, and let me preface the question with this, if I may.

Generally, we have asked—the United States, we have called on the IAEA, as I understand it, to play more of a leading role in condemning Iran for its alleged nuclear weapons program, and I think that is the appropriate and proper thing to do, yet we appeared almost simultaneously, at least it does appear this way, to undercut the IAEA's credibility with Iraq, and let me tell you why I say that.

The IAEA, as you know, is responsible for carrying out the U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq under Resolution 1441. Its inspectors, I think most would agree, have some pretty solid information of sites, suspected links to nuclear weapons programs, along with detailed inventories of existing Iraqi inventories of low enriched uranium and spent fuel stored under IAEA physical safeguards. Since the end of the war, the United States has refused to allow the IAEA inspectors to return to Iraq to verify that no tampering with the safeguards has occurred.

At the same time, we barred UNMOVIC—if that is how you pronounce that—teams headed by Hans Blix from Iraq, and this week, after Mohammed ElBaradei issued an ominous warning that looted radioactive material may create a, to quote him, “humanitarian nightmare,” Secretary Rumsfeld expressed some flexibility on the possible return of IAEA inspectors.

I wonder if you might describe the current state of discussions for us between our government and the IAEA, and their possible return to Iraq, and second, what lay behind this month-long delay in starting these talks with IAEA? At the very least, we could have exchanged some notes, I think, on their detailed knowledge of pre-Iraqi stocks of the low enriched uranium and spent fuel cells and the like, so you would comment generally where we are with this, and if you disagree with any characterization I have made about this, certainly feel free to respond to that as well.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I honestly do not have the sort of detailed track record on who said what to whom over the last few weeks. What I do know now is that—and by the way, I am making an assumption. I know how difficult it has been just to get civilians into Baghdad for the reconstruction effort. I mean, every single new job that we had, especially if it involves protecting civilians, is another burden on CENTCOM, and that has come up over and over again in a whole bunch of issues that have no political overtone to them whatsoever.

In any case, where we are today is that we are—and the U.N. resolution obviously helps also to eliminate some of the possible barriers. We are happy to have them come. We are, I believe, in discussions with them about who would come and for what pur-

poses, but there is no desire to keep them away, and I think they do have something useful to contribute.

Senator DODD. Do you have any idea when that may occur? Are we going to try and facilitate their return, and tell me about this latest report that was described as a humanitarian nightmare. If we have actually lost materials, what can you tell us about that?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I have seen the same reports that there has been some looting of sites where people may have picked up radioactive material. We are not sure who did it, or therefore why they might have done it. If they did not know what they were doing, obviously they could have caused themselves a lot of trouble.

General Pace, can you comment on how many of the sites are currently secured?

General PACE. Sir, there are 22 known sites, and they are all secure right now. I am not 100 percent sure of the details on the health hazard, Senator, but I do know that there are some containers that were holding yellowcake that were taken by local people. The yellowcake was dumped out of it and the containers were being used to hold water, which, of course, creates a radiological hazard for the people who are drinking that water. The containers have all been recovered, and there are medical teams onsite trying to assist with determining what, if any, contamination the local people contracted.

Senator DODD. Thank you for that, and any more information on that, I am sure the Armed Services Committee would be interested, and we would be as well, I think, in this committee.

And I do not know if it is the major rationale, one of the major rationales for taking military action in Iraq was obviously the weapons of mass destruction, and so I appreciate the news that we are allowing them to come back in, but it seems to me it should have been a higher priority to some degree, given their knowledge, and the possible loss of some of these materials to terrorist States or terrorist organizations and groups is disturbing, but I am heartened to know that they are moving back in.

Quickly again, and I do not know how much time we have here, but I would like to ask you as well about the looting that is going on, and what we sort of anticipated here? Obviously, we have all read the stories about the archaeological losses, the museums, the libraries. In fact, I am told that the destruction as a result of looting exceeds the destruction that was caused by the bombing during the phase of the war, and I wonder if, No. 1, did we anticipate that this might be a problem following the collapse of the regime?

I am told that there were warnings that we received from archaeologists and others that this might occur prior to the actual commencement of hostilities, and if there were warnings, why were not they heeded, or at least apparently not heeded, and I wonder if you might share with us whatever discussion might have taken place, now that it is after the fact, in planning for this, to the extent we thought this might be a problem, and what steps we were going to take to address it.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Let me speak specifically to the museum and ask General Pace to speak to the larger issue of how the military planning anticipated this issue.

We had a lot of information from archaeologists about cultural sites in Iraq which was frankly, to the best of my knowledge, fed in primarily to our people doing targeting to make sure that we did not damage those sites mistakenly. The museum is still a little bit of a mystery, and I do not think we have gotten to the bottom of it yet, but one member of a foreign embassy in Baghdad who tried to visit the museum some 3 weeks before the war was told that the museum was closed and most of the artifacts had been put into storage, and looking through the doors of the museum it looked to him as though most stuff had been put away, which would suggest that whatever happened to it afterwards was something other than a straightforward looting job.

The good news is that through a combination of rewards and border controls and just straightforward cooperation from Iraqi people I am told we have now recovered all but 38 of the objects, which is a pretty good record, and obviously we would still like to get the rest of them.

The museum story got, understandably, a special amount of attention, I think like some of the other—I am not saying there is not a great deal of random looting. Clearly, in the initial days some of the looting was by people who were just furious at the regime, and it was a chance to strike back at the regime.

The disturbing point which I make in my testimony is, I think today there is clear evidence that some of the looting is aimed deliberately at sabotaging reconstruction efforts, that it has no economic purpose, but it looks to be organized by Baathist elements supporting the old regime.

General Pace, do you want to comment on the military planning?

Senator DODD. Yes, was this anticipated in any way, general?

General PACE. Sir, this was, and it was in combination with many things that we tried to plan for. Looting was one, Shia versus Shia, Shia versus Sunni, Sunni versus Sunni killings was another, the oil fields being destroyed and how to avoid that was another, the weapons of mass destruction was still another.

So at the end of the day, when General Franks made his recommendations to the Secretary and to the President, he had to balance between a force size that he was comfortable was sufficient to complete the military campaign, but one that may not have been sufficient to completely pulse the entire nation at one time as far as stability was concerned, but on balance, the fact that the speed of the assault and the accuracy and the precision of the bombing on balance, the fact that you did not have the oil fields destroyed, you did not have weapons shot at neighboring countries, the fact that you were able to quickly get into Baghdad, that we did not have to bomb Baghdad mercilessly for days on end, because we were able to get in quickly with a relatively small force, that outweighed the concerns of not having initially enough forces on the ground to prevent things like looting.

Senator DODD. My time is up, but what I am hearing you saying, in other words, there was an argument being made as proposals were put on the table that this debate that we all read about at the time, the argument over a larger or a smaller force, that, in fact, the argument for a larger force would have been, we would be better able to deal with the after-conflict consequences such as

this, but a decision was made for the smaller force, recognizing that as a result of that we probably would not be in a position then to deal with some of the anticipated problems that we should have been—

General PACE. To my knowledge, that was all part of the fabric of the discussion, and we could still be right now adding forces into Kuwait, waiting for the attack, if we wanted to be able to have enough forces to be able to do everything that we thought we might have to do. Fortunately, we did not have to do a lot of the things we thought we might have to do. We ended up having to do the piece with looting, but on balance militarily the amount of death and destruction that was caused by going early is so much less than what we would be doing now had we gone in with a larger force and had we given him time to think through his defenses. We moved so quickly that he never was able to react, and because of that we saved a lot of lives on both sides.

Senator DODD. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHAFEE. Senator Allen.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to congratulate the General and the Deputy Secretary, and obviously our men and women in uniform for a magnificently well-done job as far as the military use of technology and precision-guided missiles. While there may be some who might be Monday-morning quarterbacking, I think it is one of the most historic changes in warfare. In the previous wars, you would pummel the population until your combatant would just give up, and that has not been the case here.

Now, in light of the United Nations resolution's success today, one of the previous questions raised the point of the cost associated with long-term reconstruction or rebuilding, or formation of some sort of a government, whether it is a federation, confederation, local up, which makes sense. That is the way our country was founded. It was first the States that then formed the union from a confederation, then to our Constitution.

Are we now exploring the option of including willing allies more actively in mitigating the cost to the United States taxpayers in this effort of constituting a new government and bringing the basics to Iraq?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Yes, Senator. We have actually been doing it even before the U.N. resolution, and maybe ask Alan Larson to provide more detail, but I think the different forms of assistance that were pledged were already beginning to approach \$2 billion. The passage of the U.N. resolution also should give us, or rather give the Iraqis access to frozen assets in a number of countries.

There is some \$12 billion in an escrow account in Paris under Oil for Food which has got to now be reviewed by the Secretary General to see—I imagine he will find that some of those dollars were committed to contracts to buy trucks to transport tanks and luxurious Mercedes for Baath Party officials, so I think there is some reallocation that can take place there, but I think most importantly the U.N. resolution opens the opportunity for much larger-scale support, including from the World Bank.

But Under Secretary Larson, do you want to comment?

Mr. LARSON. Thank you very much. As Secretary Wolfowitz said, we have been in active consultation for several weeks now with

both coalition members, but a number of noncoalition members about the importance of supporting the Iraqi people and reclaiming the country. There has already been very active international support for humanitarian relief. There has been very active support on the part of some countries for other elements of the program.

At this stage I think we really have cleared the decks to make a concerted effort internationally. The World Bank and the United Nations Development Program can be part of that by setting out a needs assessment that can be part of the benchmark of needs that can contribute to what Ambassador Bremer and the team on the ground are sizing up as the important development needs. We would intend to go forward very, very quickly now in assembling the international community to discuss those needs and to solicit contributions and cash in kind.

Senator ALLEN. Could you very shortly, because I want to get on to another point, state what percentage you think the United States will be contributing to this, and what will other nations' percentage be? If you do not feel comfortable saying it, please say so.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I really do not. In a couple of months we might have a better fix on that.

Senator ALLEN. OK. Fair enough. We will followup on that.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. We are really trying to have the last dollar come from the U.S. taxpayer rather than the first. That is the principle.

Senator ALLEN. As long as you have that good guiding principle, and I very much appreciate, Secretary Wolfowitz, the details of the lay of the land right now, some of the challenges and so forth. Here is where I think we need to go, and I think the President laid out the guiding principles in his speech earlier this year at VMI when he was talking about Afghanistan, and here should be our guiding principles in Iraq as well.

He was talking about ensuring that the people live in dignity to create and build and own property, to raise their children in peace and security. The President went on to say that dignity requires the rule of law, limits on the power of the State, respect for women, which is more of an issue in Afghanistan than necessarily Iraq, but still important in both countries, private property, equal justice, and religious tolerance.

Those are the foundational principles of individual rights, and one of those individual rights is religious beliefs, peaceful expression, private property, and then a rule of law where you get fair adjudication of disputes where property and other God-given rights of individuals are protected, and to the extent that we can bring out that idea, it is capitalism—you may say it is on the model, for example, of the Alaska Permanent Fund, or the concepts that Hernando deSoto talks about, capitalism for property, where people care more about their property, title to it, and the country.

When Secretary Powell was here recently I asked him about these sort of concepts insofar as oil is concerned, that—maybe it is not exactly like the Alaska Permanent Fund, but as oil and the fields were protected, as oil starts being produced, the concept of allowing the people to have a small dividend, it may be \$50, \$100, whatever it may be, to show that it is an asset of the people of Iraq. Have these concepts been contemplated and are they being

formulated? Because when one looks at a Marshall Plan, whether it was in Europe or whether it was what General MacArthur was able to do in Japan, those would be, to me, the models that we ought to be looking at. A lot of those are based on those fundamental principles of private property rights and having the people actually own their government and some of the resources.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. We agree with you that those are some of the most fundamental decisions that have to be taken, and I think—I am not sure if you were here when I mentioned earlier that Peter McPherson, who is a former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, president of Michigan State University, has taken a leave of several months to go out there to be the organizer of that whole effort, and it is huge. I mean, it really requires rethinking the whole property basis of a State that was national socialist, I suppose, in the fascist model, and also we talk often about the advantage of Iraq's oil resources, and the advantages are huge, but in many ways, oil is a curse as well because it discourages sometimes the development of other economic activity, which has got to be the real long-term health of the country.

So there are big issues there, huge issues. I cannot say they are sorted out yet, and ultimately, to some extent they need to be Iraqi decisions, but we would like to make sure that while we are there and before we leave that we have got it on the right course, because I agree with you, you cannot divorce those issues from the other fundamental issues of political freedom.

I might just say on that point, by the way, you mentioned religious differences. I was very heartened a couple of weeks ago I met with a group of U.S. Shia, several Iraqi-Americans looking like Shia clerics of Najaf or Karbala. One of them is the representative in North America of Ayatollah Sistani. Uniformly from all of them the message was, we as Shia do not believe in religion interfering in the State. What we want is freedom to practice our religion in Iraq the way we practice it here, and I must say I found them very sincere in the way they spoke.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I look forward to working with you in constructing those sorts of ideas, and to the best you can implement them there. It seems like some of those Jeffersonian principles at least have taken root here, and hopefully can take root there in Iraq.

Thank you.

Senator ALLEN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Senator Allen.

Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Deputy Secretary, General, Ambassadors, if this CNN report is true that General Franks is retiring, he is certainly retiring after two enormously successful military campaigns, so he has served us very well, and he happens to reside in Tampa, Florida.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. And he is a great leader.

Senator NELSON. Mr. Secretary, tell us, what is all the flap as to why General Garner is gone?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, he is not gone.

Senator NELSON. You know what I mean.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Well, I do. Let me say this. When we first approached Jay Garner in January to organize this Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs it was not even necessarily with the notion that he himself would go to Iraq, but from the beginning we said, there is a function we would like you to perform which is getting a team up and organized to make sure that the ministries can run properly and basic services can be delivered, but there is going to be a senior civilian in charge of the whole operation, and particularly with a focus on the political side of the process.

That was envisioned from the beginning, and so we did not appoint Ambassador Bremer because of any dissatisfaction with Jay Garner. He has been doing a magnificent job and we hope he will stay for sometime more.

Senator NELSON. Would you like to inform the committee of anything that you might know in the hunt for Captain Scott Speicher?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. He is one of the important priorities. We are searching for information about him. I wish I could tell you that we have found a lot. We have had one trace here and another trace there, but that seems to be the extent of it. We are deploying, I think—General Pace, is it right now, or shortly—something we call the Iraq Survey Group, which is a team led by Major General Dayton of some 1,500 people focused on searching for information about weapons of mass destruction, information about terrorists, documentation of war crimes, and specifically looking for Commander Speicher, so we will keep—I think the key to finding almost all of this stuff is going to be finding Iraqis who will talk to us, and creating the conditions under which they have the right incentives to talk.

Senator NELSON. Prior to the deployment of this team that you are talking about, how many people are searching for Speicher?

General PACE. Sir, I might be able to help on that. Captain Speicher's whereabouts was a top priority from day one. We have chased down every lead we have gotten. It is one of the things we are interrogating our detainees and our prisoners about, so it is not the number of teams, sir. It is just that every time we get a bit of information, General Franks and his folks on the ground send a team to wherever it is to find out, so we are doing it as quickly—it is not a matter of manpower, sir, it is a matter of leads, and the interrogation teams have that as one of their prime objectives when they are questioning people.

Senator NELSON. General, I might offer for you and the Deputy Secretary to consider, it has been, as you said, a couple of months, I do not know how many days you said since we have been in there, and what might be helpful is you, and I know exactly how many people that we have in there, and I am concerned that we do not have enough.

I do know that it was clearly a priority for General Franks, and I have thanked him personally for that, but I think what you have is some people who have been detailed, that you might want to get some higher-visibility leadership specifically tasked with regard to Captain Speicher.

Needless to say, you know, it is a downer every day that we do not get any information, and I am hoping that that cell where they found his initials is going to render some kind of forensic evidence.

Mr. Secretary, how many of the 55 top leaders have we now in custody?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think the number just went up to 25 or 26. General PACE. Yes, sir. I think 25 alive, one confirmed dead.

Senator NELSON. So 26 of the 55 we have accounted for?

General PACE. Yes, sir.

Senator NELSON. Can you explain to the committee what it is, the conditions that would allow the remaining 29 to be at large, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think that it is the same conditions that allow armed groups, the Baathists to continue sabotaging key facilities, attacking our people. I assume these folks are hiding in neighborhoods or areas where for one reason or another the local residents are prepared to protect them and shelter them, either out of sympathy or out of fear, or maybe some combination of both.

In a country that large, I mean, Baghdad is a city the size of Los Angeles, and to me it is not surprising that it takes some time to root them out.

I hope that success builds on success, and as more of these people are detained, and as the population begins to recognize that the Baathists are being brought under control, that the fear factor will start to eliminate, and then we will have people turning these folks in.

Senator NELSON. Including Saddam Hussein?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. If he is alive. We do not know.

Senator NELSON. What would you characterize as the level of co-operation with the President of Syria and the Government of Syria?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think I should leave that to the State Department, but let me put it this way, the most destabilizing activities that Syria was engaged in in Iraq a few weeks ago have stopped. Beyond that—Al, do you want to—

Mr. LARSON. I would just make the very simple statement, Senator, that when Secretary Powell was there, he had a very, very explicit conversation about the way in which the world and the region had changed, and the importance of the leadership there in recognizing that change and making the right choices, and it was not just a general conversation, it was very specific about a number of areas where we have concerns.

At this stage I think we are in the let us wait and see exactly how they respond to that message.

General PACE. Senator, we are out of time, sir, and I apologize, but I would be remiss as a military man if I did not thank you for what you are doing to try to find Captain Speicher, and your very intense, sustained interest in his case, sir, and all of us in uniform appreciate the fact that you are not giving up, and neither are we, sir.

Senator NELSON. And I thank you. The family, of course, is from Jacksonville, and you can imagine what the family has been going through, not just recently, but for over 12 years, and, of course, one of the greatest military principles that you have as a commander

is, you do not leave a downed pilot. You go and try to get him, and through a series of mistakes we left a downed pilot.

And then when we asked for prisoners of war we did not even ask for him. They asked for remains, and of course Iraq did not have remains, they had the prisoner, and so through one series of mistakes after another we are where we are, and that is why I think it is an important principle to follow.

Thank you, general. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. And thank you, Senator Nelson. I thank you, too, General Pace, for commending our colleague. It is certainly important.

I am going to recognize Senator Feingold in a moment. Let me try to explain to the remaining Senators and those of you who are with us that some compromises were made. Some roll call votes have been forgone, but one is in process now that was unavoidable, and we really do not know what the prospects are for the future, but nevertheless we will have a hiatus, I think, of that type of activity and our colleagues will return, but I believe Senator Feingold has voted, as I have, and so we are here, and I will recognize my colleague, Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much, and I want to thank Secretary Wolfowitz and everybody for staying here.

Let me first return to a comment that Senator Biden made when he started his questions, where he talked about the Bosnia commitment. I remember it well. I voted against the Bosnia action because I did not believe this idea that the American people were promised we would be there for 1 year, and it is really quite something to hear the fact that we have been there for 8 years cited as a plus. I understand why you say it, but the problem is that that mission was sold to the American people on the basis that those men and women would be home by the Christmas of 1996. I knew it would not happen that way, and it is funny how these things just sort of get lost in the mist of time.

Now, I give you credit, you did not give a specific time commitment with regard to Iraq, but the problem is that the American people I think were led to believe that it would not be a terribly long time commitment. I am suspicious, as Senator Biden is, that this may, in fact, be a very, very long commitment, and I agree with him that our constituents were not really prepared for that, and that is how it was sold in part to the American people.

Speaking of how things are sold, I am struck by the fact that after 2 hours, well over 2 hours of a hearing that is about stabilizing and reconstructing Iraq, we have heard quite a bit about reconstruction, and I do agree with the chairman that you did give an all-points view of the reconstruction, but for over 2 hours, until Senator Dodd apparently mentioned weapons of mass destruction, there was no conversation about stabilizing that aspect of Iraq. That is why I say this is about speaking of how things are sold, because there can be no doubt that the preeminent reason why this Congress voted to invade Iraq was in order to make sure that Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction were disarmed and that that country was stabilized from the point of view of weapons of mass destruction more than anything else.

So I do think that it matters whether or not we find WMD in Iraq. Most importantly, it matters because if those materials were in the country in the first place, and we cannot find them now, that is a security problem. Where did they go? Whose hands are they in? So I want to explore some of our efforts to date in this regard.

Just last week, the New York Times reported that the nuclear expert for the Army's Mobile Exploitation Team Alpha was unaware of any U.S. policy as to how to handle radioactive material that may be found in Iraq, material that could be used to make a dirty bomb. Does such a policy exist, and has it been disseminated to the troops on the ground, Mr. Deputy Secretary?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Pete, do you know the answer to that?

General PACE. Sir, the inspection teams that we have had on the ground are specifically trained to find chemical, biological, and nuclear, and they know that what they find is to be handled with the sensitivity that that kind of a potential weapon has, so it is not to be transported, it is to be kept where it is until it is determined exactly what it is as best we can, and then as we determine what it is, we will determine then how to proceed with its destruction or its transfer somewhere else, so there are rules that have been given to those who are searching, on what to do when they find it, sir.

Senator FEINGOLD. Are you saying this report is wrong, then, the New York Times is wrong when they quoted the Army's Mobile Exploitation Team Alpha expert that there was no U.S. policy on how to handle radioactive material? Is there a policy?

General PACE. Sir, I am not familiar with that report, and I am not sure how you are using the word, policy. What I am saying is, the military commanders on the ground have told their military folks who are doing the inspections what they are to do when they find materials that they suspect of being chemical, biological, or radiological.

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me try to followup with you in subsequent questions, but let me move on to on May 11, when the Washington Post reported that the group directing the U.S. search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq is, "winding down operations," after a host of fruitless missions. A more recent article reported that three of four Mobile Exploitation Teams have stopped hunting for WMD, and that all of the site survey teams are dedicating more and more time to work not related to the search for WMD.

I would like to know, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, if this is accurate, why are some of the teams wrapping up, given the fact that we have actually found very little of the material that has been catalogued as unaccounted for for many months?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, we are not wrapping up the effort. In fact, we are stepping it up. We are deploying something much larger called the Iraq Survey Group, which, as I mentioned earlier, some 1,500 people specifically organized for this task. I think the mobile teams—and I will ask General Pace to correct me if I am wrong—I think the mobile teams are, to some extent, going to be folded into that effort, but it is going to be organized and directed at a much more senior level by Major General Keith Dayton, and we are not dropping the effort. If anything, we are intensifying it.

But I think the important point to emphasize, too, is that at the end of the day, I believe the way we are going to have to get on this stuff is through information provided to us by people that know about it. That is probably going to be more fruitful than any number of sites that we can go through and dig up.

I think someone asked earlier how is it possible for some of these senior Iraqi leaders to still be hiding, and the answer is, it is a big country, and there are a lot of places to hide, and in the case of the weapons of mass destruction there have been 12 years of conscious, deliberate effort to hide the program, as indicated, for example, in the mobile trailers that we have discovered that Secretary Powell spoke about at the United Nations.

That is why, from the beginning of the U.N. effort, we put so much emphasis on giving the inspectors unprecedented authority to take Iraqi scientists and other knowledgeable people out of the country with their families so they could be interviewed in circumstances that were free from intimidation, and I think it is going to remain the key to finding out what has happened to Saddam's chemical and biological weapons and his nuclear program, having people who know about it tell us about it.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, does each team that is doing this have one Arabic speaker so the team can read the documents and signs and understand what they are looking at?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Obviously, linguists are one of the very important elements of the Iraq Survey Group. I can give you for the record the exact numbers.

We have also been making a serious effort to recruit through contractors and other sources Iraqi-Americans, of whom quite a few hundred are prepared to go out to the region and help us in a variety of tasks, and one of those they could obviously be very helpful on is translating documents and scanning through the large mass of documents.

Part of our problem is just the sheer volume of what we are collecting. Some of it is valuable and some of it is junk.

Senator FEINGOLD. I am pleased you are making those efforts, but what I would like to know, and perhaps you would have to tell me subsequently is, at this point, is there an Arabic speaker with each of these teams? I guess my time is up, but I would also submit for the record, Mr. Secretary, I would like to know what is the plan for securing the top 19 weapons of mass destruction sites identified by Central Command, and why were these sites not protected from looting.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The following response was subsequently received:]

PLAN FOR SECURING TOP 19 WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION SITES

The intelligence community in conjunction with USCENTCOM identified nearly 600 potential Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) sites in Iraq prior to the beginning of military action. These sites were rank ordered based upon the likelihood of finding WMD activity. USCENTCOM ordered CFLCC to secure the top 130 WMD sites as ongoing combat operations permitted. Site Survey Teams (SSTs) comprised of WMD experts from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) were embedded in maneuver units and were tasked to determine whether WMD or evidence of WMD were present at sites as they were captured and identified. In accordance with the USCENTCOM plan, security was maintained at sites with evidence of WMD or requiring further exploitation.

On 11 May 03 USCENTCOM ordered the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) to secure 22 nuclear sites. Only 2 out of the 22 nuclear sites were among the top 130 WMD sites because most were historical sites not assessed to have radiological or nuclear sources.

Some sites were looted after they were abandoned by regime authorities and before combat operations permitted coalition forces to secure them. It has yet to be determined whether any WMD materials were removed from these sites.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.

Senator Brownback.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank the panel for hanging in here on a long afternoon. I appreciate it—although some of you have not been working as hard as others, but I appreciate very much your being here.

Let me also say at the outset, as several others have said, fantastic plan and job. I realize you are still in a very difficult part of working with Iraq, but the military campaign, it appeared to me, not one schooled in military arts, but it appeared to me from outside to be incredibly successful.

I can pass on to you from Jacob Butler's family, he was a soldier from Kansas who died in action, and I have met and visited with his family several times—how proud they were of him and what the country has done, and they wanted me to pass that along personally to the President, and this is a family who has given the ultimate, and a soldier who was lost, but in a wonderful cause.

And I think you also provide the images that we all yearn to see, and that is of the face of freedom, and that face of freedom in Baghdad is the same as it is anywhere else in the world, and it is a beautiful face.

We obviously have plenty of difficulties. I have been in communication with people on the ground in Iraq. I know some of the difficulties that you are confronting, and I know you will work through those as well, although I think it is going to be a difficult time, as we are getting from this hearing.

If I could, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, yet again all on you in the questioning, and I apologize that I have been in and out some, but I wanted to focus on Iran and a statement you have got in your testimony that has been troubling me in the meetings that I have been having with different individuals. You note on page 10 of your testimony that Baathist remnants and Iranian-oriented theocratic groups constitute at present our main concerns with respect to the political reconstruction of Iraq, is what you state, and I have been deeply concerned about what is taking place in Iran, of the PUSH, the difficulty that they are creating for us in Iraq.

I do not know the degree in Afghanistan. I understand from Pakistani officials that the Iranian-backed groups continue to cause them concern in Pakistan. We had two newspaper reports of al-Qaeda operatives or headquarter-type figures in al-Qaeda operating out of Iran, and I would like to hear your thoughts and comments about, are we going to be able to stabilize the region and move forward with this much broader, grander vision of the spread of democracy in the region with the difficulty we continue to confront from the dictatorial regime that is in Iran, if you can give us any thinking about that, the problems it poses to us?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Well, as I did indicate in my statement, I think that is one of the threats to building the kind of stable and free

and democratic Iraq that we would like to see. I think that kind of Iraq poses a special challenge to the regime in Iran in two important respects, and it is a reason why I think it is an opportunity for us.

I think first of all, just the example of a free and democratic country next door is one that is likely to inspire the Iranian people, 75 percent of whom voted for opposition figures some 5 years ago, but the country is still run by the people who lost the election. That is part of the problem.

I think also it is important, and it is an opportunity if we are right in thinking that a significant portion of the Shia population of Iraq do not welcome the idea of theocratic rule, and if, as is the case, Iraq is really the heartland of Shia Islam, then that will be a challenge even to the theological basis of the Iranian regime.

I think for both those reasons they are not only ambitious about Iraq, they are kind of fearful about Iraq, and whichever the motive, we have seen evidence of the willingness to interfere, and that simply cannot be tolerated. We will do everything we can to prevent it, and the one good thing in all of this is my sense is the Iraqi people do not want to be governed from Tehran, or told what to do by some Persian ayatollahs when they think, as the Arab Shia, they are the ones who really ought to be the authority.

So I think we have a certain fundamental political sympathy on our side, and I think we will have to make sure that the Iranians do not use other means to try to destabilize the situation.

Senator BROWNSBACK. I really applaud your grand vision and work in the region that the road to peace is not through dictatorships but is through democracy, and the spread of that in the region. I think for the first time in 50 years we are on a path where you could see us moving toward true peace in a region where we have had conflict for an enormous period of time. It is a really tough path, but it is the one that actually can work. I applaud that.

I have put forward a bill—we have a number of Democrat and Republican cosponsors—called the Iran Democracy Act, and it states that it is U.S. policy to support democracy in Iran, and authorizes the use of funds for outside groups outside of Iran to broadcast into Iran, these private groups, and broadcasting messages of freedom and liberty, because it appears to me from what I am reading and the information we are getting that there is an enormous push from inside Iran for democracy, for a true government that represents them, and for a referendum supervised from outside Iran for a change of regime, for a change of government there.

I am not suggesting at all a military campaign, but really more of a campaign to help the people who are inside who already want to push toward a democratic form of governance. It seems to me we are going to have trouble stabilizing in the region, or that we are always going to have an irritant in the form of Iran, given the nature of this regime that is a lead sponsor of terrorism in the world today.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I find myself in great agreement, and I think the important point is, it is the Iranian regime that is the threat, not the Iranian people. They are a people who deserve a better gov-

ernment, and I think most of them recognize that what they got out of that revolution 20 years ago is a failed situation.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Brownback.

We will have further questioning by members who wish to question. I will ask just two or three items and then yield to the distinguished Senator from Delaware.

Secretary Wolfowitz, you mentioned the need for linguists, and this is a part of my general question. You have mentioned that Iraqi-Americans might be enlisted. To what extent do we have personnel in the Department of Defense, Department of State, or even elsewhere in our government who are really prepared for administrative situations, nonmilitary, but technical services that are probably going to be required either on the financial fiscal level or the democracy-building, the governmental side, and probably in fair numbers, and with a certain degree of linguistic ability, so that they are effective?

One critique of the current situation has been that there are not enough people, at least with language skills. I am not in a position to know. Among the 1,000 administrators you mentioned, 617 from our government and 400-and-some from others, what kinds of talents are encompassed by that group? It is a pretty extensive group already, but can you characterize either what is there, or what kind of training or what kind of resources are already in this country?

It is a different function from training people we get from the military academy, or even the Foreign Service situation, although perhaps both are helpful in this respect. In this nation-building in which business we are involved, there are a lot of technical aspects. Particularly if we are to be successful and to round it out, that would seem to be required. I am simply curious as to what kind of planning or thought has gone into the personnel.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Certainly I can say anecdotally that we have some extremely talented officers and enlisted people. I have encountered them in Afghanistan and encountered them in northern Iraq 10 years ago, more recently in Bosnia, where the division that is carrying out our responsibilities in SFOR today is the National Guard division mostly from Kansas and Kentucky, and it is interesting that for the jobs that are needed in Bosnia, Lieutenant General Kip Ward, who is the active duty three-star in charge, says the National Guard people bring some real advantages because they transfer skills from civilian life into the military situation.

I do think that one should not make the mistake of assuming all of these tasks need to be done, however, by people in uniform. And in fact, one of the things that we are trying to accomplish, and we have a major initiative here before the Congress now, is to be able to change the military, the DOD civilian personnel system so that some 300,000 or so jobs that are currently performed by people in uniform could be performed by civilians.

Part of that is making it easier to hire civilians into the Civil Service, and I encountered this recently when I made a major effort to recruit Iraqi-Americans to help us in Iraq, and I am happy to say the good news is we have been successful in getting some 150

people, including a guy who was a medical school professor at the University of South Florida, another fellow who is an engineer with Pfizer, very impressive people who have taken leave or left their jobs to go and help out in Iraq, but it was too difficult to hire them in the Civil Service, so they are hired as contractors, and we do an enormous amount of those work-arounds, because we do not have the flexibility to hire that I think would be helpful.

I think this challenge of having people who are not only bilingual but bicultural is enormous. I mean, it is great to train native-born Americans in these difficult languages, and we need to do more of it, but we have these huge resources here in the United States of Iraqi-Americans, Afghan-Americans, you-name-it Americans who are more than willing to help out, and we are trying to expand those opportunities. I wish we had a somewhat more flexible personnel system, because it would be easier. I can get you for the record some of the numbers and some of where we would like to get to.

[The following information was subsequently received.]

The response from the Iraqi-American community, and from Americans who speak Arabic, has been significant. Working primarily with the community in Dearborn, MI and through our Web site, "go-defense.com," we are in receipt of over 1,300 interest forms from Americans of all background, but primarily Iraqi-Americans, wishing to assist and participate in the reconstruction of Iraq efforts. Given the myriad requirements and tasks before us, these individuals would be performing a great service to the country for they possess all manner of civilian skill and language proficiency so necessary to our cause.

We are referring resumes we have received to many hiring sources—contract and internal. Our experience has been that we need a faster way to identify requirements and greater flexibility in our ability to place interested Americans against these requirements. To assist us in this effort—and more particularly to ensure a fair assessment of each candidate—we are enlisting the services of a contractor to review and verify the credentials of interested persons, and compile a source book for user entities.

We need to arrive at a state where the employment of heritage speakers in future operations and contingencies is second nature to us. We have one other initiative to recruit these Americans into our Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) as linguists. The Army is trying a pilot program for us, and is enjoying initial success. Since beginning in August, they have contracted 39 soldiers and have, as of mid-September, 455 leads, of which 157 appear to be pre-qualified. Programs such as these hold the promise of providing access to an important part of language and cultural expertise.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is important. I want to hear from you, Ms. Chamberlin, but will you also just for the record maybe suggest some legislative language that is going to expedite this?

This really is a major national security problem as opposed to simply a hum-drum personnel thing that in the due course of time we work out, and I think your idea is inspired. If there are that number of Iraqi-Americans who already have the language skills, the cultural background, and also the expertise that is going to help democracy or is going to help a waterworks run, or all the rest of it, we really need to lay hands on these. I sympathize with you tremendously that our own bureaucracy in its own hum-drum way, even while the world is falling apart, is still working out this and that.

I hope you know that we can be of some help, because although I am sure that this committee will certainly pile in behind you to try to get something done. It is very urgent.

Ms. Chamberlin.

Ms. CHAMBERLIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I know Senator Brownback would like me to do a little bit of work this afternoon, so perhaps I can help a bit here with this answer. We, of course, with USAID are members of ORHA and, in fact, our USAID Mission Director is double-hatted as the USAID Mission Director but also as the Director of ORHA, the pillar of reconstruction.

He is an Arabic speaker. He had been Mission Director in Jordan at one time, and that is why we recruited him, but that is not how USAID has tried to address this problem of how do we reach out for both Americans and people in the region, and Iraqis who have a lot to contribute to the effort that we are dedicated to, and in this case it is in the sectors of health, education, reconstruction and local government.

We have a mechanism where we reach out to the American private sector. It is a group that we have not really talked about it very much, but that plays an enormously important role in ORHA to deliver some of the objectives of ORHA. We do it through our contracting method. We are quite proud of it, but we reach out to the American private sector and they in turn subcontract to Iraqi-American NGOs.

We have several of them that are participating in this effort and we have, through our contracting, through the American private sector, they are hiring at this count about, well, several thousand Iraqi-American citizens in our effort in several of these sectors, so we are able to expand the pie.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. That is very helpful information. I just want to conclude by saying I appreciated General Pace's facts that as many as 18,000 additional military personnel might join the 145,000 that are there. Likewise, he added that there will be some troops withdrawn among those that were involved in the battles early on, and for that matter a lot of rotation, I guess, given the reserves and the large dependence on that, but that fact alone demonstrates I think something that most Americans do not realize, including myself, that, in fact, additional people in the military are going to Iraq presently.

There is the general view that a whole rush of people are coming out, that it is simply a one-way stream, which is totally inaccurate, but, you know, until you told us this, maybe others have picked it up somewhere else, we really did not know, and so I emphasize again our appreciation to you for sharing this information with us and with others, really, through this hearing.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Along those lines, I would like to request, if you think it is appropriate—I think it is in order—that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, in addition to making briefings available to us in a timely way, which you have committed to do and have done in the past, and I am confident you will do in the future, that you either in classified form and/or in open form in writing, give us your best estimates, because I know Under Secretary Larson was at this meeting today, on the potential of oil revenue in Iraq and whether we are really not going to have to take a lot out of our pocket in order to get whatever has to be done done.

I would like to have the administration's, and I am confident you have it—best estimate of what the schedule for oil production is, your timetable, your best estimate. That is, what will we have up and running in the next month, what do we expect to have up and running, what is our goal in the next year, what is our goal the next 3 years, how much investment will be required to get us there and how much revenue we think will be produced for the Iraqi people?

It would be very important to know that, because the vice president, a guy named Mr. Mackenzie from BP-Amoco today cited the numbers I gave earlier that some total, it is \$30 to \$40 billion direct investment. People are not going to invest if there is not security, et cetera. I do not know who is correct, I do not know what the rule, but I am confident—I would be dumbfounded if you have not gamed that out already and given your best estimates. For the record, if you would submit that, I would appreciate it.

Mr. LARSON. We would be happy to do our best to submit something of that sort.

What I did want to just say very briefly to give a flavor of it is that I think you had quoted a representative from BP as talking about the amount of investment that would be required to get up to 1 million barrels per day of export.

Senator BIDEN. And then up to 5 billion.

Mr. LARSON. Yes. On the first part of that, of course, Iraq was exporting at various times in the last couple of years a million barrels a day. In fact, we would go through a little crisis every now and then when Saddam Hussein would hold his breath and say he was going to cut us off, so our expectation, subject to further examination by the Army Corps of Engineers and the technicians, the Iraqi technicians, is that it is not necessarily going to take a long time or cost a lot of money to get up to a million barrels a day or more.

Senator BIDEN. Well, that is very useful, because I may have misunderstood, but Mr. Yergin said today and Mr. Mackenzie agreed—and I may have misheard him or misunderstood him—that to get there would require an investment of over \$1 billion now, to get to where they were at a million barrels a day.

Now, that may not be correct. If you guys do not know these numbers, we are really in trouble, we really have a problem, so I am confident you have a good estimate. But in 2 to 3 years we are talking about trying to get to 3.5 million barrels a day, and I am told a minimum requirement to get there would be a \$5 billion out-of-pocket investment by a consortium—it does not have to be by us, but someone has got to invest up to \$5 billion. And then they both said, two experts from two different organizations, that the objective of getting to 5.5 million barrels per day, which they have not had, but have the capacity to, would be a \$30 to \$40 billion investment.

I am not an oil man. I have no idea whether those figures are accurate, but it is very important we know that because most of our colleagues think—I actually have colleagues approach me on the floor and say, look, Joe, you guys in Foreign Relations keep saying we are going to have to put a lot of money into Iraq. Damn it, why do we not just take the money and pay for our own troops,

too, not only rebuild Iraq, there is enough money to pay for our troops.

So in case you all do not know it, not only the American public, but a lot of our colleagues think that once they turn the spigot on and we are going to be able to do it pretty soon, they think that man, we do not have much of a problem. That it is the furthest thing from the truth based on the people I have gone to and asked independently.

Before this morning's meeting that Wendy, you and I attended, not one person who has any knowledge of the oil business I am aware of indicated that is true, so I would like to know what you all think, because you have to have planned this. Your Marines and your military guys did something no one thought they could do. They secured those fields. They did not get blown up. They are there. You did your job, old buddy. Now the question is, can we do the rest of the job, and if we do it, what is it? It is very important for our planning.

Since my time is going to be up, and you do not know the answer, I am not going to ask you to comment any more, but the second thing I want to ask before my time goes by is, could you also provide for the record what the plan is for plussing up training, if at all, of police forces—not when we are going to need them, because at some point we are going to need them.

Now, it may be a week, it may be a month, it may be a year, it may be 2 years. If this were a military operation you would clearly have in train how you were going to get that number of military forces whenever you needed them. I would like to know what the game plan is, what your projections are, who you are training, who you are going to—whether you are training indigenous forces, how long it will take, whether you are looking for our allies and friends who have offered, I am told, carabinieri and others to participate, what you project, when you draw down, or when you think it is appropriate, general, for police presence to be there and what numbers you are looking at?

What is the game plan? As that old song goes, what is the plan, Stan? What are you looking to, because we have to be looking to what kind of money we are going to be being asked to appropriate down the road here.

And the third thing I would like to know for the record, what is your expectation, because you have obviously and understandably—it is not a criticism—had to recalibrate this. I remember speaking to the Vice President and speaking to the Secretary in a closed hearing and in an open hearing with the Secretary about the expectation—a reasonable one and again this is not a criticism—that there would be an infrastructure left, once we decapitated the Baath Party operatives within the police force and within the military, to stand up an indigenous Iraqi capability. I would like to know what the assessment is now of that possibility, what the timeframe is, your best guess, and we understand no one knows for certain, but you have to have a plan.

I would like you to be willing to share what you at the outset thought or at least indirectly acknowledged, and you gave us a good reason, Mr. Secretary. You said, we did not tell you our plans because we did not begin until January to make any, because we

did not want anyone to think that we had prejudged that we would go independently, absent the U.N. participation. I think that is kind of thin, but I will accept it.

You then told us that General Garner did not come to us when we asked him to come to us to give us a sense because you thought it was not appropriate at that time, and events overtook us, and that you want to rectify that.

I, for one, do not want to be on the other side of that glass looking in after the fact, being told that our requirements are something no one told me about, and I will end by saying there is a Wall Street Journal/NBC poll which goes to the very first point I raised, because we are going to have a hard time—I do not know whether this is going to cost us, sum total, a billion, \$20 billion, \$60 billion \$100 billion more, I do not know, but in the poll done by NBC/Wall Street Journal, support or oppose the United States spending up to \$60 billion over the next 3 years, that is \$20 billion a year over the next 3 years to rebuild Iraq, 37 support, 57 oppose.

I am confident if we told the American people now what it takes, they would be prepared to do whatever it takes, which leads me to the concluding point. I would also think it is useful if you would, for the record, state, and I will not ask you to do it now unless you want to, what the stakes are in Iraq. I have a clear view of what the stakes are in Iraq if we do not get it right. The chairman and I have both written about it. My good friend from Nebraska has a clear notion of what he thinks the stakes are.

I would like to know what the President and the administration think the stakes are for failure. What is it? We are not going to fail, but in order for me to convince my constituency to continue to spend this money, I have got to say to them—we all have to say to them, if we do not succeed, this is what will happen. This is what will happen.

So you have stated several times, you must have a notion of what you think is at stake. What is at stake here? I would like that in writing for the record. What is at stake?

And so there are my four requests, the oil projections, police training, if any, the schedule for standing up any indigenous Iraqis and what is at stake, and I will not try to take any more of the committee's time. I thank the chair. If we had time I would ask them to answer them now, but we do not.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the Senator.

[The following information was subsequently supplied:]

OIL PRODUCTION

In the past week, Iraq has been averaging 1.1 million barrels/day of oil production, which equates to roughly 600,000-700,000 barrels/day of export. Iraq should sustain 1.5 million barrels/day of production, and (at least) 1 million barrels/day of export, within one or two months, barring any major security problems. None of this will require major investment.

Our goal is for Iraq to reach 3 million barrels/day of output by the end of 2004, which translates into at least 2.5 million barrels/day of export. This would return the country to its prewar production capacity. It is estimated that it might cost roughly \$3 billion to reach that target. The Iraqi Oil Ministry has had plans for years to reach 6-8 million barrels/day of production, which some analysts believe will require 7-10 years and at least \$30-40 billion of investment. It is not part of our mission to help Iraq reach those long-term production targets.

IRAQI POLICE

As you know the Iraqi police service was terribly equipped and poorly trained. The CPA activity has focused on vetting, hiring, training and deploying Iraqi police forces and other security forces to assist in establishing a secure and permissive environment. The CPA has recalled to duty more than 27,000 police officers, is refurbishing police academies in Baghdad and Basra, is equipping 26 police stations in Baghdad, and in May began joint Iraqi-Coalition patrols. After extensive looting, CPA has had to provide virtually all equipment, uniforms and office supplies to stand up the police capability. In Baghdad, 33 police stations and 3 police divisions are now operating 24 hours a day resulting in a dramatic increase in daily patrols.

Rebuilding Iraqi police forces has been a challenge because the existing force was poorly trained, ineffective, and widely distrusted. But the creation and training of responsible public safety forces are indispensable to long-term progress in Iraq. To address the police situation, former New York City Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik was appointed to serve as CPA's Senior Policy Advisor overseeing the police, fire, borders, customs, and immigration organizations. Mr. Kerik's team recently completed a study that recommended the creation of a 50-80,000 member Iraqi police force. This force would be trained and supervised by international police advisors.

The CPA is planning a three-pronged approach to implement the recommendations of the Kerik Report. First is to re-equip and rebuild the police force, including the rebuilding and staffing of the three academies in Iraq. Second is to develop a training course for new police officers. And third provide a monitoring capability of police activities in the field and while undergoing training.

A detailed plan with associated costs is in the final stages of being completed that will meet the four-year goal of having a professional, fully trained force of 65,000 police in the field. Once that plan is complete, I will have my staff provide you a briefing.

IRAQI ARMY:

One of the CPA's major initiatives is to establish a New Iraqi Army that will help provide for the military defense of the country and, as units become operational, will assume military security duties now being performed by Coalition forces. The old Iraqi military forces disintegrated with the collapse of organized military resistance; virtually all installations and equipment that were not destroyed in the fighting were looted or stolen.

The CPA formally disbanded the former Iraqi military and security services and is currently working on the creation of a New Iraqi Army. The current plan is to build a force of about 40,000 members (roughly 3 divisions) over 2 years as the nucleus of the national armed forces of the new Iraq. The first battalion begins training this month. A U.S. company will conduct the day-to-day training under the supervision of a coalition military assistance training team, which will be commanded by a U.S. major general and will include officers from the United Kingdom, Spain, and other coalition countries. This team is leading the effort, including finalizing recruiting, vetting, and training activities.

It is our intention to build an Iraqi army that has officers who possess true leadership skills, takes on traditional Army roles such as border defense, and is truly a national force that represents the demographics of the country. It is our goal to have the first battalion in October, nine battalions by August 2004 and an additional 27 battalions by mid-2005 for a total force of 40,000 troops.

WHAT'S AT STAKE IN IRAQ?

If we don't succeed in Iraq, we lose the opportunity to—

- Provide another example alongside Turkey, Indonesia and Bangladesh that democracy can succeed in Muslim countries.
- Demonstrate a more productive way forward for the Muslim world, undercutting the appeal of fanaticism.
- Show to the region and the world that the United States is not anti-Muslim.
- Show that action by the United States will have a beneficial effect on countries that we engage in.
- Take a key step in combating terrorism, by showing the world that we will not tolerate regimes with WMD and ties to terrorism. Our actions prove it is the regime, not the people who they oppress, that are the target of our actions.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to recognize Senator Corzine, who did not have an opportunity during the first round of questioning.

Senator CORZINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate very much your holding this hearing. I think the demystification of this whole discussion on stabilization and reconstruction is something that needs to be vetted to the American public. It is certainly a question I get in New Jersey from my constituents regularly, and what we are doing is basically reading the New York Times or the Washington Post for information. I think this has been very helpful in addressing some of the questions.

I also want to join my colleagues in congratulating the military and Defense and others for the successful prosecution and liberating the people of Iraq. I think it is a real testimony to our Armed Forces, and I am particularly happy today to see the settlement or the agreement with the United Nations, which I hope will open many doors for shared responsibility with regard to the issues that we are talking about today.

I wanted to go to a question that is often framed in a political context with regard to the rationale of why we went to this war, but this morning I read the headline in the New York Times, "Pre-War Views of Iraq Threat are Under Review by the CIA," and I guess the gist of this is that television has presented one view, and is that really the view we are discovering on the ground, and my question as it relates to weapons of mass destruction is not really whether they were there, or we have a smoking gun, or any of those issues. It really goes to what is a deeper concern on my part, and I think a lot of folks, is the proliferation of these weapons.

I heard some of this in the question that Senator Dodd raised with respect to the raids, or dissemination of some of the nuclear materials, but might be even more threatening in the context of biological and chemical weapons. I am more concerned, do we feel like we are in a position to say that we have contained what we expected to see in Iraq, or has it already proliferated, which is a real question in my mind and a concern.

I am convinced that there is reason to believe that those weapons were there, or those efforts were there in place to develop them, but I think it raises a more serious question, where are they, and what do we think will happen along those lines? That is the first question.

The second question is, which really relates to this U.N. agreement today, and I am pleased to hear that it opens the door to the World Bank and U.N. Development Corporation and other elements. How about opening the door to the discussions on NATO not unlike what we have seen in Afghanistan?

I guess I would stop there. That is probably enough.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. OK, I might just say briefly, even before the U.N. resolution, NATO voted to provide planning support and other support, mainly just planning support for the Polish division that is going to be a part of the stabilization force.

Senator CORZINE. I was thinking more on the analogy of what is anticipated in Afghanistan this summer as more of a long-term—

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think the door is open to that. I was in NATO in December of last year and listed four tasks which then we expanded to six, where NATO could help in either the war or the

post-war, and the post-war was frankly highest on my list of both priorities and expectations, and there are NATO assets, alliance assets that could be provided, but I think most importantly that decision to provide the Poles with support they need I think is a very strong political signal to other countries that may participate either under a NATO umbrella or simply as coalition partners.

On your other question, which is obviously a very important question, it is very hard to answer what is going on in those things that we still do not know about. I know it is stating the obvious, but we do not know what we do not know. We are going to have to get more information from people who are involved in these programs than we have elicited so far.

I do think that we have cauterized, if that is the right term—we have stopped one major potential source of chemical or biological weapons, and that is this poisons lab, as it was called, up in northeastern Iraq that was under the protection of an outfit called Ansar al Islam, which seems to be an al-Qaeda branch organization, and it was connected to a gentleman named Zarqawi who is still at large, but who is responsible for the assassination of Mr. Foley in Jordan, who is apparently the man in charge of the networks that were—I do not know if they are fully detained, but that have been rolled up in London and Paris and in Milan.

He continues to be out there. We captured one of his lieutenants in Baghdad, and that production facility in Northern Iraq is under our control. I think most of it was bombed beyond recognition, and a couple of hundred of Ansar al Islam people were killed and a few were captured.

We do not know what has happened to the weapons of mass destruction, so I cannot sit here and guarantee you that it has not slipped out somewhere, or even that it might not be stored in some other country. There were reports that that kind of thing was going on before as well, but we believe it is very important to track this stuff down for just the reasons you say and try to get it under control so it does not end up in the wrong hands.

Senator CORZINE. Another question for me. Again, this demystification, I think this is one of the great reasons for this hearing, Mr. Chairman, is we hear much of a word that I hardly know how to pronounce or spell, de-Baathification, that we get news media reports that the coalition is working with some who may have been supervising the Yabu Gharib Prison.

I think the leadership of the Baghdad University has also been at least asserted in the press to have Baath Party leadership associated with it. It sort of is in conflict with what we hear is policy, and there are other instances of this. Is it the intent that we will look at each situation in its specific, or is there a real attempt to change the nature of that, some 30,000 folks that I hear mentioned in the leadership that might be important positions in society?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think the reason Ambassador Bremer issued this very tough and very clear decree, that—as really almost his first action shortly after coming to Iraq, was the feeling that is very important to get clarity on just those situations you describe.

I think the situation in the university and some of the ministries took place before he got there, before the decree was issued, and I think there has been some understandable tension between the

desire to maintain efficient functioning of institutions and the recognition of the need to root out members of the old regime, and bearing in mind that a lot of people joined this party fairly innocently, and probably mostly because they were given no choice, but what his decree singles out is the so-called full members of the Baath Party which even have very specific ranks associated with them, and that is where the 30,000 estimate is, as opposed to a million regular party members, and those are the people that it focuses on, and I think we may have to look at further steps, particularly with respect to those people who are actually guilty of war crimes.

Senator CORZINE. In the two specific instances, do you know if there has been a reversal?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think they were both reversed, and there have been some other reversals I heard about in recent days. That decree of his, or order, whatever it is called, clearly gave a lot of encouragement, and it is exactly what we hoped it would do to local people, to say, wait a minute, this is going on, the Americans do not want it, so let us tell the Americans about it and get it fixed.

Senator CORZINE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Corzine.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. We all are grateful that you are willing to stay a couple of extra minutes, that this will be soon complete and you will escape, so thank you.

General, I want to go back to just see if I can get a clarification on troop strength. I was here when you answered the questions about the rotation, recent question here about that issue. I read your testimony. Are we saying—and realizing this is fluid, and I understand that—that we now, I think you said have around 145,000 American troops in Iraq. I believe you said we are bringing in 18,000 additional troops coming from the 1st Armored Division. Is that right so far? That would put us up over 160,000.

Then you mentioned that there may be some rotation, I suspect from the troops, divisions, units that did the heavy initial fighting, 3rd Infantry Division, 82nd Airborne and so on, rotating out. Now, does that mean that you think we will be at a peak at about 163,000, if you are going to put 18,000 in, rotate some out? Where are we? Can you clarify that for the committee?

General PACE. I will try to, sir, thank you.

The 145,000 is the number on the ground today. There are 18,000 flowing into theater, and I will have to get back for the record of how many of those have already gotten in theater and are already counted in the 145,000, so a portion of the 1st Armored Division has already moved into Iraq and is probably already into that 145,000, so I need to come back to the record with precise numbers.

[The following information was subsequently supplied:]

As of 4 June 2003, 145,000 American troops were deployed in Iraq.

General PACE. When they were ordered forward the intent for them is that they were going to replace the 3rd Infantry Division, and that 3rd Infantry Division would come home on their arrival. Because of the situation General Franks and his commanders had

made the decision no, the 3rd Infantry Division will not leave yet, the 1st Armored Division will be added to the forces in theater, and when we, meaning them on the ground, are comfortable that we have got the right security situation, then we will rotate home some of the 3rd Infantry Division. So at the highest number, even if none of the 1st Armored Division is counted in the 145,000, then you are up around 163,000, but I think it is probably not that high, sir, maybe 160,000, 155,000 as a guesstimate.

What has also happened is, when the war began there were about 300,000, 310,000 U.S. in theater. That is about the total number in theater right now. About 66,000 Navy, Air Force primarily have come home, and 4th Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division have been added, so although the total number of U.S. in theater has remained about the same, the mix of ground to air and ground to sea has shifted significantly.

Senator HAGEL. But in country, in Iraq.

General PACE. And now the number in Iraq has gone from about 120,000 ground troops when we started the ground campaign to about 145,000 today, with an additional, guessing, 10,000 out of the 18,000 who are not yet counted.

Senator HAGEL. OK, so is it correct to say when that is fulfilled we are at about 150,000?

General PACE. About that, sir, yes.

Senator HAGEL. In country. Do you anticipate more than 150,000 in country in the next 90 days; that we might need it?

General PACE. There are no other troops on orders to the theater right now to be added to that pile, sir. That does not mean that they could not be, and the Secretary has stated many times that if needed, if the commanders on the ground, if General Franks asks for more, they will be provided, but he has not asked for more, and, in fact, he has said as early as this morning he is comfortable with what he has right now as far as ground troops.

Senator HAGEL. So that means you do not anticipate additional troops in Iraq?

General PACE. That is correct. Do not anticipate in Iraq additional troops from the United States. We do anticipate that the U.K. division that is being generated through the Force Generation Conference they held about 2 weeks ago, and the Polish division that is being generated as we speak, will be added to the forces in Iraq, and again, when they arrive, it will depend on the situation on the ground whether they are additive or they replace somebody.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

May I go back, Secretary Wolfowitz, on a question I had asked earlier when I quoted from the Washington Post, and if I might just take a moment to share with you continuation of this article, because I wanted to come back on this, and it is this. About the fifth paragraph into the story it talks about what we were talking about, Bremer's comments about selection of interim Iraqi Government 7 weeks away at least, so on and so on.

About the fifth paragraph down it says, "moreover, the interim government's responsibilities are still the subject of a disagreement between U.S. officials and their increasingly dissatisfied Iraqi allies." Is there disagreement within the administration on this issue?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Not that I am aware of. I mean I think any one of us can argue round or flat on this one. There are considerations for moving quicker, and there are considerations for taking more time, and that is why the President and Secretary gave Ambassador Bremer full authority to get on the ground and make his own judgment of what the situation was there. I think it is really important to stress that there are just enormous limits on what judgments any of us can pass sitting here, I do not know, 8,000 miles away, and much further distance in terms of knowledge and information about a very complex society, and that is why—

Senator HAGEL. But you would disagree with this story that there is any disagreement, there is no disagreement within the administration on this issue you are aware of?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I am sure you can find different views. My view, which I think is the correct view, is that there is an extraordinarily capable individual who has been put in charge to make those judgments, and that is how it should be done.

Senator HAGEL. Well, does that, then, lead to some understanding, better understanding as to why Ambassador Bremer got there? Was he in the original planning mix?

You went into some detail in your testimony about how much planning was involved, post-Saddam planning, and all of the sudden Ambassador Bremer shows up—maybe it was not all of the sudden. Maybe that was in your plans back in January—and Ambassador Bodine comes home, other people come home. It appeared at least to this Senator it was rather an abrupt switch, or change. That is not the case, or maybe you could help us understand, or help me understand it.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. It is not, and if I could clarify something, too, that I think was not clear in my statement for Senator Biden, we did not start the planning in January. We started in January with setting up ORHA. My recollection is planning particularly on dealing with possible humanitarian crises and dealing with possible destruction of oil fields started—I cannot give you an exact date, my recollection is July or August, and one of the outgrowths of that planning was, we were going to need some sort of civilian organization paralleling the military to do this kind of work, and to get USAID involved and do contracting and so forth, and that is what led to the creation of ORHA in January.

And I think I mentioned, maybe when you were not here, that when we approached Jay Garner about it, we already had in mind and told him we had in mind a senior civilian administrator over the whole operation who Garner would—actually, not Garner, because at that point Garner was setting up the office. It was not even clear he was going to deploy, and that that senior civilian would also be the person managing our end of the political process.

Senator HAGEL. But Bremer was in the mix early on?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Not by name, but by position, and—

Senator HAGEL. So essentially what happened there that appeared to be rather abrupt, was all planned?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. It was planned, and the effort, it was quite a systematic one to think about. I mean, the Secretary put together a list of criteria, then a list of some 50 candidates and narrowed it down, and then consulted with Secretary Powell and Condi Rice

and George Tenet. They all thought Bremer was a great choice, took it to the President. I mean, all of that was a two or three—

Senator HAGEL. But there were other people shifted out of there. I have got some of the names in front of me, but you had planned to shift some of those people out, too?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I have no idea. You mentioned Ambassador Bodine. I have no idea whether—my understanding is that the State Department wanted to reassigned her to other things, but—

One of the things that Ambassador Bremer has got to do is both grow and prune that office. I gave you the numbers in there; some 1,000 people there, U.S. and coalition. I imagine some of them probably are not needed or are not appropriate, and on the other hand we probably need more people for other functions.

Senator HAGEL. Although they were not there that long.

But my time is up, so thank you.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. But we learned an enormous amount each day that we did not know before about the situation on the ground. You know, the standard comment in the military is no plan survives first contact with the enemy. Believe me, no plan at all could possibly survive first contact with a complex civilian society like the one we see in Iraq, so things are going to change, and it may look abrupt, but it is a conscious notion that we need, and I might get myself in trouble with this description, but a senior quarterback out there to call audibles, because there is going to be a lot of them. And that is Bremer's job.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Hagel.

Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the panel again for their patience.

Mr. Secretary, you said on the first round of questioning that Iraq could be a model of democracy in the Middle East, and it might be fair to say that in 1979 in Iran there was a democratic revolution that brought in a virulent anti-American government. What would be our position if the Iraqi people wanted to elect not only an anti-American government, but a government that was opposed to our friend and ally, Israel?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. What took place in Iran 20 years ago was popular, and if you accept that as democratic, then you are in a realm of democratic that I do not mean and I do not accept.

Senator CHAFEE. Well, the—

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. This is important. I think we have said repeatedly—

Senator CHAFEE [continuing]. I think the etymology of—

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. No, it is more than etymology, I am—it—

Senator CHAFEE. Demo means people, I believe, in Greek.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. No, I know. That is why I constantly say a free and democratic country. We view, I think correctly, in this country that democracy is a means to an end, and that end is individual liberty and individual freedom, and that is why we do not think of democracy as just elections, not even—you know, it is more than even just, it is not enough to have one man, one vote, one time.

It is not acceptable to have a majority tyrannizing a minority, even if they do it by vote, so there are institutions, there are standards, there are rules, and I think that if we can create the condi-

tions where Iraqis really can express their views freely, I think partly because of the enormous diversity of that society and partly because it is hard for me to imagine that the 50 percent of the society that are women, many of whom are relatively educated by standards of developing countries, are going to accept any kind of theocratic tyranny, or that the Kurds or the Turkamens, or for that matter the Sunni Arabs are going to want to accept a Shia theocratic State.

There is a lot of pluralism built into that country, and as I think we have seen in our country, if it is structured properly, pluralism is a great force for liberty, so I think it may take some time, but I do not think one should anticipate the Iranian result in Iraq and, frankly, the Iranian model is a model of failure at this point, so I do not think it inspires anybody.

Senator CHAFEE. So you would say that if there were free elections, and a theocratic government—we would oppose—there are conditions on our vision of democracy, is that what you are saying?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think there are standards that people who participate in this political process need to meet. They need to be committed to protecting the basic rights of the Iraqi people. They need to be committed to the principle of equal justice under law. If they are held to those commitments, then I think they will set up institutions that have a reasonable chance of success.

There is no guarantee in this world. At some point they are going to be on their own, and people could abuse things, but I think we have a better chance here than we have had anywhere in the Arab world for decades, and I think a lot of Arabs—I mentioned the Moroccan Foreign Minister. I think there is a long list, especially of nonruling Arabs, who hope that this will be a successful model.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Just to followup on the point that Senator Hagel was making, the reason why some of us are confused is that 1700 hours, 11 April, 2003, General Garner's staff briefed my staff and other staffs here and presented us with a chart, a flow chart of authority, and there is no place on here not only for Bremer, for any Bremer-like person. Asked specifically who was going to be over General Garner as Director of ORHA, he said it was going to be McCarron, the guy on the ground responsible to Franks, and Franks. And so that is the reason for our confusion. We are not making this up.

That is why it looked to us like maybe you guys knew it, but you were a little bit of pea-in-a-shell game with us, because this is what was submitted by Garner's staff to our staff in an official briefing as to what the command flow would be, and so I would hope we do not have that kind of confusion again as to what you are going to do from this point on, because that was officially given to us, and I will give you a copy of it.

That is why we are a little confused. That is why it looks like a little bit of revisionist history to us. I am sure you are telling the truth, but understand why—we are not just looking to pick a fight—it looks like revisionist history based on not what we just thought, but what we were told as of that date.

And I remember we had Secretary Powell before us and I showed him that chart. I had to leave. The Senator from Connecticut, I gave him the chart. He asked the question on my behalf during his part, and the response from the Secretary of State was, this is news to me, and I am paraphrasing, but if this is what is intended, it will not stand, and we did not hear anything since then.

And then Garner was out there, and then, quote, from our perspective, all of the sudden there was this new organizational head, which I think is a very good idea. But I do not want the press or the public listening or any of you to think we are kind of looking frightened. It is a genuine confusion on our part caused by, as they say in southern Delaware, by y'all, caused by you guys and we asked from the administration, and this is, at least speaking for myself, what I was given. That is the only reason why I state it, because hopefully we will not go through this from this point on.

General PACE. Senator, I can help with just a small piece of it, if I may.

Senator BIDEN. Sure, please. Please do.

General PACE. Just a small piece of it, because you are correct if you did not have the entire picture, you did not have the entire picture, and what you see is what you got handed to you.

I can tell you for a fact that the entire time that this organization was being talked about, starting back in July or August and certainly in the January timeframe, when Jay Garner came on board, that all of us in uniform and out, inside the Department, understood that the plan was that there would be a senior civilian who would be picked, because it was important to not have a general in command in Iraq very long, so clearly for all of us in the building we knew that that was the next or preordained step.

The fact that you did not know is a bust on us, sir, and we need to find out how that happened.

Senator BIDEN. The reason I mention it, I hope this will not happen again. I mean, this is important stuff, and again, there is not a member of this committee—I do not think there is a single solitary time that has publicly been anything other than supportive, myself included, of what you have undertaken before and after in Iraq, and this just makes it difficult.

The second question I have, and if you do not want to answer it now, you can answer it for the record—there is an awful lot of speculation, and I think it is just that, that possibly weapons of mass destruction, at least some biological weapons from looted departments within Baghdad and Iraq generally may have gotten in the hand of looters and may or may not have gotten in the hands of terrorists. Let me be specific.

In the Tuwaitha nuclear site which was looted, there were deadly materials, I am told, that were taken from that site. And with our focus on WMD—and I do not want to embarrass, so I will not mention his name—when the military guy onsite was asked by an ABC News crew why he did not stop the looting, he said that he did not have it on his list as a place that warranted being guarded.

Now, this is a site that the U.N. had investigated, and our intelligence, I believe, had given the U.N. information a number of times that this was a sort of Iraqi CDC. The looters entered and took live HIV virus, live black fever virus, and as I said, the young

marine lieutenant in charge I believe told ABC he was never briefed on what was in the building, which is why he did not try to prevent the looting.

And so the two questions I have, either now or for the record, classified or unclassified, will be No. 1, was this on the list—because you said earlier, Mr. Secretary, there was a list. Everybody knew, the military personnel going into Baghdad knew the places. They may not have had the ability, understandably, to guard everyone, but they knew. It was not a surprise. So was it on the list, No. 1?

No. 2, if it was not on the list, what else was not on the list that got looted that we are worried about?

And No. 3, what is your classified or unclassified assessment of what was taken, and whether there has been any success in tracking down who took, if it is true, HIV virus and live black fever virus from that facility?

And again—and excuse me, no, there are two different places. The one place is the equivalent of the CDC in Iraq, which is the place from which the HIV and black fever virus was taken, and the other place was the Tuwaitha nuclear site, which was allegedly looted of deadly materials. I do not have a listing of the alleged materials that were taken from that site, radiological material taken from that site, and so there are two different sites.

Were they—the CDC the young lieutenant said was not on the list. Was Tuwaitha on the list, and what was taken, to the best of our knowledge, and what kind of danger does what was taken pose, if anything was taken, and again, you may want to do that in a classified forum, which is fine, Mr. Chairman, I believe by the committee.

[The following information was subsequently supplied:]

LOOTING OF WMD SITES

The International Atomic Energy Agency inspected the sites and estimates that ten kilograms or less of yellowcake material remains unaccounted for at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Facility. It is their belief that this small amount is not a proliferation concern.

Senator BIDEN. I have several other questions I will not take the time to ask, I will submit in writing, if I may Mr. Chairman, and close by saying that afterwards if maybe you, general, could hang for just a second, I do not want to give the location, but Mr. Mohammed, the young lawyer who is in this country now, is credited with saving Private Lynch. I met with him—he came to my home State—and I and I spent a little time with him. I presumed to ask him how his family members were.

I received a call today saying that he had been in contact with them. They are in a certain particular place in Iraq, and his father has a serious heart artery condition and needs some help, and I have a location where he is, so I would like to pass that on to you, and I am sure you will do the right thing and know what to do, because I do not, for certain.

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

Let me just say for the benefit of all members of the committee that the record will remain open until the close of business tomor-

row for the members' statements and questions. We deeply appreciate responses by those who are testifying today, or by those who are helpful to you in responding to the questions that have been raised publicly, as well as those questions that members may submit later today and tomorrow.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, can I ask unanimous consent with regard to a question I asked—the statement I made to the Deputy Secretary early on about the candidate Bush saying we should get out of Bosnia. I submit for the record the newspaper report. It was on October 25, 2000, quoting Dr. Rice, who was then his chief foreign policy advisor, and another insert of October 27 from the Plain Dealer responding to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Those will be made a part of the record.

[The articles referred to follows:]

[From The New York Times, October 25, 2000]

EUROPEANS SAY BUSH'S PLEDGE TO PULL OUT OF BALKANS COULD SPLIT NATO

(BY STEVEN ERLANGER)

PRAGUE, Oct. 24.—A promise by George W. Bush that, if elected president, he would negotiate the removal of American troops from peacekeeping duties in the Balkans and leave such work to the Europeans has provoked a collective sigh of anxiety and even weariness among European diplomats, officials and analysts.

These officials said the proposal, as expressed in the Republican platform, enunciated by Mr. Bush during a presidential debate and elaborated upon by Mr. Bush's foreign-policy adviser, Condoleezza Rice, in an interview with The New York Times, could divide the NATO alliance, undermine the current European effort to increase its military capacity and question the postwar rationale for NATO's existence, which has revolved around the Balkans.

Mr. Bush's idea comes at a time when Kosovo, which is run by the United Nations but patrolled by NATO-led troops, is facing a difficult and even explosive period with the fall from power of the Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milosevic. Kosovo Albanians' desires for independence seem farther away than before, and yet they trust Washington and American troops more than the Europeans, whom they see as pro-Serb.

Ms. Rice dug new ground with the idea that the American military should be reserved for war-fighting, in the Persian Gulf or the Pacific, while the weaker European forces should concentrate on peacekeeping at home.

"Dividing NATO into 'real soldiers' and 'escorts' who walk children to school is the first way to divide the alliance itself," said a senior NATO-country official. "President Bush decided he liked allies fighting alongside the Americans in the gulf war—the American people certainly did."

When questioned, no NATO government—including the British, French and Italians—would provide any official reaction, given the prominence Ms. Rice's comments have been given in the endgame of the American presidential campaign. The Democratic candidate, Al Gore, supported by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, moved quickly to use the Rice comments to try to cast doubt on the fitness of Mr. Bush to be president.

Any wariness by the allied governments was enhanced by the strong suspicion—expressed for example by Lord Roper, the British defense analyst and Liberal Democratic peer—that Ms. Rice intended her comments politically, to underline the usual Republican charge that, as he put it, "the Democrats get Americans involved in long wars."

Still, the Bush-Rice proposal is not new, but an extension of a doctrine put forth by Gen. Colin L. Powell under the last Republican president, Mr. Bush's father. General Powell's belief was that American troops would essentially be reserved for a real crisis where overwhelming force could be brought to bear, to ensure victory and limit casualties.

Ms. Rice also made it clear that any American move would be made after consultations with European allies, which means, the officials said, that an American pullout from the Balkans would be highly unlikely and certainly not soon.

Lord Robertson, the NATO secretary general, has regularly told visiting American congressmen that the Bush proposal could undermine the whole idea of "risk shar-

ing, which is precisely the glue that holds the alliance together," one NATO official said. "That's where we went wrong in Bosnia, and having corrected that error, it would be tragic to go back."

Nearly all of those interviewed made the same point. In 1992-95 in Bosnia, European forces were on the ground under United Nations auspices, while Washington kept out and kept NATO out, while undermining European proposals for a solution. "Different perspectives—being on the ground and not—led to different policy perceptions," one official said. "The problem in Bosnia was NATO's absence, not its presence."

When President Clinton finally committed American forces to Bosnia and NATO bombed the Serbs there, a peace deal was rapidly signed at Dayton.

A further problem, the official said, is the bipartisan American insistence on controlling NATO policy. "If you're not going to be on the ground, you can't expect to have your policy preferences prevail," he said.

Lord Roper said: "You can't not be present and want to call all the shots. Then we really are back to Bosnia in 1992-95. And the Europeans—and not just the French—will say that this idea of the Americans doing all the tough work and the Europeans mopping up afterwards is just another recipe for hegemony."

The officials and analysts said that another complicated issue is the role of Russia in the Balkans. The Russians have participated in peacekeeping in both Bosnia and Kosovo under the aegis of the Americans, in order not to be taking orders directly from a NATO general. If the Americans leave, who manages the Russians? "Washington will hardly want the NATO relationship with Moscow managed by anybody else," a senior NATO diplomat said.

Another common point expressed was NATO's own reason for existing after the cold war. The Balkans gave NATO a role, to defeat aggression and stabilize southern Europe; if the Americans pull out, what use is NATO?

The bombing war in Kosovo highlighted the gaps in European military capacity, and the Europeans have since moved to fill them with the European strategic defense project, which envisages a European force of up to 60,000 troops ready to move quickly into a Kosovo-hike crisis. The project is also intended to improve European capacity for troop transport, electronic warfare, jamming, surveillance and smart-bombing—just the kind of "high end" warfare Ms. Rice suggests the United States should handle alone.

Washington was initially wary about the Europeans wanting to create a counterpoint to NATO without the Americans. American officials continue to stress in speeches that the European project is intended for crisis management "where NATO as a whole is not engaged," but after alliance-wide consultation and consensus. French officials, too, emphasize that the European force would be used as an option after a NATO consensus, in areas where Washington does not want to be involved on the ground.

In this sense, there is an opening for the Bush desire to hand over peace maintenance duties to the Europeans. Already, in Bosnia and Kosovo, American troops are no more than 20 percent of the total, and under 15 percent in Kosovo alone. American aid represents no more than 20 percent of what is being provided in Bosnia and Kosovo.

But European officials say that a small presence is different from no presence at all. And if the Americans do not want to use the 82nd Airborne to escort children to school, as Ms. Rice said, then surely, they pointed out, the Pentagon can train some peacekeepers, too.

In Yugoslavia itself, Predrag Simic, an adviser on foreign affairs to the Serbian Renewal Movement, said that Mr. Bush's proposal is "another indication of American capriciousness in foreign affairs" and will only give the Kosovar Albanians a "new pretext to push for independence as soon as possible."

Both Europeans and Americans will eventually withdraw from Kosovo, Mr. Simic said. "But Washington has to take responsibility first. If America took up the Kosovo brief, if it bombed in Yugoslavia, killing people in the pursuit of its goals and values, then the least America can do is not abandon the region before it can leave behind a stable structure, and some sense of security and well-being for the people of the region. I'd like to believe that the Europeans can do that on their own," he said. "But I know they cannot."

Some officials interviewed argued that the risks in Bosnia now are so low that American troops could leave without any real problems, but that Kosovo is another matter entirely, given Albanian sensitivities.

But Lord Roper believes that it is Bosnia where Americans must remain, because the troops are there to enforce an American-negotiated peace.

One NATO-country diplomat said that the Bush argument for a better division of labor is a strong one, pointing to the Australian peacekeepers in East Timor, for

example. "But it is simply not realistic in the Balkans. The Americans have national interests in Europe and they play a deterrent role that is irreplaceable. NATO is not in Kosovo for the Kosovars, but for ourselves."

[From the Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), October 27, 2000]

BUSH WOULD REDEFINE U.S. STRATEGY IN EUROPE; TEN YEARS AFTER THE COLD WAR'S END, A RETHINKING OF THE U.S. ROLE IN NATO IS LONG OVERDUE

(BY CHRISTOPHER LAYNE)

Foreign policy finally has emerged as a campaign issue, sparked by the proposal advanced last week by Texas Gov. George W. Bush's top national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice. Rice stated that one of the first priorities of a Bush administration would be to have Western Europeans assume full responsibility for NATO's peacekeeping in the Balkans. Predictably, the Bush-Rice plan was denounced by Vice President Al Gore as reckless and proof that Bush is too inexperienced to be entrusted with the presidency.

But exaggerated, partisan criticism notwithstanding, this proposal aimed at a new "division of labor" within NATO, has considerable merit. Explaining the plan's logic, Rice stated: "This comes down to function. Carrying out civil administration and police functions is simply going to degrade the American capability to do the things America has to do" in regions outside Europe where the United States has vital security interests.

At one level, the Bush-Rice plan can be seen as just another chapter in the 50-year saga of NATO debates about "burden sharing." Yet, these repeated calls for Western Europe to do more, so the United States can do less—for a more rational trans-Atlantic strategic division of labor—are the proverbial tip of the iceberg. Beneath it lurk fundamental questions about the often divergent geopolitical interests of the United States and its European allies; the proper scope and extent of NATO's role; and how the risks of defending the alliance's members from external threat should be shared.

Western Europe lacks the ability to keep peace in the Balkans without American assistance. However, the European Defense and Security Policy has the more ambitious goal of investing Western Europe with the military capability to deal on its own with post-Cold War security threats.

Though professing to welcome EDSP as an instrument to attain a fairer distribution of the alliance's burdens, the Clinton administration regards this West European initiative as a threat to NATO's existence, and has warned the EU strongly that EDSP should not be used to promote a truly independent Western Europe. The administration's stance reflects Washington's similar long-standing ambivalence about Europe.

This fear is not without foundation. In 1965, Henry A. Kissinger, then a Harvard professor, observed that if Western Europe ever achieved political and economic unity and strategic self-sufficiency, it would be for the purpose of advancing its own interests, not America's. Although this is true, there is nonetheless a powerful argument that, in the long run, trans-Atlantic relations would be more stable if based on Western Europe's independence from, rather than dependence on, the United States.

If implemented, the Bush-Rice plan, which implicitly is linked to EDSP's success, would transform the trans-Atlantic relationship—and NATO—in important ways. The Atlantic alliance's original architects never intended that the United States would be responsible for Europe's security in perpetuity. They intended the alliance to be a temporary shield to allow Western Europe to recover from World War II, at which point Western Europe would resume full responsibility for managing its own security affairs.

Ten years after the Cold War's end, a rethinking of the U.S. role in NATO is long overdue. Historically, America's only strategic concern in Europe was to prevent a single power from dominating the continent's resources and using them to threaten the United States. With the Soviet Union's collapse, this specter of a European hegemony has disappeared. The continent's post-Cold War security concerns are quite different: nasty but small-scale conflicts such as those in Bosnia and Kosovo. Such conflicts do affect Western Europe's interests, but are peripheral to America's strategic concerns, which increasingly are centered on East Asia and the Persian Gulf.

The fact is that although Western Europe remains important to the United States, it is much less so geopolitically and economically than it was during the Cold War. Beneath official declarations of harmony, U.S.-West European relations have

been fraying for some time. Western Europe and the United States are locked in a bitter economic rivalry, and their political interests often clash. Most of all, Western Europe resents America's cultural and political dominance.

Bush recognizes that the United States needs to exercise its power with restraint, lest America's current geopolitical preponderance trigger a geopolitical backlash. Seen from this perspective, the Bush-Rice plan is the first step toward establishing a new U.S.-Western Europe relationship based on equality. As such, it should be seen as a potentially wise and far-sighted act of statesmanship.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to constrain members from more questions if you are prepared to ask them, but I think in fairness to our witnesses, who have been very, very generous of their time, that we will call the hearing to a conclusion, with, once again, great appreciation to all four of you.

We thank you, especially Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, for a very comprehensive and well-prepared, well-researched statement which all of us need to study and think through. We read it, and we appreciate having the testimony before we came today, but it has been fleshed out a lot more in our understanding during this hearing.

We thank you, General Pace, for your testimony, and likewise Mr. Larson and Ms. Chamberlin for the contributions you have made, which have been substantial, to this hearing. We will be hearing more from the State Department in subsequent hearings. We look forward to that testimony. As I have already announced, we will hold a number of hearings on Iraq. We will try to work with you, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, on briefings, or methods of bringing information to us that are useful and not unduly onerous as far as you are concerned. We will try to think through on our part about how to set up a process of dissemination of that material so that it is as useful and widespread to Senators and their staffs, and therefore their constituents, as possible.

We thank you very much.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, folks. Appreciate it very much.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing is adjourned.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Thank you. If I might just thank you for having this hearing, and repeat what I said at the beginning, of how much we appreciate the support the Congress has given us since the beginning of the war on terrorism, including the war in Iraq, and as all three or all four of you have said in different ways quite eloquently, the stakes are enormous, our commitment is large, and we look forward to working with you to sustain the support of the American people.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 6 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF HON. PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, TO
ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK

IRAQ STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

Question 1. Secretary Wolfowitz, beyond efforts to restore law and order, is the ORHA taking steps to protect vulnerable religious minorities? What are they?

Answer. The CPA is striving to protect religious minorities through the establishment of civil order and a representative government that recognizes and protects minority rights.

Question 2. Secretary Wolfowitz, is there anyone in the Bremer administration charged with monitoring and relating to religious minority groups?

Answer. An official in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) charged with oversight of the Ministry of Religious Affairs has the duty of liaising with religious minority groups. In addition, senior CPA officials have met with leaders of all Iraq's principal minority groups.

Question 3. Secretary Wolfowitz, has the Bremer administration or anyone else in ORHA made statements specifically aimed at dominant Shiite groups and militants warning them not to attack or harass non-Muslim minorities?

Answer. During meetings with individual leaders, officials of the CPA stress the importance of respecting the rights of all, including minorities. Additionally, the CPA plans to release a policy prohibiting the incitement of one religious group against another.

Question 4. Secretary Wolfowitz, will basic human rights including religious freedom be guaranteed without qualification for all groups and individuals, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, in the new Iraq constitution?

Answer. Iraqis will draft their new constitution themselves. The United States will work to ensure that that document will guarantee basic human rights, including religious freedom.

Question 5. Secretary Wolfowitz, will the U.S. advocate protection for these basic human rights in the new constitution and laws of Iraq?

Answer. Iraqis will draft their new constitution themselves. The United States will work to ensure that that document will guarantee basic rights, including religious freedom.

Question 6. Secretary Wolfowitz, will Islamic law be a basis for Iraq's new legal system and judiciary or will it be referenced in the new constitution?

Answer. Iraqis will draft their own constitution. I cannot say what the outcome will be as the final product will represent a compromise between Iraqis of widely varying beliefs and ideologies.

Question 7. Secretary Wolfowitz, what can be pointed to as a model for "Islamic democracy" that Prof. Feldman enthusiastically supports in his book?

Answer. Professor Feldman outlines a theory. However, the policy of our government is to encourage democracy, regardless of the ethnic or religious composition of any country. We hope that every nation will follow the road to democracy that Turkey, South Korea, Mali and Taiwan have.

Question 8. Secretary Wolfowitz, is it out of the question for Iraq to be a secular state or is it a foregone conclusion that Iraq will be an Islamic state as Prof. Feldman implied in his BBC interview just before going to Baghdad?

Answer. There is no foregone conclusion that Iraq will be an Islamic state. The constitution that determines the structure of the future Iraqi government will be the result of compromise between Iraq's wide range of ethnic and religious groups. Given Iraq's heritage and diversity, I am confident that even if the constitution makes reference to Iraq as an "Islamic state," it will protect basic human freedoms.

Question 9. Secretary Wolfowitz, if it is to be an Islamic state what protections would there be for Iraq's many religious minorities?

Answer. Given Iraq's heritage and diversity, I am confident that even if the constitution makes reference to Iraq as an "Islamic state," it will protect basic human freedoms.

Question 10. Secretary Wolfowitz, will the constitution drafting team include any Christian human rights experts (such as Habib Malik)?

Answer. We will recommend a broad range of experts to the constitutional convention and its drafting team.

Question 11. Secretary Wolfowitz, is there anyone in the drafting team who are expert in forging human rights guarantees within an Islamic context (like Khalid El Fadi)?

Answer. Again, we are recommending a large group of experts to help draft these human rights guarantees.

RESPONSES OF HON. PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD

Question 2. If it is our policy to eradicate terrorist networks of global reach, then what does it mean when U.S. forces sign a cease-fire agreement with a designated foreign terrorist organization, as they did on April 15 with the Mujahedeen Khalq, or MEK? Now we read that the organization surrendering weapons to U.S. forces in a reversal of the April 15 decision, but I would like some explanation of that initial cease-fire agreement decision. How do we make peace with terrorist organizations? What was the policy process that led to this decision? Did it involve agencies outside of the Pentagon?

Answer. U.S. policy regarding MEK has always been, and continues to be, that they are designated as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). The policy of the USG is to eliminate MEK's ability and intent to engage in terrorist activity and to prevent its reconstitution as a terrorist organization.

The April 15 cease-fire agreement with the MEK was an interim, tactical agreement that ultimately led to the MEK falling under the control of the U.S. forces and being disarmed. We did not make peace with this or any terrorist organization. The cease-fire agreement did not involve any agencies outside of the Department of Defense.

Question 3. Secretary Wolfowitz, what is U.S. policy now regarding the MEK? What are the terms of the agreement by which they surrendered weapons to U.S. forces? Where is the MEK leadership? Can you compare the MEK's status with that of any other designated foreign terrorist organization?

Answer. The MEK group that has fallen under U.S. control is being disarmed. We have also issued policy guidance to the combatant commander to screen individual members under the Article 5 of Geneva Convention to determine their status. After the screening, decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis regarding parole, etc.

We do not know the whereabouts of Massoud and Maryam Rajavi or other MEK leaders. USCENTCOM is aware only of the location of Mr. Mahmoud Baraei, the leader of the group under U.S. Control.

